The v2.5.x patch tags (v2.5.0, v2.5.1, v2.5.2) were cut from main *after* #20585 bumped TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION to 2.6.0, so all three binaries report "2.6.0" in the admin-panel inferred-version view despite being tagged 2.5.x.
Restore the version constants to the values they had at v2.5.0 so v2.5.3 reports the correct minor version. Same shape as a pure revert of #20585.
## Summary
Cross-version upgrade fails at the 2.3
`DropMessageDirectionFieldCommand` stage:
```
[QueryFailedError] column ViewFilterEntity.relationTargetFieldMetadataId does not exist
at WorkspaceFlatViewFilterMapCacheService.computeForCache
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25929264129/job/76219964380)
Same shape as #20584 (subFieldName), one column over.
### Root cause
1. The 2.3 `DropMessageDirectionFieldCommand` builds a workspace
migration that deletes a `fieldMetadata` (the `direction` field).
2. `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run` walks the metadata cascade
graph and pulls `viewFilter` into the dependency set because
`viewFilter` is the inverse one-to-many of `fieldMetadata`.
3. That maps to cache keys → `flatViewFilterMaps` gets requested →
`WorkspaceFlatViewFilterMapCacheService.computeForCache` runs.
4. `computeForCache` does `viewFilterRepository.find({ where: {
workspaceId }, withDeleted: true })` with no `select`, so TypeORM emits
a SELECT that includes `relationTargetFieldMetadataId` — column only
added by the 2.6 fast instance command `1798000005000`, not yet run at
the 2.3 stage. 💥
### Why v2.5.0 / v2.5.1 passed
They didn't include #20527 (one-hop relation filters, May 14), which
added `relationTargetFieldMetadataId` to `ViewFilterEntity` and the 2.6
instance command. The CI base image (v1.22) seeded the DB, then the
v2.5.0/v2.5.1 container ran upgrade commands against an entity that
didn't yet know about this column.
## Summary
Cross-version upgrade fails at the 2.1
`GateExportImportCommandMenuItemsByPermissionFlagCommand` stage:
```
[GateExportImportCommandMenuItemsByPermissionFlagCommand] Found 3 command menu item(s) to update for workspace ...
error: column WorkspaceEntity.isInternalMessagesImportEnabled does not exist
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25929264129/job/76219964380)
### Root cause
Same class of bug as #20581 and #20583, one layer deeper in the call
graph.
1. The 2.1 workspace command emits a `commandMenuItem` migration (3
items differ from the current standard expressions).
2. After the migration commits,
`WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.invalidateCache` walks the
related-for-validation metadata for `commandMenuItem`, which includes
`objectMetadata`. That puts `flatObjectMetadataMaps` in the keys set.
3. `getLegacyCacheInvalidationPromises` sees `flatObjectMetadataMaps` in
the keys and calls
`WorkspaceMetadataVersionService.incrementMetadataVersion(workspaceId)`.
4. `incrementMetadataVersion` did a bare `findOne` on `WorkspaceEntity`
with no `select` → TypeORM emits a SELECT for every column declared on
the entity → hits `isInternalMessagesImportEnabled` (added by #20457),
whose DB column is only created by the 2.5 fast instance command
`1778525104406-add-is-internal-messages-import-enabled`, which has not
run yet at the 2.1 stage. 💥
### Fix
The function only reads `workspace.metadataVersion`, so narrow the
`select` to `['id', 'metadataVersion']`. No behavior change.
```diff
async incrementMetadataVersion(workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
const workspace = await this.workspaceRepository.findOne({
+ select: ['id', 'metadataVersion'],
where: { id: workspaceId },
withDeleted: true,
});
```
## Summary
- Added `color: ${themeCssVariables.font.color.primary}` to
`StyledPageInfoTitleContainer` in `SidePanelPageInfoLayout.tsx`
- The "Update records" title had no explicit color, so it didn't adapt
to dark mode and was nearly invisible against the dark background
- Now correctly uses the theme-aware primary font color
## Changes
-
`packages/twenty-front/src/modules/side-panel/components/SidePanelPageInfoLayout.tsx`
Fixes#20627
## Summary
- Cap password length at 50 characters in the shared regex used by
sign-up, password reset, and password change (both `twenty-front` and
`twenty-server`).
- Update the user-facing validation message on sign-up and password
reset to mention both the 8 min and 50 max bounds.
- Extend the `PASSWORD_REGEX` unit test to cover the new upper bound.
The cap also prevents unbounded inputs from reaching bcrypt, which
silently truncates passwords above 72 bytes and can mask user-visible
bugs.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth/utils/__tests__/passwordRegex.test.ts`
passes (8-char min and 50-char max).
- [ ] Sign up with a 51-character password — form rejects with "Password
must be between 8 and 50 characters".
- [ ] Sign up with an 8–50 character password — succeeds.
- [ ] Password reset rejects a 51-character password with the same
message.
- [ ] Existing users with longer passwords (if any pre-exist) can still
sign in (the regex only gates write paths: sign-up, change, reset).
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Context
The runtime create-field path and the v2.5
`NormalizeCompositeFieldDefaultsCommand` workspace upgrade both run
composite `defaultValue`s through `nullifyEmptyCompositeDefaultValue`.
The manifest install/sync path was the only write path that skipped it:
[`fromFieldManifestToUniversalFlatFieldMetadata`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/application/application-manifest/converters/from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.ts)
passed `fieldManifest.defaultValue` through verbatim.
For the SDK-emitted ACTOR system fields (`createdBy` / `updatedBy`),
`twenty-sdk` ships `{ name: "''", source: "'MANUAL'" }`. After the
runtime or the 2.5 normalize command stores them, the workspace row
holds the canonical four-key form `{ context: null, name: null, source:
"'MANUAL'", workspaceMemberId: null }`. The next install computes its TO
map from the manifest, still gets the raw two-key shape, and diffs it
against the normalized FROM. The dispatcher emits a `defaultValue`
update on each system actor field; the flat-field-metadata validator
rejects it with `FIELD_MUTATION_NOT_ALLOWED`, blocking every re-install
of any application that defines a custom object on a v2.5-normalized
workspace.
## Fix
Normalize composite `defaultValue`s inside the converter, reusing the
same `nullifyEmptyCompositeDefaultValue` helper the three other write
paths already share:
-
[`get-default-flat-field-metadata-from-create-field-input.util.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/flat-field-metadata/utils/get-default-flat-field-metadata-from-create-field-input.util.ts)
— `createOneObject` and `createOneField` GraphQL paths.
-
[`sanitize-raw-update-field-input.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/flat-field-metadata/utils/sanitize-raw-update-field-input.ts)
— `updateOneField` GraphQL path.
-
[`2-5-workspace-command-1778000001000-normalize-composite-field-defaults.command.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/database/commands/upgrade-version-command/2-5/2-5-workspace-command-1778000001000-normalize-composite-field-defaults.command.ts)
— the upgrade backfill that introduced the divergence.
After the fix, the four write paths agree on the canonical shape, so
re-installs are no-ops on system actor fields regardless of when the 2.5
normalize command ran. Non-composite types pass through unchanged.
## Test
New spec
`from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.spec.ts`
covers:
- Empty-name actor defaults are normalized to the four-key canonical
shape.
- The converter is idempotent: feeding its own output back in produces
the same result (so two consecutive syncs of the same manifest never
emit a `defaultValue` update).
- When the manifest omits `defaultValue`, the converter falls back to
`generateDefaultValue` and normalizes the result.
- Non-composite defaults pass through unchanged.
```
PASS src/engine/core-modules/application/application-manifest/converters/__tests__/from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.spec.ts
fromFieldManifestToUniversalFlatFieldMetadata
composite defaultValue normalization
✓ normalizes empty-name actor defaults to the canonical four-key shape
✓ is idempotent: re-running the converter on its own output yields the same defaultValue
✓ falls back to the generated default and normalizes it when defaultValue is omitted
✓ leaves non-composite defaults untouched
Tests: 4 passed
```
## CI gap that let this through
The integration suites covering manifest install (`appDevOnce` against
the test workspace) never re-installed an existing app on a workspace
whose composite fields had already been put through the 2.5 normalize
command. They synced once, then ran assertions on the resulting state;
the second sync that would have re-triggered the `defaultValue` diff was
never exercised.
If we want to catch this class of regression at the integration level
too, we'd add a test that (1) syncs an app whose manifest includes an
ACTOR system field with the raw SDK shape, (2) invokes
`NormalizeCompositeFieldDefaultsCommand` directly on the test workspace,
(3) re-syncs the same manifest, and (4) asserts no
`FIELD_MUTATION_NOT_ALLOWED` errors. The unit-level idempotency check in
this PR is the minimal version of that same coverage. Happy to ship that
integration spec in a follow-up if it'd help.
**Stacked on #20527**
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48995655-401a-4c35-8094-e88da8408bdd
## Summary
Surfaces the one-hop relation traversal added in #20527 through the
existing **composite sub-field dropdown pattern**. Clicking a
MANY_TO_ONE relation field in the "+ Filter" picker now opens the same
second-level dropdown that composite fields (FULL_NAME, ADDRESS,
CURRENCY, etc.) already use — populated with the target object's
filterable fields. Picking one (e.g. `Company → Name`) builds a filter
that serializes to the nested GraphQL filter the backend now accepts: `{
company: { name: { ilike: "%X%" } } }`.
No new components. The whole feature reuses
`AdvancedFilterSubFieldSelectMenu` + the existing
`subFieldNameUsedInDropdownComponentState` + the existing `MenuItem
hasSubMenu` indicator. Only the conditions that gate the sub-menu (and
the sub-menu's content for relations) were broadened.
## What landed
| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `ObjectFilterDropdownFilterSelectMenuItem` | Sub-menu chevron now
shows on MANY_TO_ONE relations (`isManyToOneRelationField` util). |
| `AdvancedFilterFieldSelectMenu` | Relation clicks open the sub-menu
alongside composite clicks. |
| `AdvancedFilterSubFieldSelectMenu` | New branch: when the sub-menu
type is `'RELATION'`, render the target object's filterable fields via
`useFilterableFieldMetadataItems(targetObjectMetadataId)`. Composite
logic untouched. |
| `objectFilterDropdownSubMenuFieldType` state | Widened to accept a
`'RELATION'` sentinel. Role-permissions sub-field menu narrows it back
out (it doesn't traverse relations). |
| `useSelectFieldUsedInAdvancedFilterDropdown` | New optional
`targetFieldMetadataItem` arg. When present, the stored RecordFilter's
`type` is the target field's type so the operand picker and value input
render the target's operands (`'TEXT'` operators when filtering
`company.name`, etc.). |
| `turnRecordFilterIntoGqlOperationFilter` (shared) | When the filter
targets a `RELATION` field with a `subFieldName`, synthesize a
field-metadata for the target, recurse to build the inner filter, then
wrap it under the relation field's name → `{ relationName: {
targetFieldName: { ...operator } } }`. |
`RecordFilter.subFieldName` stays narrowly typed as
`CompositeFieldSubFieldName` so the wide downstream consumers
(`shouldShowFilterTextInput`, composite handlers in the serializer,
etc.) don't change. The relation target field's name is stored through a
narrowly-scoped cast at the dropdown's storage point — the serializer
checks `filter.type === 'RELATION'` before interpreting it as a target
field name, so the cast can't be mis-read by composite-only code paths.
## Test plan
- [ ] Open a table view on People, click "+ Filter", click "Company" →
sub-menu opens with Company's filterable fields
- [ ] Pick "Name" → operand picker shows TEXT operators (Contains,
Equals, …)
- [ ] Type "Airbnb" → filter applies, table shows people whose company
name contains "Airbnb"
- [ ] Verify network tab: the GraphQL filter variable is `{ company: {
name: { ilike: "%Airbnb%" } } }`
- [ ] Same flow with a composite target field (e.g. `Company →
annualRecurringRevenue → amountMicros`) — should work end-to-end
(backend supports composite-within-relation; #20527 has an integration
test covering this)
- [ ] Composite fields (FULL_NAME, ADDRESS) still open their normal
sub-menu and filter correctly — no regression
- [ ] Role-permissions field-select sub-field menu is unaffected (it
bails out early on the RELATION sentinel)
## Out of scope
- ONE_TO_MANY traversal (no backend support yet)
- Aggregates (`people.count > 5`)
- Persisting relation-traversal filters into a saved view (ViewFilter
has no `relationPath` column yet; that's a separate slice)
- REST API DSL changes
- AI Tools
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
`RebuildUniquePhoneIndexesCommand` reuses each index's existing
`indexWhereClause` when recreating the physical index. For workspaces
whose unique phone indexes have a legacy clause like
`"primaryPhoneNumber" != ''` (created before PR #18024 hardened the
validator allowlist), the recreate path fails at
`validateAndReturnIndexWhereClause` because the clause isn't in
`ALLOWED_INDEX_WHERE_CLAUSES`.
Two workspaces are hitting this on the 2.5 upgrade:
- `3a797122-…` — `"companyPhonePrimaryPhoneNumber" != ''`
- `ea74716f-…` — `"phonesPrimaryPhoneNumber" != ''`
## Fix
Detect the legacy `"<col>" != ''` shape via a strict regex. When it's
there, before the existing drop+create, do three things inside the
workspace transaction:
1. **Normalize the data** that the legacy partial clause was masking —
`UPDATE "<schema>"."<table>" SET "<col>" = NULL WHERE "<col>" = ''` for
every column the index covers. Without this the next step would fail
because the new plain-unique index would see duplicate `''` values
across the rows the old partial clause was excluding.
2. **Null out `core."indexMetadata".indexWhereClause`** so the metadata
row matches what the UI would have created (`indexWhereClause: null`)
and doesn't carry the validator-rejected clause forward to any future
re-emit. Uses the same workspace `queryRunner` (Postgres lets one
connection write across schemas).
3. **Recreate** with an overridden flat index where `indexWhereClause:
null`. `createIndexInWorkspaceSchema` → `indexManager.createIndex` →
`validateAndReturnIndexWhereClause` short-circuits on null, no allowlist
check.
End state matches the shape a fresh "toggle unique in Settings UI"
creates: plain unique index, no `WHERE`, NULL semantics doing the
"exclude empty phones" work via PG's default NULL-distinct behaviour.
For indexes whose clause is already allowlisted (`"deletedAt" IS NULL`)
or null, behaviour is unchanged — just the column-list widening this
command already does.
