Files
twenty/packages/twenty-server/test/integration/secret-encryption/application-variable-encryption.integration-spec.ts
T
Charles BochetandGitHub 7fa136f305 feat(twenty-server): migrate remaining at-rest encryption sites to versioned envelope (#20550)
## Summary

Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR
(#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and
migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer.
This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the
versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed
CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window
— every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently
delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload.

### Service migrations
- **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF
info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new
`decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for
the resolver display path.
- **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers —
**instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config
readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info
is `instance`. Updated consumers:
  - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap`
  - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials`
- **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** —
workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into
`decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at
execution time.
- **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`**
(workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the
secret/non-secret toggle.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are
shared across the JWKS.
- **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING
config variables.

### Slow instance commands (2.5.0)

Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows
into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained:

| timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId |
`"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance
| `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance |
`"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_
— heterogeneous jsonb column |

All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2
form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint.
Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint —
they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback.

### Tests

- Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the
idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope.
- New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts
`decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId`
(instance scope).
- Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`,
`ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API
and the workspace HKDF context plumbing.
- New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the
service spec.
- Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to
assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw
legacy CTR.

### Out of scope (future PRs)
- `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke
`jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key +
`encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own
migration.
- `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc`
`iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration.

## Test plan

- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier)
- [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token |
application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var
| jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable |
encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key |
encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass.
- [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86
tests pass.
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer
(each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the
migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
2026-05-14 06:10:52 +00:00