## Summary
- Adds a new admin-only **Security** tab to the Admin Panel (alongside
General/Apps/AI/Config/Health) containing a **Signing Keys** section.
The tab is intentionally introduced now so the upcoming **Encryption
rotation** work can land as a sibling section.
- Lists every JWT signing key with key id, `createdAt`, `revokedAt`,
current/active/revoked status, and a **7-day verification count** read
from Redis. A trailing row aggregates **legacy HS256** verifications so
it is clear when the deprecated path is still in use.
- Lets an admin **revoke** a public key. Revoking the current key drops
`isCurrent`, sets `revokedAt`, nulls the encrypted `privateKey` and
clears the in-process cached current key; the existing lazy path in
`JwtKeyManagerService.getCurrentSigningKey()` then mints a fresh current
key on the next sign.
## Backend
- `SigningKeyVerifyCounterService` — bucketed Redis counter under the
existing `EngineMetrics` namespace. 1-day UTC-aligned buckets, 8-day TTL
refreshed on every increment, batched read via `mget`. Failures are
swallowed and logged at `warn` so a Redis hiccup cannot break auth.
- `JwtWrapperService.verifyJwtToken` records verifies **after success**
for both ES256 (`kid` as identifier) and HS256 (the literal `legacy`
identifier).
- `JwtKeyManagerService.listSigningKeys()` and `revokeSigningKey(id)`:
list ordered by `isCurrent DESC, createdAt DESC`; revoke is idempotent,
validates the UUID, invalidates the public-key cache, and resets the
cached current-key promise.
- `AdminPanelResolver.getSigningKeys` (query) and `revokeSigningKey`
(mutation) are both decorated with `@UseGuards(AdminPanelGuard)` so they
are admin-only, like the 35 existing admin-only methods on this
resolver. `privateKey` is never returned over GraphQL.
## Frontend
- New `SECURITY` tab id wired into `SettingsAdminContent` and
`SettingsAdminTabContent` (gated by `canAccessFullAdminPanel`).
- `SettingsAdminSecurity` / `SettingsAdminSigningKeysTable` strictly
reuse existing admin-panel components: `Section`, `H2Title`,
`Table`/`TableRow`/`TableCell`/`TableHeader` from `@/ui/layout/table`,
`Tag`/`Button` from `twenty-ui`, and `ConfirmationModal` mirroring the
queue retry/delete modals. Only one minimal styled helper for the
monospaced UUID rendering.
- `useRevokeSigningKey` uses `useApolloAdminClient`, refetches
`GetSigningKeys`, shows success/error snackbars (same pattern as
`useRetryJobs`/`useDeleteJobs`).
<img width="1293" height="881" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7cf98664-950b-4451-af85-27781a8e9a9c"
/>
## Summary
Closes#20565.
The Twenty docs package still pointed contributors at the removed
`mintlify build` command. This switches the docs workflow to a
`validate` command, which matches the supported Mintlify CLI command for
validating the documentation build, and updates the README wording to
match.
## Changes
- Replaced the `twenty-docs` package `build` script with a `validate`
script.
- Renamed the Nx docs target from `build` to `validate` and kept it
wired to `mintlify validate`.
- Updated the README validation command to `npx nx run
twenty-docs:validate`.
## Verification
```bash
$ npx -y mintlify validate --help
usage: mintlify validate [options]
Options:
-t, --telemetry Enable or disable anonymous usage telemetry [boolean]
--groups Mock user groups for validation [array]
--disable-openapi Disable OpenAPI file generation
[boolean] [default: false]
-h, --help Show help [boolean]
-v, --version Show version number [boolean]
Examples:
mintlify validate validate the build
```
```bash
$ npx -y mintlify build
Unknown command: build
```
I also started `npx -y mintlify validate --disable-openapi`; the CLI
recognized the command and began validating, but this Windows
environment could not finish Mintlify framework extraction because it
hit an EPERM symlink error inside the local `.mintlify` cache.
## Summary
- ECR Inspector flagged 9 CVEs on the `prod-twenty` image — 8 PostgreSQL
CVEs on `postgresql18-18.3-r0` (pulled in transitively by `apk add
postgresql-client`) and CVE-2026-27135 on `nghttp2-1.68.0-r0` (pulled in
by `curl` / `aws-cli`).
- Alpine 3.23 already ships patched `postgresql18-18.4-r0` and
`nghttp2-1.69.0-r0`, but the GHA buildx cache was reusing the stale `apk
add` layer because `FROM node:24-alpine` had not moved.
- Pinning the base image to `node:24.15.0-alpine3.23@sha256:8e2c930f…`
forces a layer cache miss, picks up the patched apk packages, and gives
Dependabot/Renovate a stable target for future digest bumps.
Applied to both
[packages/twenty-docker/twenty/Dockerfile](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/charles/trusting-solomon-259ec8/packages/twenty-docker/twenty/Dockerfile)
(4 stages → ECR `prod-twenty`) and
[packages/twenty-docker/twenty-website-new/Dockerfile](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/charles/trusting-solomon-259ec8/packages/twenty-docker/twenty-website-new/Dockerfile)
(2 stages).
## Test plan
- [ ] CI builds both images successfully on amd64 + arm64
- [ ] After merge + deploy, re-run ECR Inspector on the new
`prod-twenty` image and confirm the 9 CVEs
(CVE-2026-6473/6474/6475/6476/6477/6478/6479/6637 + CVE-2026-27135) are
gone
- [ ] Smoke-test the staging deployment (server boot, DB migrations via
`psql` in the entrypoint)
## Summary
Continues retiring `APP_SECRET` as a hot signing secret (after the TOTP
migration in #20577). This PR moves the last two cryptographic uses of
`APP_SECRET` off it:
1. **Approved-access-domain validation tokens** — was a one-shot
`sha256(JSON.stringify({id, domain, key: APP_SECRET}))` HMAC with no
built-in expiry. Now a JWT signed by the workspace `signingKey` with a
7-day expiry and claims bound to `approvedAccessDomainId`,
`workspaceId`, and `domain`.
2. **Express-session cookie signing** — was `sha256(APP_SECRET ||
'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')`. Now `HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY,
info='twenty:hmac:v1:session-cookie')` with `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
supported for rotation.
### Approved-access-domain — strict cutover
- `ApprovedAccessDomainService.mintValidationToken` issues a JWT via
`JwtWrapperService.signAsyncOrThrow` (workspace `signingKey`, asymmetric
ES256 with kid-based rotation built in).
- `validateApprovedAccessDomain` verifies the JWT, asserts `type ===
APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN`, cross-checks `claim.approvedAccessDomainId`
against the URL's `approvedAccessDomainId`, then re-checks `domain` and
`workspaceId` against the stored row. Any failure maps to
`APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN_VALIDATION_TOKEN_INVALID`.
- **No legacy fallback:** any pending invitation link minted with the
old SHA hash will fail validation and must be re-sent. Volume is small
and admins can re-issue from settings — this is the cleanest cutover.
### Session cookies — bridged cutover
- `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` returns an array
`[HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY), HKDF(FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY)?,
sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')?]`.
- `express-session` signs new cookies with the first secret and verifies
against any entry, so in-flight cookies signed under the legacy SHA keep
verifying until `maxAge` (30 min) expires.
- New `deriveInstanceHmacKey` HKDF utility uses a dedicated
`twenty:hmac:v1:` info prefix — distinct from the AEAD subkey prefix
`twenty:enc:v2:` — so HMAC and encryption subkeys can never collide for
the same raw `ENCRYPTION_KEY`.
- TODO comment marks the legacy slot for removal post-2.5.
### Notes on rotation behaviour
- Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY` while keeping the old value in
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` keeps cookies signed under either key
verifying. New cookies sign under the new key. After all in-flight
cookies expire (≤30 min), the fallback slot can be dropped from env.
- Rotating the workspace `signingKey` (already supported by
`JwtKeyManagerService`) keeps already-issued approved-access-domain JWTs
verifying via `kid` until their 7-day expiry.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit tests for `ApprovedAccessDomainService` cover: happy path,
JWT verify failure, wrong token type, JWT id ≠ input id, JWT-claimed
domain ≠ row, missing row, already-validated row.
- [x] Unit tests for `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` cover: throws
without keys, primary order (`ENCRYPTION_KEY` → APP_SECRET fallback),
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` placement, empty-string vars treated as unset,
legacy slot omitted when `APP_SECRET` missing, HKDF domain separation
across purposes.
- [x] `nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean.
- [x] Full test surface across approved-access-domain,
secret-encryption, session-storage — 78/78 pass.
- [ ] CI green.
- [ ] Manual smoke: boot with a dummy `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, confirm sign-in
succeeds (session cookie works), create + validate an
approved-access-domain end-to-end through the UI.
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
Prod 2.5 upgrade failed on the slow instance command
`EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand`:
```
[Nest] LOG [InstanceCommandRunnerService] 2.5.0_EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand_1798000005000 starting data migration...
[Nest] WARN [SecretEncryptionService] Decrypted a legacy unprefixed AES-CTR ciphertext...
[Nest] ERROR [InstanceCommandRunnerService] data migration failed
TypeError: Invalid initialization vector
```
### Root cause
The migration assumes every row matching `isSecret = true AND value <>
'' AND value NOT LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` is legacy AES-CTR ciphertext. In prod
we found multiple `isSecret = true` rows whose `value` is plaintext
(e.g. `SLACK_HOOK_URL = 'https://hooks.slack.com/services/...'`) — most
likely the result of `isSecret` being flipped to true on a row that
already held a plaintext value, or a write path that bypassed
`ApplicationVariableEntityService.update`. Those values can't decode
into the 16-byte IV that AES-CTR needs, so `Buffer.from(value,
'base64')` truncates at the first non-base64 char (`:`), the buffer is <
16 bytes, and `createDecipheriv` throws.
### Fix
Follow the same policy as
`EncryptConnectedAccountTokensSlowInstanceCommand`: anything that isn't
already in the `enc:v2:` envelope is plaintext. Concretely:
1. Try `decryptVersioned` — legacy CTR rows decrypt fine.
2. If it throws (mis-classified plaintext), log a warning naming the row
id and fall back to treating `row.value` as plaintext.
3. Encrypt the resulting plaintext into the `enc:v2:` envelope and
update the row.
In-loop `isSecret` guard is kept (alongside the SQL filter) so
non-secret rows are never touched even if the SQL filter is ever
loosened.
### Integration test coverage
Added one new case alongside the existing ones in
`…encrypt-application-variable.integration-spec.ts`:
- `treats plaintext-under-isSecret=true as plaintext and re-encrypts as
v2` — seeds a row with `isSecret = true` and a URL value (`:` and `/`
are not base64, so this is the exact failure shape from prod), runs the
migration, and asserts the value is now `enc:v2:...` and decrypts back
to the original URL.
Existing cases unchanged: legacy CTR happy path, non-secret rows
untouched, idempotent across re-runs, `up()` adds the CHECK constraint,
`down()` removes it.
### Why this is a 2-5 edit
`TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION` is now 2.6.0, so editing a 2-5 file trips the
`server-previous-version-upgrade-mutation-guard` —
`ci:allow-previous-version-upgrade-mutation` label is on the PR. `up()`
and `down()` are unchanged; only `runDataMigration` is modified.
## Test plan
- [ ] Re-deploy 2.5 to prod and confirm
`EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand` completes
- [ ] Inspect warning log to count rows that went through the plaintext
fallback
- [ ] Verify resulting secret rows all satisfy `value = '' OR value LIKE
'enc:v2:%'` and the CHECK constraint is in place
## Summary
- The upgrade runner calls `getWorkspaceLastAttemptedCommandName` twice
per workspace step. Grafana showed it averaging ~4.4s and trending
upward as the `core.upgradeMigration` table grows during an in-flight
upgrade.
- The old query joined every outer row against a correlated subquery
(`attempt = (SELECT MAX(sub.attempt) ... WHERE sub.name = m.name AND
sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId")`). Even with the `(workspaceId,
name, attempt)` index added in 2.3, each outer row triggers an index
lookup — fine for a few rows, painful at production scale.
- Replaced with a two-level `DISTINCT ON`:
- Inner `DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name) ORDER BY "workspaceId", name,
attempt DESC` walks `IDX_UPGRADE_MIGRATION_WORKSPACE_ID_NAME_ATTEMPT`
directly and yields one row per `(workspaceId, name)` at max attempt.
- Outer `DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId") ORDER BY "workspaceId", "createdAt"
DESC` picks the most recent row per workspace.
- Semantically identical; planner now does a single index walk + one
sort instead of N correlated lookups.
The same correlated-subquery shape exists in
`getLastAttemptedCommandNameOrThrow`, `areAllWorkspacesAtCommand`, and
`getLastAttemptedInstanceCommand`. They run far less often during an
upgrade (per instance step, not per workspace step), so they're out of
scope for this hotfix — happy to follow up if we want them too.
## Benchmark (prod)
Run over all distinct workspaceIds in `core."upgradeMigration"`:
| Variant | Execution Time |
| --- | --- |
| Before (correlated subquery) | **2979.659 ms** |
| After (two-level DISTINCT ON) | **1225.690 ms** |
~2.4× faster, and the gap widens as the table grows over the course of
an upgrade.
Equivalence confirmed: the diff query below returned `0` divergent
workspaces on prod.
### Variant A — original (correlated subquery)
```sql
SELECT DISTINCT ON (m."workspaceId")
m."workspaceId", m.name, m.status, m."executedByVersion",
m."errorMessage", m."createdAt", m."isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration" m
WHERE m."workspaceId" IN ($1, $2, ...)
AND m.attempt = (
SELECT MAX(sub.attempt)
FROM core."upgradeMigration" sub
WHERE sub.name = m.name
AND sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId"
)
ORDER BY m."workspaceId", m."createdAt" DESC;
```
### Variant B — new (two-level DISTINCT ON)
```sql
SELECT DISTINCT ON (latest_per_name."workspaceId")
latest_per_name."workspaceId",
latest_per_name.name,
latest_per_name.status,
latest_per_name."executedByVersion",
latest_per_name."errorMessage",
latest_per_name."createdAt",
latest_per_name."isInitial"
FROM (
SELECT DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name)
"workspaceId", name, status, "executedByVersion",
"errorMessage", "createdAt", "isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" = ANY($1)
ORDER BY "workspaceId", name, attempt DESC
) latest_per_name
ORDER BY latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name."createdAt" DESC;
```
### Equivalence check (returned 0 on prod)
```sql
WITH target_ids AS (
SELECT DISTINCT "workspaceId"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" IS NOT NULL
),
old_result AS (
SELECT DISTINCT ON (m."workspaceId")
m."workspaceId", m.name, m.status, m."executedByVersion",
m."errorMessage", m."createdAt", m."isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration" m
WHERE m."workspaceId" IN (SELECT "workspaceId" FROM target_ids)
AND m.attempt = (
SELECT MAX(sub.attempt)
FROM core."upgradeMigration" sub
WHERE sub.name = m.name
AND sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId"
)
ORDER BY m."workspaceId", m."createdAt" DESC
),
new_result AS (
SELECT DISTINCT ON (latest_per_name."workspaceId")
latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name.name, latest_per_name.status,
latest_per_name."executedByVersion", latest_per_name."errorMessage",
latest_per_name."createdAt", latest_per_name."isInitial"
FROM (
SELECT DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name)
"workspaceId", name, status, "executedByVersion",
"errorMessage", "createdAt", "isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" IN (SELECT "workspaceId" FROM target_ids)
ORDER BY "workspaceId", name, attempt DESC
) latest_per_name
ORDER BY latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name."createdAt" DESC
),
diffs AS (
SELECT 'only_in_old' AS bucket, o."workspaceId", o.name, o.status, o."createdAt"
FROM old_result o
LEFT JOIN new_result n ON n."workspaceId" = o."workspaceId"
WHERE n."workspaceId" IS NULL OR n.name <> o.name OR n.status <> o.status
UNION ALL
SELECT 'only_in_new', n."workspaceId", n.name, n.status, n."createdAt"
FROM new_result n
LEFT JOIN old_result o ON o."workspaceId" = n."workspaceId"
WHERE o."workspaceId" IS NULL OR o.name <> n.name OR o.status <> n.status
)
SELECT COUNT(*) AS divergent_workspaces FROM diffs;
```
## Test plan
- [ ] `npx nx test twenty-server --testPathPattern upgrade-migration`
- [ ] Integration tests: `npx nx run
twenty-server:test:integration:with-db-reset --testPathPattern
sequence-runner`
- [ ] Verify on staging that the slow query disappears from the
PostgreSQL Grafana board during the next upgrade run
## Summary
Prod deploy of v2.5.0 fails with a query failure inserting into
`core.upgradeMigration`:
```
query failed: INSERT INTO "core"."upgradeMigration" ("id", "name", "status", "attempt", "executedByVersion", "errorMessage", "isInitial", "workspaceId", "createdAt")
VALUES (DEFAULT, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, DEFAULT, $6, DEFAULT),
(DEFAULT, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, DEFAULT, $12, DEFAULT),
... (continues past $2515) ...
```
### Root cause
`UpgradeMigrationService.recordUpgradeMigration` writes one row per
workspace via a single `repository.save([...rows])` call.
`UpgradeMigrationEntity` has **6 user-provided columns** per row
(`name`, `status`, `attempt`, `executedByVersion`, `errorMessage`,
`workspaceId`), so the multi-row INSERT binds `6 * (1 + N_workspaces)`
parameters.
Postgres' wire protocol caps a single statement at **65,535 bind
parameters** (16-bit count). That gives a hard ceiling of ~10,920 rows
per call. Production has enough workspaces to overflow.
## Summary
- Bumps `twenty-sdk` from `2.4.2` to `2.5.0`.
- Bumps `twenty-client-sdk` from `2.4.2` to `2.5.0`.
- Bumps `create-twenty-app` from `2.4.2` to `2.5.0`.
## Summary
- Moves current version to previous versions array
- Sets TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION to the new version
- Updates TWENTY_NEXT_VERSIONS with the next minor version
## Checklist
- [ ] Verify version constants are correct
Co-authored-by: Github Action Deploy <github-action-deploy@twenty.com>
## Summary
After a user completes a multi-workspace social-SSO sign-in,
[auth.service.ts:988-1011](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.ts#L988-L1011)
issues a **workspace-agnostic** access + refresh token pair and lands
them on `app.twenty.com/welcome?tokenPair=…`.
[SignInUpGlobalScopeFormEffect.tsx](packages/twenty-front/src/modules/auth/sign-in-up/components/internal/SignInUpGlobalScopeFormEffect.tsx)
reads the URL param, writes the cookie, pushes them to
`SignInUpStep.WorkspaceSelection`.
The problem: if the user revisits `app.twenty.com/welcome` later (e.g.
ChatGPT pings `/authorize` and the global page-change effect redirects
them to `/welcome` with `returnToPath=/authorize?…`), the existing
branch is a no-op — the URL param is gone. The user sees the regular
email/SSO form and has to re-authenticate, even though the
workspace-agnostic cookie is still valid.
This PR adds a second branch in the same `useEffect` that handles the
"valid cookie, no URL param" case:
```ts
if (signInUpStep !== SignInUpStep.Init) return;
if (!hasAccessTokenPair) return;
loadCurrentUser();
setSignInUpStep(SignInUpStep.WorkspaceSelection);
```
Single `useEffect`, no `useRef`, no async then/catch. The synchronous
`setSignInUpStep(WorkspaceSelection)` is the gate — once the step
transitions, subsequent effect runs early-return. Mirrors the existing
URL-param branch's pattern exactly.
If the cookie is stale, `loadCurrentUser` triggers Apollo's renewal
middleware. Renewal of a workspace-agnostic refresh token is supported
end-to-end (verified in audit, see below) — if it succeeds the user sees
their workspaces; if both tokens are expired, `onUnauthenticatedError`
clears the cookie and the next render lands them on the regular sign-in
form. Same fallback as if the cookie had never been there.
## Behavior matrix
| State on /welcome mount | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| No tokenPair anywhere | Show sign-in form | Show sign-in form |
| tokenPair in URL (just bounced from SSO) | Set tokens →
WorkspaceSelection | (unchanged) Set tokens → WorkspaceSelection |
| tokenPair in cookie, access valid | Show sign-in form ❌ | **→
WorkspaceSelection ✓** |
| tokenPair in cookie, access expired, refresh valid | Show sign-in form
(Apollo eventually 401s on a query) | Renewal succeeds silently →
WorkspaceSelection ✓ |
| tokenPair in cookie, both expired | Show sign-in form |
`onUnauthenticatedError` clears cookie → fall back to sign-in form |
## Workspace-agnostic renewal: confirmed working end-to-end
Audit summary:
- **Refresh token carries the type**:
[refresh-token.service.ts:104](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/token/services/refresh-token.service.ts)
preserves `targetedTokenType` in the JWT payload and returns it from
`verifyRefreshToken`.
- **Renewal branches on type**
([renew-token.service.ts:70-87](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/token/services/renew-token.service.ts)):
```ts
const accessToken =
isDefined(authProvider) &&
targetedTokenType === JwtTokenTypeEnum.WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC &&
!isDefined(workspaceId)
? await
this.workspaceAgnosticTokenService.generateWorkspaceAgnosticToken({...})
: await this.accessTokenService.generateAccessToken({...});
```
Renewed refresh token preserves `targetedTokenType` (line 93).
- **Resolver is workspace-agnostic**: `@UseGuards(PublicEndpointGuard,
NoPermissionGuard)` on `renewToken`
([auth.resolver.ts:796-804](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/auth.resolver.ts))
— no `@AuthWorkspace()` requirement, callable from `app.twenty.com`.
- **Frontend middleware is type-agnostic**:
[apollo.factory.ts:180-209](packages/twenty-front/src/modules/apollo/services/apollo.factory.ts)
just passes the refresh token blob.
Net: no backend change needed. The full workspace-agnostic lifecycle
(issue → cookie → renew → re-issue) already works.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx oxlint` + `prettier --check` — clean.
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` — clean.
- [ ] Manual: complete one full SSO flow ending on a workspace
subdomain. Visit `https://app.twenty.com/welcome` directly — expect the
workspace picker, not the sign-in form.
- [ ] Manual: same but with tokenPair cookie cleared — expect the
regular sign-in form (no regression).
- [ ] Manual: sign-out from a workspace, then visit
`app.twenty.com/welcome` — expect the regular form (sign-out clears the
cookie via full page reload).
- [ ] Manual: stale/expired tokenPair cookie — Apollo renewal kicks in
transparently; if renewal fails, regular form (no infinite loop, no
crash).
- [ ] Manual: pair with #20572 — visit `app.twenty.com/authorize?…` with
a stale workspace-agnostic cookie. Expected chain: `/authorize` renders
→ `PageChangeEffect` redirects to `/welcome?returnToPath=/authorize?…` →
this effect lands the user on WorkspaceSelection → picking a workspace
bounces to `<workspace>/authorize?…` where consent renders.
## Out of scope
- Fixing `lastAuthenticatedWorkspaceDomain` for custom-domain users
(separate cookie-scoping issue, tracked separately).
## Summary
Cross-version upgrades from pre-2.3 still fail after #20581 / #20583 —
different column, structurally similar problem:
```
column ViewSortEntity.subFieldName does not exist
at WorkspaceFlatViewSortMapCacheService.computeForCache (...flat-view-sort/services/workspace-flat-view-sort-map-cache.service.js:40)
... triggered indirectly by DropMessageDirectionFieldCommand (2.3 workspace command)
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25862573418/job/75997337604)
### Why narrowing the `select` doesn't fit here
In the previous two PRs the offender was a bare `findOne` on
`WorkspaceEntity` — easy to narrow. Here the chain is:
1. The 2.3 `DropMessageDirectionFieldCommand` builds a workspace
migration that deletes a `fieldMetadata` (the `direction` field).
2. `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run` walks the metadata cascade
graph (`getMetadataRelatedMetadataNames`) and pulls `viewSort` into the
dependency set because `viewSort` is the inverse one-to-many of
`fieldMetadata` (deleting a field cascades to view sorts that reference
it).
3. That maps to cache keys → `flatViewSortMaps` gets requested →
`WorkspaceFlatViewSortMapCacheService.computeForCache` runs.
4. `computeForCache` does `viewSortRepository.find({ where: {
workspaceId }, withDeleted: true })` with no `select`, so TypeORM emits
a SELECT that includes `subFieldName` — the column doesn't exist in DB
yet (added by a 2.5 instance command much later in the sequence). 💥
Narrowing the cache provider's select would silently drop `subFieldName`
from the cache for runtime use too, until something invalidates it.
Brittle, and would re-break the next time anyone adds a `viewSort`
column.
### Structural fix
Ensure the column exists in DB before any 2.3 workspace command can
trigger that cascade. Within a version, the upgrade runner sorts: fast
instance → slow instance → workspace, so a new 2.3 fast instance command
lands before `DropMessageDirectionFieldCommand`.
- **Add**
`2-3/2-3-instance-command-fast-1747234200000-add-sub-field-name-to-view-sort.ts`
— `ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "subFieldName"`. Comment in
the file explains the cascade and why this lives in 2.3 instead of 2.5.
- **Make idempotent** the existing
`2-5/...-add-sub-field-name-to-view-sort.ts` — switched to `ADD COLUMN
IF NOT EXISTS` / `DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS` so it's a no-op on
cross-upgrade paths while still creating the column on fresh-from-2.5
installs.
- Register the new command in `instance-commands.constant.ts`.
The 2.5 command body change is semantically preserving (idempotent), and
v2.5.0 hasn't shipped to any production DB yet — so this doesn't violate
the "never rewrite committed instance commands" rule in spirit.
### Note on the previous two PRs
#20581 and #20583 narrowed `select` on `WorkspaceEntity` for
`isInternalMessagesImportEnabled`. That's a band-aid that works because
there's a small, enumerable set of bare `workspaceRepository.findOne`
call sites. It could in principle be replaced with the same pattern as
this PR (early 2.x instance command that adds the workspace column). Not
doing that here to keep the diff tight, but happy to follow up if
preferred.
## Test plan
- [ ] Re-run twenty-infra cross-version-upgrade CI and confirm 2.3
workspace commands complete
- [ ] Verify the new 2.3 instance command and the modified 2.5 instance
command are both idempotent (running upgrade twice should not error)
- [ ] Verify a fresh install path still ends with `subFieldName` present
on `core.viewSort`
## Summary
Cross-version upgrade still fails after #20581:
```
column WorkspaceEntity.isInternalMessagesImportEnabled does not exist
at ApplicationService.findWorkspaceTwentyStandardAndCustomApplicationOrThrow (application.service.ts:84)
at UpdateGlobalObjectContextCommandMenuItemsCommand.runOnWorkspace (1-23-…)
at BackfillRecordPageLayoutsCommand.runOnWorkspace (1-23-…)
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25861366732/job/75993012161)
### Root cause
Same class of bug as #20581, different location.
`ApplicationService.findWorkspaceTwentyStandardAndCustomApplicationOrThrow`
does:
```ts
await this.workspaceRepository.findOne({
where: { id: workspaceId },
withDeleted: true,
});
```
No `select`, so TypeORM emits a SELECT for every column declared on
`WorkspaceEntity`. PR #20457 added `isInternalMessagesImportEnabled` to
the entity; its DB column is only created by the 2-5 fast instance
command `1778525104406-add-is-internal-messages-import-enabled`. Many
workspace commands across versions 1-21 → 2-3 call this service (notably
the 1-23 commands shown in the stack), and they all run before the 2-5
instance command — so the bare findOne hits a column that doesn't exist
yet and the upgrade aborts.
### Fix
The function only reads `workspace.id` (passed to cache) and
`workspace.workspaceCustomApplicationId`. Narrow the select to just
those.
The `workspace: WorkspaceEntity` input variant of the function is
unchanged — only the path where we fetch the workspace ourselves is
narrowed. Callers don't see the workspace entity (the function only
returns `{ twentyStandardFlatApplication, workspaceCustomFlatApplication
}`).
### Why not edit the committed 1-23 workspace commands
Same reasoning as #20581: the fix lives in the service that does the
read, so future column additions to `WorkspaceEntity` don't risk
re-breaking every caller. Per `CLAUDE.md`, instance command `up`/`down`
is immutable; this isn't an instance command.