237 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'crypto';
import gql from 'graphql-tag';
import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
import { type DataSource } from 'typeorm';
import { buildBaseManifest } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/application/utils/build-base-manifest.util';
import { cleanupApplicationAndAppRegistration } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/application/utils/cleanup-application-and-app-registration.util';
import { setupApplicationForSync } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/application/utils/setup-application-for-sync.util';
import { syncApplication } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/application/utils/sync-application.util';
import { makeMetadataAPIRequest } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/utils/make-metadata-api-request.util';
import { buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv } from 'test/integration/upgrade/utils/build-secret-encryption-service.util';
import { SECRET_APPLICATION_VARIABLE_MASK } from 'src/engine/core-modules/application/application-variable/constants/secret-application-variable-mask.constant';
import { SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/constants/secret-encryption.constant';
import { type SecretEncryptionService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/secret-encryption.service';
const V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX = /^enc:v2:[0-9a-f]{8}:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$/;
const CONSTRAINT_NAME = 'CHK_applicationVariable_value_encrypted';
const CONSTRAINT_EXPR = `"isSecret" = false OR "value" = '' OR "value" LIKE 'enc:v2:%'`;
const V2_VARIABLE_KEY = 'TEST_V2_SECRET';
const LEGACY_VARIABLE_KEY = 'TEST_LEGACY_CTR_SECRET';
const buildExpectedMask = (plaintext: string): string => {
const visibleCharsCount = Math.min(5, Math.floor(plaintext.length / 10));
return `${plaintext.slice(0, visibleCharsCount)}${SECRET_APPLICATION_VARIABLE_MASK}`;
};
describe('ApplicationVariable encryption (integration)', () => {
let dataSource: DataSource;
let secretEncryption: SecretEncryptionService;
let applicationUniversalIdentifier: string;
let applicationId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
dataSource = global.testDataSource;
secretEncryption = buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv();
applicationUniversalIdentifier = crypto.randomUUID();
const roleUniversalIdentifier = crypto.randomUUID();
await setupApplicationForSync({
applicationUniversalIdentifier,
name: 'Test Application',
description: 'App for testing application-variable encryption',
sourcePath: 'test-application-variable-encryption',
});
await syncApplication({
manifest: buildBaseManifest({
appId: applicationUniversalIdentifier,
roleId: roleUniversalIdentifier,
overrides: {
application: {
universalIdentifier: applicationUniversalIdentifier,
defaultRoleUniversalIdentifier: roleUniversalIdentifier,
displayName: 'Test Application',
description: 'App for testing application-variable encryption',
applicationVariables: {
[V2_VARIABLE_KEY]: {
universalIdentifier: crypto.randomUUID(),
isSecret: true,
},
[LEGACY_VARIABLE_KEY]: {
universalIdentifier: crypto.randomUUID(),
isSecret: true,
},
},
packageJsonChecksum: null,
yarnLockChecksum: null,
},
},
}),
expectToFail: false,
});
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindAppForEncryptionTestSetup($universalIdentifier: UUID!) {
findOneApplication(universalIdentifier: $universalIdentifier) {
id
}
}
`,
variables: { universalIdentifier: applicationUniversalIdentifier },
});
if (!isDefined(findResponse.body?.data?.findOneApplication?.id)) {
throw new Error(
`findOneApplication after sync did not return an id: ${JSON.stringify(
findResponse.body,
)}`,
);
}
applicationId = findResponse.body.data.findOneApplication.id;
}, 120000);
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanupApplicationAndAppRegistration({
applicationUniversalIdentifier,
});
});
it('encrypts the value on the API write path, persists a v2 envelope in Postgres, and returns the masked decrypted value via the API read path', async () => {
const plaintext = 'v2-encrypted-application-variable-secret-value-here';
const updateResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation UpdateAppVariableForEncryptionTest(
$key: String!
$value: String!
$applicationId: UUID!
) {
updateOneApplicationVariable(
key: $key
value: $value
applicationId: $applicationId
)
}
`,
variables: {
key: V2_VARIABLE_KEY,
value: plaintext,
applicationId,
},
});
expect(updateResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
expect(updateResponse.body.data.updateOneApplicationVariable).toBe(true);
const [dbRow] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "value"
FROM "core"."applicationVariable"
WHERE "applicationId" = $1 AND "key" = $2`,
[applicationId, V2_VARIABLE_KEY],
);
expect(dbRow.value).not.toContain(plaintext);
expect(dbRow.value.startsWith(SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX)).toBe(
true,
);
expect(dbRow.value).toMatch(V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX);
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindAppVariablesForEncryptionTest($id: UUID!) {
findOneApplication(id: $id) {
applicationVariables {
key
value
isSecret
}
}
}
`,
variables: { id: applicationId },
});
expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variable =
findResponse.body.data.findOneApplication.applicationVariables.find(
(v: { key: string }) => v.key === V2_VARIABLE_KEY,
);
expect(variable).toBeDefined();
expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(true);
expect(variable.value).toBe(buildExpectedMask(plaintext));
});
describe('legacy CTR fallback', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
await dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE core."applicationVariable"
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}"`,
);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await dataSource.query(
`UPDATE core."applicationVariable"
SET "value" = ''
WHERE "applicationId" = $1 AND "key" = $2`,
[applicationId, LEGACY_VARIABLE_KEY],
);
await dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE core."applicationVariable"
ADD CONSTRAINT "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}" CHECK (${CONSTRAINT_EXPR})`,
);
});
it('decrypts a legacy CTR-encrypted value through the live API read path', async () => {
const plaintext = 'legacy-ctr-application-variable-secret-value-here';
await dataSource.query(
`UPDATE core."applicationVariable"
SET "value" = $1
WHERE "applicationId" = $2 AND "key" = $3`,
[
secretEncryption.encrypt(plaintext),
applicationId,
LEGACY_VARIABLE_KEY,
],
);
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindLegacyCtrAppVariablesForEncryptionTest($id: UUID!) {
findOneApplication(id: $id) {
applicationVariables {
key
value
isSecret
}
}
}
`,
variables: { id: applicationId },
});
expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variable =
findResponse.body.data.findOneApplication.applicationVariables.find(
(v: { key: string }) => v.key === LEGACY_VARIABLE_KEY,
);
expect(variable).toBeDefined();
expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(true);
expect(variable.value).toBe(buildExpectedMask(plaintext));
});
});
});