## Test plan
- [ ] Re-run the failing cross-version-upgrade job and confirm it gets
past 1-23
- [ ] Verify the function still resolves the standard + custom
applications correctly for a workspace (no behavior change in returned
shape)
## Summary
Cross-version upgrades from pre-1-21 instances currently fail with:
```
error: column WorkspaceEntity.isInternalMessagesImportEnabled does not exist
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25857499266/job/75979993686)
### Root cause
The 1-21 workspace command `backfill-datasource-to-workspace` does:
```ts
const workspace = await this.workspaceRepository.findOne({
where: { id: workspaceId },
});
```
No `select`, so TypeORM emits a SELECT for every column declared on
`WorkspaceEntity`. PR #20457 added `isInternalMessagesImportEnabled` to
the entity, but its DB column is only created by the 2-5 fast instance
command `1778525104406-add-is-internal-messages-import-enabled`. On a
fresh cross-version upgrade, the runner reaches the 1-21 workspace
segment before that 2-5 instance command runs, the bare `findOne` issues
SELECT on a column that doesn't exist yet, and the upgrade aborts.
### Fix
Narrow the select to just the columns this command actually reads (`id`,
`databaseSchema`). The query now ignores entity columns added later in
the upgrade sequence.
### Why edit a committed workspace command
Per `CLAUDE.md`, committed *instance* command `up`/`down` logic is
immutable. Workspace commands are idempotent backfills — adding a
`select` narrows the read but doesn't change behavior, so it's safe.
### Audit
Verified this is the only unguarded `workspaceRepository.find*` across
the entire upgrade subtree:
- `WorkspaceIteratorService.iterate` uses `select: ['databaseSchema']`
- `WorkspaceVersionService.getActiveOrSuspendedWorkspaceIds` uses
`select: ['id']`
- `UpgradeStatusService.loadActiveOrSuspendedWorkspaces` uses `select:
['id', 'displayName']`
## Test plan
- [ ] Re-run the failing cross-version upgrade job and confirm it gets
past 1-21
- [ ] Verify the 1-21 backfill still correctly skips workspaces with a
non-empty `databaseSchema` and backfills those without
## Summary
Adds support for filtering records by fields on a related MANY_TO_ONE
object via the GraphQL API. Backend only — no frontend, no REST, no
view-filter persistence yet.
```graphql
{
people(filter: { company: { name: { like: "%Airbnb%" } } }) {
edges { node { id } }
}
}
```
### Where the work lands
- **Schema** — `relation-field-metadata-gql-type.generator.ts` now emits
`{relationName}: TargetFilterInput` alongside the existing
`{joinColumnName}: UUIDFilter` for MANY_TO_ONE relations. Mirrors the
order-by generator that already does this for sort. Lazy thunks in
`object-metadata-filter-gql-input-type.generator.ts` handle the cycle
between filter inputs.
- **Arg processor** — `FilterArgProcessorService` no longer hard-rejects
accessing a relation by its name. When the value is a nested object on a
MANY_TO_ONE field, it recurses into the target object's metadata so each
leaf still gets validated and coerced. Depth-capped at 1.
- **Query parser** — new `parseRelationSubFilter` branch in
`graphql-query-filter-field.parser.ts`. When triggered: looks up the
target object metadata, calls `ensureRelationJoin` against the outer
query builder, and recurses via a child
`GraphqlQueryFilterConditionParser` scoped to the target.
`and`/`or`/`not` inside the relation filter keep working because the
child dispatches through the same `parseKeyFilter`.
- **Shared join utility** — `ensureRelationJoin.util.ts` is a single
function that inspects `queryBuilder.expressionMap.joinAttributes` for
the alias before adding a `LEFT JOIN`. Rewired the existing inline
`qb.leftJoin` calls in the order parser and group-by service to use it,
so filter-driven joins no longer collide with sort-driven joins on the
same relation.
### Out of scope (explicit)
- ONE_TO_MANY reverse traversal (needs EXISTS subqueries)
- Aggregates (`company.people.count > 5` — needs HAVING)
- View-filter storage (no `relationPath` column on `ViewFilterEntity`)
- REST DSL changes
- Frontend filter-picker UX
- Nesting deeper than one hop (parser and arg-processor both reject)
### Open question for review
Permissions. The order-by-on-relation code path already lets users sort
People by Company.name without a Company read-permission check, and this
PR matches that behavior for filters — felt wrong to add a stricter gate
only on the filter side. If we want object-permission gating on the
relation target, it should be a follow-up that covers both paths
consistently. The only attack surface today is existence inference via
timing, identical to what sort already exposes.
## Test plan
- [x] `tsc --noEmit` — clean for changed files (5 unrelated pre-existing
errors on main untouched)
- [x] `oxlint --type-aware` + `prettier --check` — 0 errors on all 17
changed/new files
- [x] `jest filter-arg-processor.service.spec` — 229 tests pass (the new
optional `flatObjectMetadataMaps` arg is backwards-compatible)
- [x] Integration test (`filter-by-relation-field.integration-spec.ts`,
6 cases) — needs to be verified against a seeded test DB. Could not
exercise the happy path in my isolated worktree; depth-2 rejection
passed there.
- [ ] EXPLAIN ANALYZE on the integration test query to confirm the FK on
`person.companyId` is indexed for both standard and custom MANY_TO_ONE
relations.
### Integration test cases
1. Filter People by `company.name = "Airbnb"` (exact match)
2. Filter People by `company.name like "%irbnb%"`
3. Non-matching filter returns empty
4. Combined with a scalar filter at root via `and`
5. **Combined with `orderBy` on the same relation** — proves the
join-dedupe works (without `ensureRelationJoin`, TypeORM throws
"duplicate alias")
6. Depth-2 nesting (`company.accountOwner.name`) returns
`INVALID_ARGS_FILTER`
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Removes the last `APP_SECRET`-derived at-rest encryption site by
migrating `core.twoFactorAuthenticationMethod.secret` from
`SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (AES-256-CBC with key derived from
`sha256(APP_SECRET + userId + workspaceId + 'otp-secret' +
'KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY')`) to the versioned `enc:v2:` envelope
(ENCRYPTION_KEY → HKDF-SHA256 bound to `workspaceId` → AES-256-GCM).
- New `decrypt-legacy-aes-cbc.util.ts` faithfully reproduces the
pre-migration CBC derivation byte-for-byte;
`SecretEncryptionService.decryptVersioned` dispatches to it when callers
pass `legacyAesCbcPurpose`, with a dedicated one-shot WARN log family.
- `TwoFactorAuthenticationService` now uses `encryptVersioned` /
`decryptVersioned` (passing the legacy purpose so existing rows still
decrypt). `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` and its spec are deleted;
`TwoFactorAuthenticationModule` imports `SecretEncryptionModule` in
their place.
- `TwoFactorAuthenticationMethodEntity` gets a `@Check` decorator
(`CHK_twoFactorAuthenticationMethod_secret_encrypted`) restricting
`secret` to the `enc:v2:` envelope; the matching 2.5 slow instance
command (`1798000009000-encrypt-totp-secrets`) cursor-paginates `JOIN`ed
`userWorkspace` rows to recover the legacy `userId`, re-encrypts to
`enc:v2`, and applies the CHECK constraint in `up()`.
### Deviation note
The plan suggested wiring a workspace-only legacy derivation directly
into `decryptVersioned`. In practice the production rows are
user-and-workspace-scoped (the legacy purpose is
`\${userId}\${workspaceId}otp-secret`), so a workspace-only derivation
could not recover them. The PR keeps the public `decryptVersioned` API
intact and adds an optional `legacyAesCbcPurpose` so callers that can
reconstruct the legacy context (the 2FA service and the slow command)
opt in.
### Final state of remaining `APP_SECRET` usages
- HS256 JWT verify (read-only, self-retiring once asymmetric migration
completes).
- Express-session cookie signing.
- Approved-access-domain HMAC (signing root, not at-rest).
- Zero-friction fallback in `resolveEncryptionKeysOrThrow`
(intentional).
No production at-rest data is encrypted with `APP_SECRET`-derived keys
anymore.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption
src/engine/core-modules/two-factor-authentication` — 170 unit tests
pass, including new unit tests for the legacy CBC util and the new
`SecretEncryptionService` fallback branch.
- [x] `npx jest --config ./jest-integration.config.ts
test/integration/upgrade/suites/2-5-instance-command-slow-1798000009000-encrypt-totp-secrets.integration-spec.ts`
— 4 integration tests cover legacy-CBC seed → slow command → `enc:v2`
round-trip, idempotency, CHECK constraint enforcement on `up()`, and
rollback via `down()`.
- [x] `npx oxlint --type-aware` and `npx prettier --check` clean on all
touched files.
- [ ] CI on this PR (server validation, tests, lint, typecheck).
## Context
This PR extends the multi-root VSCode workspace configuration introduced
in #2937 by adding the remaining packages from the `packages/*`
directories to the `twenty.code-workspace` folders array.
## Problem
Previously, some packages were not added to the multi-root workspace
configuration. As a result, when opening the repository as a vscode
workspace, those packages were hidden from the VSCode Explorer because
they were not part of the configured workspace folders.
## Benefits
- Prevents packages from being hidden when the repository is opened as a
vscode workspace.
- Improves consistency and navigation across the monorepo workspace
experience.
## Related PR
- #2937
`activateWorkspace` enqueues SDK gen job inside
`WorkspaceManagerService.init()` introduced by
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/19271
But if enqueue call fails it crashes cuz it doesn't have try catch so
created workspace is in corrupted state
<img width="636" height="812" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/09acd042-46d0-4225-adc0-c74ea770785d"
/>
FIx:
Move SDK enqueue out of `init()` Call after
`activateAndInitializeUpgradeState` succeeds, wrap in try catch. Mirror
preInstalledAppsService.installOnWorkspace pattern.
Assuming enqueue failure if Redis is unavailable we fallback to
`SdkClientArchiveService.downloadArchiveBufferOrGenerate` which
generates it on the fly
Around 19 workspaces in prod affected with status `ONGOING_CREATION`
## Summary
Fixes the blank `/authorize` page reported when a user reopens the OAuth
consent screen on `app.twenty.com` after a prior multi-workspace SSO
sign-in.
### Reproduction
1. ChatGPT (or any MCP client) opens
`https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=…` while signed out.
2. User picks "Continue with Google", lands in workspace selection,
picks a workspace, authorizes the app. Works.
3. Some time later, ChatGPT re-opens
`https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=…`.
4. **Observed:** fully blank page, no console errors. Deleting the
`tokenPair` cookie unblocks it.
### Root cause
The multi-workspace social-SSO branch
([auth.service.ts:988-1011](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.ts#L988-L1011))
lands the user on `app.twenty.com/welcome?tokenPair=…` with a
workspace-agnostic token. `SignInUpGlobalScopeFormEffect` writes that
into the host-scoped `tokenPair` cookie on `app.twenty.com`, and nothing
clears it after the user proceeds to a workspace subdomain. On the next
visit to `app.twenty.com/authorize?…`, `MinimalMetadataGater` sees
`hasAccessTokenPair === true` and renders `<UserOrMetadataLoader />`
instead of `<Authorize />`. The loader never goes away because:
- `IsMinimalMetadataReadyEffect` waits for `metadataStore.status ===
'up-to-date'`.
- `MinimalMetadataLoadEffect` only loads metadata when
`hasAccessTokenPair && isActiveWorkspace`, and the default domain has no
workspace context.
Skeleton loader stays forever → user perceives "blank page".
Some users get rescued by `WorkspaceProviderEffect` auto-redirecting
them to their last-authenticated workspace subdomain, but that cookie is
set with `domain: .twenty.com` and silently fails to persist for users
on custom domains — so the bug is most visible there.
### Fix
`/authorize` only issues `findApplicationRegistrationByClientId`, which
is a `PublicEndpointGuard` query. It doesn't need workspace metadata.
Add it to the gater's excluded-paths list alongside the existing
pre-auth pages (`SignInUp`, `Verify`, `Invite`, …) so the page renders
immediately regardless of token state.
This is a one-line, minimum-blast-radius fix. Two related cleanups are
separate concerns and not addressed here:
- Clearing the workspace-agnostic `tokenPair` cookie on `app.twenty.com`
after workspace selection.
- Fixing `lastAuthenticatedWorkspaceDomain` propagation for
custom-domain users.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx oxlint` + `prettier --check` on the touched file — clean.
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` — clean.
- [ ] Manual: with a stale `tokenPair` cookie set on `app.twenty.com`,
open `https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=<valid>&…` — consent
screen renders, no blank.
- [ ] Manual: signed-out → open the same URL — still redirects to
`/welcome` and back through the flow.
- [ ] Manual: signed-in on a workspace subdomain → open
`https://app.twenty.com/authorize?…` — `WorkspaceProviderEffect`
auto-redirect still kicks in (unchanged behavior).
## Context
When the tsvector full-text search returns 0 hits on the first page,
SearchService falls back to ILIKE '%word%' over searchVector::text. The
leading wildcard makes the GIN index unusable, so it seq-scans the
table.
On large searchable custom objects (e.g. a workspace with ~500k rows in
_logs) a single fallback can take 2–3s, multiplied across all searchable
objects in one request.
## Implementation
Wrap the fallback query in a tiny TypeORM transaction and apply a
Postgres per-statement timeout via set_config('statement_timeout', ms,
true) (= SET LOCAL). On timeout, Postgres throws 57014 (QUERY_CANCELED);
we catch it, warn-log with workspace/object context, and return [] for
that object
## Note
This PR bounds the slow fallback and doesn't make it fast. The right
structural fix is to let the fallback use an index. Since tsvector does
not work with certain language (which is the reason why the ILIKE
fallback was implemented in the first place), we should probably use the
pg_trgm extension instead (@FelixMalfait)
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
## Summary
Drops the `postgresCredentials` legacy feature: a never-finished
"postgres proxy" that would have let users query their workspace data
over a standard Postgres connection. Nothing — frontend, e2e, Zapier,
docs, other server code — calls these mutations/query.
## History
- **Introduced** June 2024 (#5767, Thomas Trompette) as "first step for
creating credentials for database proxy", alongside the Postgres FDW /
remote-server work and the custom `twenty-postgres-spilo` image. Planned
follow-ups (provisioning a DB on the proxy, mapping users, exposing it
as a remote server) never landed.
- **Abandoned** January 2026 (#17001, Weiko) when the sibling "remote
integration" feature was removed as a BREAKING CHANGE — "not maintained
for more than a year and never officially launched". The spilo image was
then replaced with vanilla `postgres:16` (#19182, March 2026), retiring
the FDW infrastructure entirely.
- This PR finishes the cleanup: removes the orphaned module, the
`allPostgresCredentials` relation, `JwtTokenTypeEnum.POSTGRES_PROXY` +
payload, the reserved metadata keywords, and adds a 2.5.0 fast instance
command that drops `core.postgresCredentials` (reversible `down`).
Regenerated frontend GraphQL types + SDK metadata client.
## Test plan
- [x] `tsgo --noEmit` clean on twenty-server + twenty-front; lint +
prettier clean on touched files.
- [x] `database:migrate:generate` reports no pending schema diff; server
boots and serves the new schema.
## Summary
Updates the OAuth consent screen to match the provided modal treatment,
including the header artwork, app-to-Twenty logo layout, scope icons,
and a content-hugging title that stays on one line until its max width.
Also preserves `returnToPath` through Google and Microsoft social SSO so
users who sign in from `/authorize` return to the OAuth consent flow
with the original OAuth query parameters intact.
## Reference

## Validation
- `yarn nx test twenty-front
--testFile=src/modules/auth/hooks/__tests__/useAuth.test.tsx
--coverage=false`
- `yarn nx test twenty-server
--testFile=src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.spec.ts
--coverage=false`
- `yarn nx typecheck twenty-front`
- `yarn nx typecheck twenty-server`
- `git diff --check`
## Notes
The reference screenshot is linked from a separate branch-hosted image
commit so it renders in the PR body without adding that screenshot to
the product diff.
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
## Summary
Pure dead-code removal. The Google and Microsoft SSO strategies have
been packing `workspacePersonalInviteToken` into the OAuth `state` blob
and re-emitting it on `validate()`, but
[`signInUpWithSocialSSO`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.ts)
never destructures or reads it from the user object. The SSO flow
resolves invitations by the IdP-verified email instead:
```ts
const invitation =
currentWorkspace && email
? await this.findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace,
email, // ← matched against appToken.context.email
})
: undefined;
```
So the strategy plumbing is write-only and confusing for readers.
Removed from:
-
[`SocialSSOState`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/types/social-sso-state.type.ts)
- `GoogleRequest['user']` and `MicrosoftRequest['user']`
- The `state` JSON in both strategies' `authenticate()`
- The user object in both strategies' `validate()`
No frontend change needed — `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` still sets the
`inviteToken` query param when a personal invite token is present (used
by other paths), and nothing on the SSO server side was reading it.
The token-based invitation lookup is preserved for the password signup
flow via `auth.resolver.signUp` → `findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace, workspacePersonalInviteToken })`. Unrelated,
untouched.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 26 suites /
178 tests pass.
- [x] `tsgo -p tsconfig.json --noEmit` — no new errors on the touched
files (pre-existing `IS_REST_METADATA_API_NEW_FORMAT_DIRECT` errors on
main are unrelated).
- [x] `oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean.
- [ ] Manual smoke: Google sign-in still works (workspace selection /
verify flow unaffected since `workspaceInviteHash`, `workspaceId`,
`action`, `locale`, `billingCheckoutSessionState`, `returnToPath` still
flow correctly).
## Summary
Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR
(#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and
migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer.
This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the
versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed
CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window
— every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently
delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload.
### Service migrations
- **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF
info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new
`decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for
the resolver display path.
- **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers —
**instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config
readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info
is `instance`. Updated consumers:
- `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap`
- `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials`
- **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** —
workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into
`decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at
execution time.
- **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`**
(workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the
secret/non-secret toggle.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are
shared across the JWKS.
- **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING
config variables.
### Slow instance commands (2.5.0)
Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows
into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained:
| timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId |
`"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance
| `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance |
`"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_
— heterogeneous jsonb column |
All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2
form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint.
Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint —
they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback.
### Tests
- Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the
idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope.
- New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts
`decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId`
(instance scope).
- Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`,
`ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API
and the workspace HKDF context plumbing.
- New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the
service spec.
- Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to
assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw
legacy CTR.
### Out of scope (future PRs)
- `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke
`jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key +
`encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own
migration.
- `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc`
`iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier)
- [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token |
application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var
| jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable |
encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key |
encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass.
- [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86
tests pass.
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer
(each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the
migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
## Summary
- Both \`IS_RECORD_PAGE_LAYOUT_EDITING_ENABLED\` and
\`IS_RECORD_PAGE_LAYOUT_GLOBAL_EDITION_ENABLED\` are force-enabled on
every existing workspace by the 1.23.0 upgrade command
\`BackfillRecordPageLayoutsCommand\` and seeded enabled for new
workspaces via \`DEFAULT_FEATURE_FLAGS\` +
\`seed-feature-flags.util.ts\`. They are no longer load-bearing.
- Unwrap all \`if (flag) { … }\` conditionals to their enabled branch on
both server and front.
- Delete legacy fallback files that only the disabled branch reached:
\`PageLayoutRelationWidgetsSyncEffect\`,
\`usePageLayoutWithRelationWidgets\`,
\`reInjectDynamicRelationWidgetsFromDraft\`,
\`injectRelationWidgetsIntoLayout\`, \`isDynamicRelationWidget\` (and
their tests).
- Strip the two \`enableFeatureFlags\` calls from the 1.23 upgrade
command — the page-layout backfill data logic itself is kept intact
since old workspaces upgrading from < 1.23 still need it.
- No DB cleanup migration: stale \`featureFlag\` rows are left in place,
matching the precedent set by #20531 and #20460.
Net diff: 37 files, +106 / -1727.
## Test plan
- [x] \`npx nx typecheck twenty-shared twenty-server twenty-front\` —
all pass
- [x] \`npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server twenty-front\` — all
pass
- [x] \`cd packages/twenty-front && npx jest page-layout\` — 1240 tests,
all pass
- [x] \`cd packages/twenty-server && npx jest
workspace-entity-manager.spec\` — pass
- [ ] Manual smoke: open a record page, verify tabs render and \"Edit
Layout\" command-menu action is available
- [ ] Manual smoke: Settings → Data model → object → Layout tab is
visible (and hidden for remote / Dashboard objects)
- [ ] Manual smoke: edit a tab title, save, reload — confirm persistence
## Summary
Adds a fourth gauge alongside the existing
`twenty_upgrade_workspaces_behind_total` /
`twenty_upgrade_workspaces_failed_total` so dashboards can show how many
workspaces are currently healthy, not just the ones that need attention.
- New gauge: `twenty_upgrade_workspaces_up_to_date_total`
- New count is computed during
`UpgradeStatusService.refreshInstanceAndAllWorkspacesStatus` (cheap — we
already iterate over every workspace), persisted in the existing
`UpgradeStatusCacheService` so the cache-hit path stays a single round
trip, and surfaced via `InstanceAndAllWorkspacesUpgradeStatusDTO` for
the admin panel.
## Files
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/upgrade/upgrade-gauge.service.ts`
— register the new ObservableGauge
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/upgrade/services/upgrade-status.service.ts`
— count UP_TO_DATE workspaces during refresh, propagate through cached
path
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/upgrade/services/upgrade-status-cache.service.ts`
— persist `upToDateWorkspaceCount` next to behind/failed sets
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/upgrade/dtos/instance-and-all-workspaces-upgrade-status.dto.ts`
— `Int` field on the admin DTO
- Tests: extended `upgrade-status.service.spec.ts` (14/14 green) —
cached and refresh paths both assert on `upToDateWorkspaceCount`
## Follow-up
A companion `twenty-infra` PR adds the new tile + line on the
upgrade-status Grafana dashboard.
## Summary
Fixes the consent-modal-not-reopening half of
[#20535](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20535): when a
signed-out user opens an OAuth `/authorize?...` URL (e.g. ChatGPT
connecting to `api.twenty.com/mcp`) and signs in with **Google or
Microsoft**, the original `/authorize` request was lost and the consent
screen never reopened.
### Root cause
`PageChangeEffect` already saves the deep link as `returnToPath` (Jotai
atom) before navigating to `/welcome`. That atom is in-memory: it
survives SPA navigation, and the cross-subdomain workspace hop is
handled by `useBuildSearchParamsFromUrlSyncedStates` round-tripping the
value through the URL.
But the social-SSO path leaves `app.twenty.com` entirely —
`app.twenty.com/welcome` → `api.twenty.com/auth/google` → Google →
`api.twenty.com/auth/google/redirect` → frontend — so the atom is wiped.
None of the existing code paths plumbed `returnToPath` through that hop:
- `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` packed `workspaceInviteHash`/`action`/etc.
but not `returnToPath`.
- `SocialSSOState` / the Google + Microsoft strategies didn't carry it
through the OAuth `state` blob.
- `signInUpWithSocialSSO` + `computeRedirectURI` didn't re-emit it on
the redirect back to the frontend.
The email path worked because all transitions stay on the default
frontend domain, so the atom survives until `SignInUpGlobalScopeForm`
bakes it into the workspace URL.
### What changed
Plumb `returnToPath` through the SSO state the same way
`workspaceInviteHash` and `action` already flow:
- **Frontend** (`useAuth.buildRedirectUrl`): read `returnToPath` from
the Jotai store and append it to `/auth/google` / `/auth/microsoft` when
set and structurally valid.
- **Server types** (`SocialSSOState`, `GoogleRequest['user']`,
`MicrosoftRequest['user']`): add optional `returnToPath`.
- **Strategies** (`google.auth.strategy.ts`,
`microsoft.auth.strategy.ts`): include `returnToPath:
req.query.returnToPath` in the JSON `state` and read it back in
`validate`.
- **auth.service.ts** (`signInUpWithSocialSSO`, `computeRedirectURI`):
forward `returnToPath` on both branches — the multi-workspace redirect
to `AppPath.SignInUp?tokenPair=...` and the single-workspace redirect to
`<workspace>/verify?loginToken=...`. Validated via a new
`isValidReturnToPath` helper so a tampered query value can't become an
open-redirect vector.
After the round-trip, `useInitializeQueryParamState` rehydrates the atom
from the URL and `usePageChangeEffectNavigateLocation` resolves it as
the post-auth destination — same mechanism the email path already relied
on.
Out of scope: the OAuth `resource` parameter handling tracked in
[#20296](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20296) is independent
and not addressed here.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest src/engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 27
suites / 183 tests pass, including new
`is-valid-return-to-path.util.spec.ts`.
- [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth` (twenty-front) — 13 suites / 52 tests
pass, including two new cases in `useAuth.test.tsx` covering the happy
path and the protocol-relative open-redirect guard.
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` / `twenty-front` — clean.
- [x] `npx oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean.
- [ ] Manual: signed-out user opens
`https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=...` → Continue with Google
→ completes Google → selects workspace → consent screen renders.
- [ ] Manual: same flow, single workspace — lands on consent screen
directly after Verify.
- [ ] Manual: email path still works (regression).
- [ ] Manual: tamper `returnToPath=//evil.com` on the `/auth/google` URL
→ server validation rejects, user lands at default home, not at
`evil.com`.
E2E note: existing `return-to-path.spec.ts` already covers deep links
with query params through the email path. A mock OAuth provider would be
needed to cover the SSO path end-to-end; unit coverage stands in for
now.
## Summary
Adds a small helper that lets every log line in the upgrade flow stay
human-readable while emitting a structured tail that Loki / the
upgrade-status Grafana dashboard can filter on.
Output shape per `logger.log()` call:
```
<humanMessage as-is, may span multiple lines>
[upgrade] event=<event> key=value … ← always single line
```
Same call produces **one** structured Loki event regardless of how
chatty the human-readable part gets — the dashboard's `|= "[upgrade]"`
filter only matches the trailing line.
## Helper API
```ts
formatUpgradeLog({
humanMessage: string, // free-form, multi-line OK, for engineers scrolling raw pod logs
event: string, // required anchor for Loki filtering / dashboards
logFields?: Record<string, // short structured key=value tail
string | number | boolean | null | undefined
>,
});
```
- `humanMessage` is preserved as-is. A thrown `new Error('line one\nline
two')` surfacing through `humanMessage` stays human-readable across
multiple lines.
- `logFields` values are logfmt-escaped: whitespace / `=` / `"` get
quoted, embedded `\` / `"` / `\n` / `\r` / `\t` are escaped, `null` /
`undefined` emit literally (`key=null`, `key=undefined`) instead of
being silently dropped — caught via `isDefined` from
`twenty-shared/utils`.
- `event` itself runs through the same escape so an event name with
whitespace or `=` can't break parsing.
## Example output
```
Initialized upgrade sequence: 8 step(s)
[upgrade] event=sequence.initialized stepCount=8 dryRun=false
Upgrading workspace abc-123 1/10
[upgrade] event=workspace.start workspaceId=abc-123 index=1 total=10 dryRun=false
Upgrade for workspace abc-123 completed.
[upgrade] event=workspace.success workspaceId=abc-123 executedByVersion=1.4.0 dryRun=false
Upgrade summary: 42 workspace(s) succeeded, 1 workspace(s) failed
[upgrade] event=summary totalSuccesses=42 totalFailures=1 dryRun=false
Upgrade failed: Workspace migration runner failed:
- Option id is required
- Option id is invalid
[upgrade] event=aborted totalSuccesses=41 totalFailures=2 dryRun=false
```
Loki query for the dashboard: `{namespace="twenty"} |= "[upgrade]" |
logfmt event, workspaceId, command, executedByVersion`
## Scope
Only the **upgrade-specific** call sites carry the tag:
- `upgrade.command.ts` — `sequence.initialized`, `sequence.step`
(verbose), `summary`, `aborted`
- `upgrade-sequence-runner.service.ts` — `sequence.stopped`,
`sequence.aborted`
- `workspace-command-runner.service.ts` — `workspace.start`,
`workspace.success`, `cache.invalidate.failed`
`instance-command-runner.service.ts` is intentionally **not** tagged —
`runFastInstanceCommand` / `runSlowInstanceCommand` are also invoked
from `RunInstanceCommandsCommand` (DB init / `run-instance-commands`),
so an `[upgrade]` tag there would mislead at init time. Those lines stay
plain-text; stacks still flow on their own via NestJS
`logger.error(message, error.stack)`.
`chalk` is dropped from `upgrade.command.ts` — ANSI escapes break log
parsers and chalk is a no-op without a TTY anyway.
## Tests
9 inline-snapshot tests in `format-upgrade-log.util.spec.ts` surface the
actual output of every interesting shape (summary call site, multi-line
humanMessage, quoted / escaped / control-character logField values,
null/undefined fields, event name escaping). Snapshots double as
documentation of what a real upgrade log line looks like.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit tests green (`jest format-upgrade-log`)
- [x] oxlint + prettier clean
- [x] tsgo typecheck clean on the upgrade module
- [x] CI green
- [ ] Smoke test on staging: run `upgrade` command, confirm `[upgrade]`
structured lines surface in Loki and `| logfmt` extracts fields
## Summary
Lets users choose which sub-field of a composite column to sort by —
directly from the sort chip — by clicking the sub-field label and
picking from a dropdown. Persists per view via a new nullable
\`subFieldName\` column on \`ViewSort\`.
Replaces #20438, which proposed a field-settings (admin) configuration
for the same problem. The chip-level approach is more discoverable (the
option lives where the user is looking) and per-view, so different views
on the same object can sort by different sub-fields.
### What changes for users
- **FullName columns**: previously sorted by \`firstName\` and
\`lastName\` together as a stable dual-key sort. Now the user can pick
which sub-field is primary (the other is the tie-breaker). Default
remains \`firstName\` primary, \`lastName\` tie-breaker.
- **Address columns**: previously not sortable at all (not in
\`SORTABLE_FIELD_METADATA_TYPES\`). Now sortable, with a chip dropdown
listing each enabled sub-field. Default is \`addressCity\` if enabled,
else the first enabled sub-field. Disabling a sub-field at the
field-metadata level (existing setting) removes it from the dropdown.
- **Other composite types** (Currency, Phones, Emails, Links, Actor) and
scalar fields keep their existing single-key sort behavior.
### UX
```
┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐
│ ↑ Name · Last name ✕ │ │ ↑ Address · City ✕ │
└────────┬────────────────┘ └────────┬────────────────┘
▼ (click sub-field) ▼
┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐
│ First name │ │ Address 1 │
│ Last name ✓│ │ Address 2 │
└────────────┘ │ City ✓│
│ State │
│ Postcode │
│ Country │
└────────────┘
```
The chip body still toggles direction on click — the \`Dropdown\`'s
internal wrapper calls \`stopPropagation\` so the sub-field click
doesn't bubble to the chip's onClick.
## What changed
**Backend:**
- \`ViewSortEntity\` — new nullable \`subFieldName: varchar\` column
- \`ViewSortDTO\`, \`CreateViewSortInput\`,
\`UpdateViewSortInputUpdates\` — new \`@Field(() => String, { nullable:
true })\`
- \`FLAT_VIEW_SORT_EDITABLE_PROPERTIES\` — \`'subFieldName'\` added so
the property flows through the update merge path
- \`ALL_ENTITY_PROPERTIES_CONFIGURATION_BY_METADATA_NAME.viewSort\` —
new \`subFieldName\` entry with \`toCompare: true\` so cache diffs
notice it
- \`fromCreateViewSortInputToFlatViewSortToCreate\` — threads
\`subFieldName\` through
- Instance command migration (\`add-sub-field-name-to-view-sort\`) —
single \`ALTER TABLE core.viewSort ADD subFieldName varchar\` / \`DROP\`
**Frontend:**
- \`RecordSort\` and \`ViewSort\` types — \`subFieldName?: string |
null\`
- \`VIEW_SORT_FRAGMENT\` — adds \`subFieldName\` so the field
round-trips
- \`mapRecordSortToViewSort\` + \`areViewSortsEqual\` — carry the new
field through, include it in the diff so the usual
\`useSaveRecordSortsToViewSorts\` create/update flow fires when it
changes
- \`useSaveRecordSortsToViewSorts\` — passes \`subFieldName\` in both
\`CreateViewSortInput\` and \`UpdateViewSortInputUpdates\`
- \`getOrderByForFieldMetadataType(field, direction, subFieldName?)\` —
new optional third arg. \`turnSortsIntoOrderBy\` threads
\`sort.subFieldName\` into it.
- \`Address\` added to \`SORTABLE_FIELD_METADATA_TYPES\`
- New helpers: \`getEnabledAddressSubFields\` (filters by the field's
\`subFields\` setting, falls back to the 6 default visible address
sub-fields), \`getDefaultSortSubFieldForAddress\`,
\`getDefaultSortSubFieldForFullName\`
- New shared types/constants: \`AllowedFullNameSubField\`,
\`ALLOWED_FULL_NAME_SUBFIELDS\`, \`DEFAULT_VISIBLE_ADDRESS_SUBFIELDS\`
- \`SortOrFilterChip\` — new \`labelSubField?: ReactNode\` slot; renders
as \` · {sub-field}\` with subdued weight after the main label
- \`EditableSortChip\` — builds options from field metadata
(\`ALLOWED_FULL_NAME_SUBFIELDS\` for FullName,
\`getEnabledAddressSubFields\` for Address), uses i18n-wrapped labels,
persists picks via \`upsertRecordSort\`
## Test plan
- [x] \`npx nx typecheck\` passes for twenty-shared, twenty-front,
twenty-server
- [x] \`oxlint --type-aware\` on all 19 frontend + 9 server changed
files: 0 errors
- [x] \`prettier --check\`: clean
- [x] 16 unit tests pass — \`getOrderByForFieldMetadataType\` covers the
new \`subFieldName\` override branch for FULL_NAME and ADDRESS;
\`getDefaultSortSubFieldForAddress\` covers the city/first-enabled
fallback path; \`getDefaultSortSubFieldForFullName\` exercises its
constant
- [ ] Manual: sort a People view by Full Name → click the chip's
sub-field label → switch between First name and Last name → reload page
→ choice is preserved
- [ ] Manual: sort a Company view by Address → confirm dropdown lists
only enabled sub-fields → disable Address \`addressCity\` in field
settings → confirm dropdown options update and runtime falls back to the
first enabled sub-field
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Simplify `create-twenty-app` for zero-interaction use
Makes `npx create-twenty-app@latest my-app` a fully non-interactive,
single-command experience suitable for automated environments (Codex,
Claude plugins).
### Changes
- **Remove all interactive prompts** — app name, display name,
description, and scaffold confirmation are now derived from CLI args
with sensible defaults. `inquirer` dependency removed
entirely.
- **Replace OAuth with API key auth** — use the seeded dev API key
(`DEV_API_KEY`) to authenticate against the Docker instance as
`tim@apple.dev`, eliminating the browser-based OAuth
flow.
- **Docker-first with early validation** — check Docker is installed
before scaffolding; if missing, print the install URL and exit. Detect
alternative runtimes (Podman, nerdctl).
- **Parallel image pull** — `docker pull` runs in the background during
scaffold + dependency install, saving 10-30s on typical runs.
- **Always pull latest image** — ensures the dev server is up-to-date on
every run.
- **Stop detecting port 3000** — only check port 2020 (Docker instance).
- **Update CLI flags** — remove `--skip-local-instance` and `--yes`; add
`--skip-docker`.
- **Update CI workflows and docs** — align e2e workflows, package
README, and template README/cd.yml with the new flow.
## Summary
- Inject non-secret application variables (`isSecret: false`) into front
component `process.env` via the existing Web Worker `setWorkerEnv`
mechanism
- Filter secret variables server-side in the resolver so they never
reach the browser
- Set application variables before system variables (`TWENTY_API_URL`,
`TWENTY_APP_ACCESS_TOKEN`) to prevent override
- Wire up environment variable keys in the logic function code editor
for TypeScript autocomplete
## Test plan
- [x] Unit tests for `buildNonSecretEnvVar` (6 passing)
- [x] Typecheck passes for `twenty-front` and `twenty-server`
- [x] Install an app with both `isSecret: false` and `isSecret: true`
variables, open a front component, verify only non-secret vars appear in
`process.env`
- [x] Open a logic function editor, verify autocomplete suggests
declared variable keys
## Summary
- Adds `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (primary) and `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
(decrypt-only fallback for rotation) env vars to twenty-server, with
backward-compatible fallback to `APP_SECRET` when `ENCRYPTION_KEY` is
unset.
- Introduces a versioned ciphertext envelope `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`
using AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 derived per-context keys. The 8-hex
`keyId` fingerprint lets every row identify which physical key encrypted
it, so rotation routes directly to primary or fallback without trial
decryption; GCM's auth tag gives true integrity (legacy CTR has none).
- Migrates `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` to the new envelope
and plumbs `workspaceId` through every caller, so per-workspace HKDF
context binds each row to its tenant.
The remaining encryption sites (`jwt-key-manager`, `config-storage`,
`postgres-credentials`, `application-variable`, TOTP) stay on the legacy
unprefixed CTR path and will be migrated in follow-up PRs. The
operator-facing rotation runbook is out of scope here.
### Format details
`enc:v{N}:{keyId}:{base64}` — `N=2` is the only version produced by new
writes (`v1` exists for backward-compatible decryption of existing
connected-account rows). `keyId =
sha256(rawKey).slice(0,4).toString('hex')`. The CHECK constraint on
`core.connectedAccount.{accessToken,refreshToken}` is relaxed from `LIKE
'enc:v1:%'` to `LIKE 'enc:v_:%'` so both versions pass.
### Key resolution
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_SECRET` | Encrypt
with | Decrypt try order |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| set | set | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary →
fallback |
| set | unset | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary |
| unset | set | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` →
fallback |
| unset | unset | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` |
| unset | unset | unset | startup error | n/a |
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx jest
'secret-encryption|connected-account-token-encryption|connected-account-refresh-tokens|encrypt-connected-account-tokens|connection-provider-oauth-flow'`
— 87 tests pass
- [x] New `secret-encryption.service.versioned.spec.ts` covers: key
resolution table (no-key error, APP_SECRET fallback, ENCRYPTION_KEY
precedence), v2 round-trip with/without workspaceId, GCM tamper
rejection, workspaceId-mismatch rejection, keyId-based primary→fallback
routing, missing-key error names the fingerprint, v1 legacy decryption,
no-prefix legacy decryption, malformed envelope rejection.
- [x] Updated `connected-account-token-encryption.service.spec.ts`
covers workspaceId binding and HKDF context isolation.
- [x] Updated slow instance command spec verifies workspaceId is
threaded through encryption and the relaxed `enc:v_:%` LIKE pattern
matches both v1 and v2.
- [ ] Manual E2E: connect a Gmail account on a freshly deployed instance
with `APP_SECRET` only → confirm `core.connectedAccount.accessToken` is
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: rotate — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` and
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<old APP_SECRET>`, restart, confirm
pre-rotation rows still decrypt and new rows carry the new `keyId`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: missing key — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` without the
fallback, confirm decrypt error names the old `keyId` so the operator
can identify the missing key.
## Summary
`ImapFlow` is an `EventEmitter`; per Node.js semantics, an emitted
`'error'` event with no listener becomes an uncaught exception that
exits the process. Both ImapFlow construction sites in `twenty-server`
(`ImapClientProvider` used by all messaging flows, and
`testImapConnection` in the connection-wizard validator) currently build
the client without attaching a permanent `'error'` listener, so a
transient socket condition (idle timeout, network blip, server-side
disconnect) crashes `twenty-server` and triggers a container restart
with a ~1 min HTTP 502 window for end users.
This patch attaches an `'error'` listener at each call site that logs
the error and lets `imapflow`'s internal reconnect handle recovery. Same
shape / same precedent as #20143 (Redis session-store client) which
fixed#20144.
Closes#20509.
## What changed
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/modules/messaging/message-import-manager/drivers/imap/providers/imap-client.provider.ts`:
`ImapClientProvider.createConnection` now attaches `client.on('error',
...)` between construction and `connect()`.
-
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/imap-smtp-caldav-connection/services/imap-smtp-caldav-connection.service.ts`:
`testImapConnection` does the same on its short-lived test client.
Both listeners log via the existing `Logger` instance (matching the
resolver-level logging already in `ImapClientProvider.getClient`) and
surface `error.stack` so transient socket conditions are observable but
no longer fatal.
## Crash this fixes (real production stack)
```
node:events:487
throw er; // Unhandled 'error' event
^
Error: Socket timeout
at TLSSocket.<anonymous> (/app/node_modules/imapflow/lib/imap-flow.js:795:29)
at TLSSocket.emit (node:events:509:28)
at Socket._onTimeout (node:net:610:8)
...
Emitted 'error' event on ImapFlow instance at:
at ImapFlow.emitError (/app/node_modules/imapflow/lib/imap-flow.js:397:14)
code: 'ETIMEOUT',
```
End-user impact: server process exits cleanly (code 0), Docker / k8s
restarts it; the DB, worker, redis, and caddy containers are unaffected
— only the API server dies, taking the GraphQL/REST surface offline for
a ~1 min health-check warmup.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` (planned — relying on CI for
verification)
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (planned — relying on
CI for verification)
- [x] Manually reproduced the crash on `v2.2` by hitting an
IMAP/SMTP/CalDAV outbound flow with Gmail; with the patch applied
locally to the running container (verified the listener fires and logs
without process exit), the server stays up across the same trigger
sequence.
- [ ] Unit-level coverage: behavior is "listener exists, doesn't throw"
— not easily covered without a contrived socket-mock test. Existing call
sites have no unit tests today; happy to add one if a reviewer prefers,
otherwise mirroring the convention from #20143 which merged without a
new test.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com>
Billing is now decremented per-step, not per-turn. The onStepFinish
callback in chat-execution.service.ts calls a new
decrementAndCheckAvailableCredits method on each model step, so Redis is
debited incrementally as the agent runs rather than all at once at the
end.
Credit exhaustion stops the stream mid-run. When a step depletes the
remaining credits, a hasNoMoreAvailableCredits flag is set and passed
into the stopWhen predicate of streamText, causing the agent to halt
before starting the next step.
A new credits-exhausted event is introduced. After the stream drains and
the response is persisted, if credits ran out the job publishes a
dedicated credits-exhausted event to the frontend instead of the normal
message-persisted event.
The frontend handles this new event. useAgentChatSubscription has a new
credits-exhausted case that sets a BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED-coded error
on the atom, closes the writer, and stops the streaming state —
triggering the existing AiChatCreditsExhaustedMessage UI.
## Summary
Fixes#20502
/claim #20502
The navigation drawer's collapsed state is persisted to \`localStorage\`
via \`isNavigationDrawerExpandedState\`. When a user collapses the
drawer in the main app and then opens settings via a **direct URL,
refresh, or new tab**, the settings layout renders in collapsed mode —
no \`useOpenSettingsMenu\` call is made in those paths to force
expansion.
\`StyledAnimatedContainer\` (which controls the outer drawer width) used
raw \`isNavigationDrawerExpanded\` with no settings-route override.
Inner components (\`NavigationDrawerItemsCollapsableContainer\`) already
guard with \`isExpanded = isNavigationDrawerExpanded || isSettingsPage\`
— the outer container simply needed the same treatment.
**Fix:** derive \`isExpanded = isSettingsDrawer ||
isNavigationDrawerExpanded\` using the already-in-scope
\`useIsSettingsDrawer()\` result and pass it to both
\`StyledAnimatedContainer\` and \`StyledContainer\`. 1 derived variable,
2 prop changes, no new hooks or state.
**Changed files:**
-
\`packages/twenty-front/src/modules/ui/navigation/navigation-drawer/components/NavigationDrawer.tsx\`
## Test plan
Verified via code review and CI. The fix is structurally identical to
the existing \`isSettingsPage\` guard already used in
\`NavigationDrawerItemsCollapsableContainer\` — the outer container
simply lacked the same treatment. No new hooks, no side effects, no
state mutations.
Manual UI verification (collapse → navigate to settings → confirm
expanded) was not performed against a running instance. If the
maintainers want to verify, the logic path is the same as the inner
component guard that already ships in production.
> **Note (2026-05-12):** PR #20508 was submitted after this PR with a
\`useEffect\`-based approach. That approach has already received a
review comment from a team member noting that \`useEffect\` should be a
last resort per the project's own React guidelines. This fix uses no
effects or imperative state — only a derived variable.
---
> [!NOTE]
> **AI-Assisted Contribution**
> This patch was generated by
[Mesopredator](https://github.com/GusFromSpace), an autonomous code
intelligence system.
> Static analysis located the bug, the fix was written and verified with
\`tsc --noEmit\` + \`node\` test suite, and reviewed by a human before
submission.
> Please treat this as a community contribution and request changes if
needed.
## Issue
As per the developer docs, the local setup uses the `npx nx
database:reset twenty-server` command, which seeds 4 workspaces. This
works correctly for multi-workspace mode
(`IS_MULTIWORKSPACE_ENABLED=true`) and integration tests but causes
issues in single-workspace mode (`IS_MULTIWORKSPACE_ENABLED=false`) or
when switching from multi-workspace mode back to single-workspace mode.
Also, the default mode is single-workspace but 4 workspaces are already
seeded in the database. As a result,
`WorkspaceDomainsService.getDefaultWorkspace()` selects the newest
workspace (Empty4), which is intended only for integration testing and
contains no user data.
There is also an existing warning log mentioning fallback to the Apple
seed workspace when multiple workspaces are found in single-workspace
mode i.e `IS_MULTIWORKSPACE_ENABLED=true`, but it was never implemented.
```
if (workspaces.length > 1) {
Logger.warn(
` ${workspaces.length} workspaces found in database. In single-workspace mode, there should be only one workspace. Apple seed workspace will be used as fallback if it found.`,
);
}
```
Although we could replace with `"nx command-no-deps --
workspace:seed:dev --light"` in `project.json` for `database:reset`,
which will only seed one workspace but it wont resolve issue when
switching from multi-workspace mode back to single-workspace mode or for
integration test `with-db-reset`.
## Changes
- Implement fallback behavior already hinted by existing warning logs.
- Ensure the Apple seed workspace is used as the fallback in
single-workspace mode when multiple workspaces exist.
This improves:
- Local developer onboarding experience.
- Switching between multi-workspace and single-workspace development
modes.
- Consistency during local development and integration testing.
## Related PR
- #19822
- #20464
These PRs only resolves the issue for docker environments but not for
local development setup.
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
**Root cause:** getWorkflowRunContext(stepInfos) builds a Record<string,
unknown> from the previous steps' results. There is no workspaceId key
in it, so context.workspaceId as string silently evaluated to undefined.
That undefined was then passed all the way down to
WorkspaceCacheService.getOrRecompute, **which correctly throws** when
workspaceId is not a valid UUID.
Before :
<img width="525" height="130" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-13 at 14 58 54"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0549b4dc-7063-44e5-95a1-00a460a6d7f1"
/>
Introduced with billing v2 yesterday, since then, workspaceId is needed
to bill credit usage
# Introduction
Adding `no-miused-promise` lint rule to the twenty-server
In order to flag such pattern
```ts
// ❌ Flagged — forEach doesn't await the callback
items.forEach(async (item) => {
await process(item);
});
```
## What happened
- Refactored the code-interpreter driver to have a async onResult (
which is also expected by e2b )
- Workspace manager still dirty solution including force cast
- Basic fixes
## Summary
- Replace the dynamic `RestApiMetadataController` (which parsed
`/rest/metadata/*path` and proxied to internal GraphQL) with two
dedicated controllers: `ObjectMetadataController` and
`FieldMetadataController`.
- Drop the GraphQL hop: reads hit Postgres directly via TypeORM
repositories; writes call the existing
`{create,update,delete}One{Object,Field}` service methods.
- Introduce a new clean response shape behind a workspace feature flag
(`IS_REST_METADATA_API_NEW_FORMAT_DIRECT`) — see grace period below.
- Update the OpenAPI spec so the REST playground reflects the (default)
legacy shape during the grace period.
## Why
The legacy metadata controller was over-complex: it routed every method
through a path parser, a set of GraphQL query-builder factories, an
internal GraphQL call, and a
`cleanGraphQLResponse` post-processor. Operation names from GraphQL
(`createOneObject`, `updateOneField`, …) leaked straight into REST
responses. The internal-GraphQL hop also gave us
nothing on metadata reads — pagination, filtering, and serialization all
happen against the same Postgres tables either way.
## Feature flag & grace period
`IS_REST_METADATA_API_NEW_FORMAT_DIRECT` (workspace-scoped):
- **Existing workspaces:** flag absent → resolves to `false` → **legacy
response shape** (no behavior change).
- **Newly created workspaces:** flag seeded to `true` via
`DEFAULT_FEATURE_FLAGS` → **new response shape** from day one.
- **Toggle:** support-assisted (no frontend); customers contact us to
opt into the new shape early.
- **Removal:** the flag, the legacy adapter utils
(`to-legacy-{object,field}-metadata-response.util.ts`), and the
parametrized test wrapper get deleted after the grace window. New shape
becomes the only shape; OpenAPI flips to new shape; POST loses the
conditional and reverts to a declarative response.
## Response shapes
| Operation | Legacy (flag OFF, default for existing) | New (flag ON) |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------|---------------|
| `GET /rest/metadata/objects` | `{ data: { objects: [...] }, pageInfo,
totalCount }` | `{ data: [...], pageInfo, totalCount }` |
| `GET /rest/metadata/objects/:id` | `{ data: { object: {...} } }` | `{
... }` |
| `POST /rest/metadata/objects` | `201 { data: { createOneObject: {...}
} }` | `201 { ... }` |
| `PATCH/PUT /rest/metadata/objects/:id` | `{ data: { updateOneObject:
{...} } }` | `{ ... }` |
| `DELETE /rest/metadata/objects/:id` | `{ data: { deleteOneObject: {
... } } }` | `{ ... }` |
Same matrix for `/rest/metadata/fields`. Cursor params
(`starting_after`, `ending_before`, `limit`) and `totalCount` are
preserved across both shapes. POST returns `201` in both (old
controller already did — the doc on main saying `200` was wrong).
## Implementation notes
- Reads go straight to Postgres with TypeORM cursor pagination
(`paginateByIdCursor` util, mutually-exclusive `starting_after` /
`ending_before`). No cache on this path — caching +
filterable pagination didn't combine cleanly.
- Object endpoints inline `fields[]` via a single follow-up `WHERE
objectMetadataId IN (...)` query.
- Controllers read the flag via `FeatureFlagService.isFeatureEnabled`
and conditionally pass the result through a legacy-shape adapter util
before returning.
- Per-domain REST exception filters
(`{Object,Field}MetadataRestApiExceptionFilter`); the `exceptionCode →
httpStatus` switch is extracted to a util so it can be merged with the
existing GraphQL handler later.
- New controllers live inside the metadata domain modules
(`metadata-modules/{object,field}-metadata/controllers/`) to match
existing precedent (view-field, view, page-layout, …).
- Removes: `RestApiMetadataController`, `RestApiMetadataService`,
`metadata/query-builder/`, `clean-graphql-response.utils.ts`.
- Integration tests are parametrized over both flag values via
`describe.each` — both shapes are asserted in CI.
- OpenAPI fixes inherited from the migration (kept as-is): documents
flat `fields: [...]` rather than the obsolete `{edges:{node:[...]}}`
wrapping; always emits `totalCount`; POST
status `201`. These match what customers actually receive on both
shapes.
Note: Next goal is to implement something similar for graphql and remove
nestjs-query dependency for those 2 entities, then generalise it.
Note2: We have the same issue with Core Rest API such as
```json
{
"data": {
"createCompany": {
"id": "123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000",
"createdAt": "2026-05-07T12:14:52.769Z",
"updatedAt": "2026-05-07T12:14:52.769Z",
"deletedAt": "2026-05-07T12:14:52.769Z",
...
```
with "createCompany" here which is odd compared to REST standards (FYI
@etiennejouan @charlesBochet)
## Before (Without feature flag)
<img width="1346" height="712" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 20 50 38"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/316ce225-1045-4aac-97a9-60fd537eb1ec"
/>
<img width="1378" height="729" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 20 52 24"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a621ab6f-e4f8-44d5-817c-1efd25d33c30"
/>
## After (With feature flag)
<img width="1376" height="728" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 20 50 46"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2424d9c5-e4ed-497c-8e5c-6b54d78675e4"
/>
<img width="1375" height="727" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 20 51 47"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/101d957f-38ed-45d9-ab7b-f4f4eb983397"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: prastoin <paul@twenty.com>
## Summary
Closes#20195
Fix phone field unique constraints so phone numbers are considered
unique by both `primaryPhoneNumber` and `primaryPhoneCallingCode`.
- Include `primaryPhoneCallingCode` in the shared phone composite unique
constraint metadata
- Align the frontend settings composite field config with the backend
metadata
- Return all included unique composite subfields when building
create-many conflict fields
- Match composite unique conflict fields as a group during create-many
upserts
## Root Cause
Phone composite metadata only marked `primaryPhoneNumber` as part of the
unique constraint. That made different international phone numbers with
the same national number conflict, for example `+1 123456789` and `+32
123456789`.
## Test Plan
- `yarn workspace twenty-shared build`
- `jest --runTestsByPath <index action handler and create-many utility
specs>`
- `prettier --check <touched files>`
- `oxlint --type-aware <touched files>`
- `nx run twenty-shared:typecheck`
- `nx run twenty-server:typecheck`
- `nx run twenty-front:typecheck`
---------
Co-authored-by: mkdev11 <MkDev11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Etienne <45695613+etiennejouan@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: prastoin <paul@twenty.com>
## Summary
Extends the asymmetric signing work from #20467 to cover **every
remaining `JwtTokenTypeEnum` value**: `LOGIN`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`,
`FILE`, `API_KEY`, `APPLICATION_ACCESS`, `APPLICATION_REFRESH`,
`APP_OAUTH_STATE`, plus the ACCESS-shaped session token issued by the
code interpreter tool.
After this PR, every JWT the server signs is ES256 with a `kid` pointing
at the current `core."signingKey"` row, while legacy HS256 tokens (no
`kid` header) remain verifiable indefinitely through the existing
fallback in `JwtWrapperService.resolveVerificationKey`. No new entity /
migration / config: this is a pure routing change on top of the
infrastructure that already shipped.
## Why
`#20467` only flipped `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` to ES256. Every other JWT
type was still HS256-signed against the global `APP_SECRET`, which kept
the original blast radius (a leaked `APP_SECRET` invalidates *every* JWT
type forever). Migrating the rest unifies the sign path on rotatable
per-server private keys without forcing any token reissue.
## Mechanical changes
### Sign side (8 services)
- `LoginTokenService.generateLoginToken`
- `TransientTokenService.generateTransientToken`
- `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.generateWorkspaceAgnosticToken`
- `ApplicationTokenService.signApplicationToken` (`APPLICATION_ACCESS` +
`APPLICATION_REFRESH`)
- `ApiKeyService.generateApiKeyToken`
- `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` / `signWorkspaceLogoUrl`
- `ConnectionProviderOAuthFlowService.signState` (`APP_OAUTH_STATE`)
- `CodeInterpreterTool.generateSessionToken`
Each call site swaps `jwtWrapperService.sign(payload, { secret:
generateAppSecret(...), ... })` for `await
jwtWrapperService.signAsync(payload, { expiresIn, [jwtid] })`. The
`generateAppSecret` calls on the sign side are dropped (verifier-side
`generateAppSecret` stays in `resolveVerificationKey` for the HS256
fallback).
### Verifier side
- `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.validateToken` now goes through
`verifyJwtToken` instead of the bespoke `verify({ secret })` path, so
new ES256 tokens are accepted while the legacy HS256 fallback inside
`resolveVerificationKey` still serves the old shape.
- `JwtWrapperService.sign()` is kept (legacy compat / tests) but is now
strictly deprecated — there are no remaining production callers.
### Async ripple (`signFileByIdUrl` was synchronous)
- `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` and `signWorkspaceLogoUrl` are now
`async`; the `signUrl` callback used by `getRecordImageIdentifier` is
widened to accept `Promise<string | null>`.
- Every direct/indirect caller is updated: admin panel (user lookup +
statistics + top workspaces), search service
(`computeSearchObjectResults`, `getImageIdentifierValue`), workspace
resolver (`logo` resolver, public workspace by domain/id),
`WorkspaceMemberTranspiler` (now `async toWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` /
`toDeletedWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` / `generateSignedAvatarUrl`),
`UserService.loadSignedAvatarUrlsByUserId`,
`UserWorkspaceService.castWorkspaceToAvailableWorkspace`,
workspace-invitation, approved-access-domain, agent-chat-streaming,
agent-message-part resolver, navigation-menu-item record identifier,
file-ai-chat / file-core-picture / file-email-attachment / file-workflow
/ files-field services, rich-text & files-field query result getters,
and the code-interpreter tool.
## Backward compatibility
- **Legacy HS256 tokens (no `kid`)** keep verifying via
`resolveVerificationKey` → `extractAppSecretBody` → `generateAppSecret`
for both `workspaceId`-bearing and `userId`-bearing payloads.
- The `API_KEY` HS256-via-ACCESS-secret fallback (#16504) still kicks in
inside `verifyJwtToken` for pre-2025-12-12 API keys.
- No payload shape changes, no DB writes, no env var changes — old
tokens issued by `main` continue to authenticate.
## Tests
### Unit (all green locally — 63/63)
Updated specs for every migrated service to mock `signAsync` instead of
`sign` and assert the new option shape:
- `login-token.service.spec.ts`, `transient-token.service.spec.ts`,
`workspace-agnostic-token.service.spec.ts`,
`application-token.service.spec.ts`, `api-key.service.spec.ts`,
`connection-provider-oauth-flow.service.spec.ts`.
### Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`)
- Existing ACCESS coverage (current key, legacy HS256 fallback,
rotated-out key, revoked key, unknown kid) is preserved.
- New `it.each` assertion: `REFRESH`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, and `LOGIN`
tokens emitted by the real signUp → signUpInNewWorkspace →
getAuthTokensFromLoginToken pipeline are ES256 with a `kid` matching the
current signing key — proves end-to-end that the migration didn't
regress those flows.
## Open question (separate decision)
This PR keeps the legacy HS256 verification fallback **forever**. We may
eventually want to sunset it for `API_KEY` once telemetry shows
pre-migration tokens are gone, but that's a separate product/security
decision and not part of this change.
## Test plan
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` passes
- [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` passes
- [ ] `jwt-key-rotation` integration suite passes (new + existing
assertions)
- [ ] Manually verify: signing in issues an ES256 ACCESS / REFRESH
token, generating an API key issues an ES256 token with `kid`, signed
file URL JWT is ES256 with `kid`
- [ ] Pre-existing HS256 tokens still authenticate (covered by
integration test, but worth a manual check with a token from `main`)
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Context
Calling `POST /rest/views` (and other metadata mutations) currently
returns a generic `500` for user-input failures:
Ex:
1. **Invalid `objectMetadataId`** —
`resolveEntityRelationUniversalIdentifiers` throws
`FlatEntityMapsException(RELATION_UNIVERSAL_IDENTIFIER_NOT_FOUND)`.
Should be `404`.
2. **Missing required field** (e.g. `icon`) — Postgres raises a `NOT
NULL` violation, wrapped as
`WorkspaceMigrationRunnerException(EXECUTION_FAILED)` carrying a
`QueryFailedError`. Should be `400`.
Neither was caught by `ViewRestApiExceptionFilter`, so both fell through
to `UnhandledExceptionFilter` and were emitted as `500`s without
reaching Sentry.
Same gap existed on most metadata GraphQL resolvers — only
`page-layout*` and `role` resolvers covered
`WorkspaceMigrationRunnerException` via
`WorkspaceMigrationGraphqlApiExceptionInterceptor`.
## Changes
### New filters
REST (`HttpExceptionHandlerService` + Sentry-aware):
- `FlatEntityMapsRestApiExceptionFilter` — maps
`RELATION_UNIVERSAL_IDENTIFIER_NOT_FOUND` / `ENTITY_NOT_FOUND` → `404`,
`ENTITY_ALREADY_EXISTS` → `409`, others → `500`.
- `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerRestApiExceptionFilter` — for
`EXECUTION_FAILED`, unwraps the underlying `metadata` /
`workspaceSchema` / `actionTranspilation` error; if it's a
`QueryFailedError` it gets remapped to `400` via
`HttpExceptionHandlerService`. `APPLICATION_NOT_FOUND` → `404`,
`DDL_LOCKED` → `503`, otherwise `500`.
GraphQL (graphql-errors + existing formatter):
- `FlatEntityMapsGraphqlApiExceptionFilter` — kept as the GraphQL-shaped
counterpart (`NotFoundError` / `InternalServerError`).
- `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerGraphqlApiExceptionFilter` — reuses
`workspaceMigrationRunnerExceptionFormatter` for parity with the
existing interceptor.
### Wiring
Filters are now declared **per controller / resolver** via `@UseFilters`
(no global `APP_FILTER` registration) so they participate in the normal
NestJS filter chain instead of being preempted by
`UnhandledExceptionFilter`.
REST:
- `view.controller.ts` — adds `FlatEntityMapsRestApiExceptionFilter` and
`WorkspaceMigrationRunnerRestApiExceptionFilter`.
GraphQL (14 resolvers, all that mutate flat entities):
- `FlatEntityMapsGraphqlApiExceptionFilter` added to: `view`,
`view-field`, `view-field-group`, `view-sort`, `view-group`,
`view-filter`, `view-filter-group`, `page-layout`, `page-layout-tab`,
`page-layout-widget`, `role`, `object-metadata`, `field-metadata`,
`index-metadata`.
- `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerGraphqlApiExceptionFilter` added to the same
list **except** the four already covered by
`WorkspaceMigrationGraphqlApiExceptionInterceptor` (`page-layout`,
`page-layout-tab`, `page-layout-widget`, `role`) — to avoid
double-handling.
## Why per-resolver / per-controller instead of global
Earlier attempt to register the filters globally via `APP_FILTER`
regressed: NestJS reverses the global filter list and
`selectExceptionFilterMetadata` is first-match-wins, so
`UnhandledExceptionFilter` (registered last via `app.useGlobalFilters`
in `main.ts`) ended up first in the iteration order and preempted every
domain-specific filter. The per-resolver / per-controller approach is
explicit and predictable.
## Before
<img width="953" height="450" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 15 31 40"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3c3bc6a8-f6bc-4032-97d0-7243540cfb90"
/>
## After
<img width="1050" height="598" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 15 31 17"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c66c9ce5-d1ea-4f1d-b2fe-07979e2261f7"
/>
<img width="1068" height="503" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-12 at 15 31 09"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ddd9eed8-812b-47d6-96cb-b019b807991b"
/>
## Context
Today every JWT issued by Twenty (access, refresh, login, file, etc.) is
HMAC-signed with a per-token-type secret derived from the global
`APP_SECRET`. Rotating that secret invalidates **every** active token at
once and there is no way to scope a leak to a subset of tokens.
This PR is the first slice of a broader effort to **decouple stateful
encryption (`APP_SECRET`-derived secrets) from stateless encryption
(JWTs)**. It introduces an asymmetric (private/public key) signing path
for `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` tokens and a signing-key registry to enable
**safe rotation**: leaked keys can be revoked by flipping
`revokedAt`/`isCurrent` on the matching row without invalidating tokens
issued by other keys.
> Out of scope (intentionally): swapping stateful encryption for
`APP_SECRET`, asymmetric signing for token types other than
`ACCESS`/`REFRESH`, an admin-panel rotation UI, and an enterprise
re-encryption command. Those will land in follow-up PRs.
## What changes
- **New `core.signingKey` table** (instance command `2.5.0` /
`1778550000000`) storing both the public key (PEM, in clear) and the
private key (PEM, encrypted with `APP_SECRET` via
`SecretEncryptionService`). One row is marked `isCurrent = true`
(enforced by a partial unique index). The row's UUID `id` is used
directly as the JWT `kid`.
- When a key is rotated out, its `privateKey` is nulled (we never keep
historical private keys) but the `publicKey` row stays so previously
issued tokens can still be verified.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService`** lazily loads-or-generates the current
signing key on first use:
- If a row with `isCurrent = true` exists → decrypts and uses it.
- Otherwise → generates a fresh EC P-256 keypair, encrypts the private
key, inserts the row (UUID id = kid). Handles concurrent insert races
via the unique constraint.
- **`JwtWrapperService.signAsync()`** signs `ACCESS`/`REFRESH` payloads
with `ES256` and a `kid` header. Falls back to `HS256` if no signing key
is available (boot-time DB error, transient failure).
- **Dual-path verification** in both `JwtWrapperService.verifyJwtToken`
and the Passport `JwtAuthStrategy.secretOrKeyProvider`:
- JWT with a `kid` header → resolve the public key PEM by id and verify
with `ES256`,
- otherwise → fall back to the existing `APP_SECRET`-derived `HS256`
path (unchanged).
- **`AccessTokenService` / `RefreshTokenService`** now sign through
`signAsync` (single public surface; the routing detail stays internal to
the wrapper).
- **Public key cache**: a new `SigningKeyEntityCacheProviderService`
plugs into `CoreEntityCacheService` (`signingKeyPublicKey` namespace)
and serves PEMs by id, with the standard local-memo + Redis layering.
- **PEM strings end-to-end**: `jsonwebtoken` accepts PEM strings
directly for both sign and verify, so the manager never converts to a
Node `KeyObject` and the cache hands the PEM straight to `jwt.verify`.
## Why ES256 (and not EdDSA / RS256)
- `@nestjs/jwt` is backed by `jsonwebtoken`, which does **not** support
EdDSA today.
- ES256 keys are tiny (~120 bytes vs 1.6 kB for RS256), signatures are
short (~64 bytes), and signing/verification is fast — important since
JWT verification runs on every authenticated request.
- ES256 is widely supported and standardized (RFC 7518), with mature
ecosystem support.
## Why store the private key in DB (not env)
- No new secret to provision: existing instances already have
`APP_SECRET`, which we reuse to encrypt the private key at rest.
- Self-healing: a fresh instance auto-generates its first signing key on
first boot. Nothing to copy/paste.
- Rotation is a SQL operation against `core.signingKey`, not a redeploy
+ env mutation.
## Backward compatibility
- All previously-issued tokens (no `kid`) keep verifying through the
legacy HS256 path with their existing `APP_SECRET`-derived secret. No
forced re-login.
- Token types not in scope (`WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, `API_KEY`, `FILE`,
`LOGIN`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, etc.) keep their current HS256 behavior
unchanged — they still go through the synchronous
`JwtWrapperService.sign(payload, options)` with a caller-supplied
secret.
- `signWithAppSecret` is kept intentionally as the HS256 fallback path;
it will be deprecated in a follow-up PR.
- If the DB lookup/generation fails for any reason, the wrapper logs the
error and falls back to HS256 — no startup crash, no silent regression.
## Rotation story
1. Bootstrap: first signing call lazily inserts a row in
`core.signingKey` with `isCurrent = true`, `privateKey =
encrypt(pem_A)`. New tokens carry `kid_A`.
2. Rotate: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "isCurrent" = false,
"privateKey" = NULL WHERE id = '<kid_A>';` then insert a new row with
`isCurrent = true`. New tokens carry `kid_B`. Tokens still in flight
with `kid_A` keep verifying because the public-key row for `kid_A` is
still there.
3. Revoke: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "revokedAt" = now() WHERE id =
'<kid_A>';`. All tokens with `kid_A` now fail verification cleanly with
`UNAUTHENTICATED` (no 500).
4. Tokens with no `kid` (legacy) are unaffected throughout.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit: `JwtWrapperService` dual-path verification (HS256 no-kid vs
ES256 with-kid), unknown-kid → `UNAUTHENTICATED`, `signAsync` happy path
+ `null` when no key, `signAsync` rejection for non-rotatable types.
- [x] Unit: `JwtAuthStrategy` `secretOrKeyProvider` dual-path resolution
and algorithm validation.
- [x] All existing JWT/auth/application unit tests adjusted to the
renamed public method.
- [x] Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`):
- **Happy path**: signed-up user's `ACCESS` token has `alg=ES256` +
correct UUID `kid`, the `isCurrent=true` row exists in
`core.signingKey`, `getCurrentUser` resolves.
- **Legacy fallback**: hand-crafted no-kid HS256 token verifies via the
legacy `APP_SECRET`-derived path.
- **Previous-key rotation**: token signed by a hardcoded *previous* key
whose row is pre-inserted with `privateKey = NULL` (rotated-out) still
verifies — proves the leaked-key revocation flow works in both
directions.
- **Unknown kid**: token signed with an orphan UUID `kid` is cleanly
rejected (no 500).
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx test twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx run twenty-server:lint`
## Summary
On kanban cards, the title was being truncated even when the checkbox
wasn't displayed. The checkbox is hidden via `opacity: 0` on the card's
non-hovered state, which keeps it in flex flow and still reserves its
~24px of width — so the title's flex item was shrinking unnecessarily.
This change collapses the checkbox container's `max-width` to `0` (with
`overflow: hidden`) while it's hidden, and expands it back to the
checkbox's natural size (`spacing[6]` = 24px) on hover or when selected.
The existing `transition: all ease-in-out 160ms` animates the title
expanding into the freed space.
### Before
Title truncates with ellipsis even though the checkbox slot is empty:
<img width="350" alt="before"
src="https://i.imgur.com/placeholder-before.png" />
### After
Title uses the full row width when not hovered; the checkbox slides in
on hover (or when the card is selected) and the title reflows.
### Tooltip
The full title is already exposed on hover when truncated — `RecordChip`
→ `Chip` already wraps the label in `OverflowingTextWithTooltip`, which
detects overflow (`scrollWidth > clientWidth`) and renders an
`AppTooltip` with the full text. No additional wiring needed.
## Test plan
- [ ] On a kanban board, verify a long record title now uses the full
card width when the card is not hovered (no ellipsis if the title fits).
- [ ] Hover the card: the checkbox slides in smoothly (animated), and
the title reflows (may now truncate if it doesn't fit).
- [ ] Hover the (now-truncated) title: tooltip with the full title
appears.
- [ ] Select the card via the checkbox: checkbox stays visible (and
title stays in its hover-state width) without hovering.
- [ ] Compact view (eye icon) still renders correctly.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Two related cleanups, following the same pattern as #19916 and #19074.
### Dead feature flags
Drops four feature flags whose only references are the enum entry and
the generated GraphQL/SDK files:
- `IS_COMMAND_MENU_ITEM_ENABLED` — never read anywhere.
- `IS_DATASOURCE_MIGRATED` — already commented `@deprecated`. Zero
non-generated consumers.
- `IS_RICH_TEXT_V1_MIGRATED` — the 1-19 migration that gated it was
removed in #19074; the flag became dead at that point.
- `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` — only read by the 1-21
`migrate-messaging-infrastructure-to-metadata` command as an
early-return guard, but the flag was never written anywhere in the
codebase, so the guard never fired (and that workspace command is now
removed entirely — see below).
Generated GraphQL/SDK schemas and the `workspace-entity-manager` test
mock are trimmed to match.
### 1-21 workspace commands
Same pattern as #19074 (which removed workspace commands ≤ 1.18). Twenty
is now on 2-5; the 1-21 workspace commands have long since run on every
active workspace and are dead code.
Removes:
- All 14 workspace commands under `upgrade-version-command/1-21/`
(compose-email menu item, key-value-pair index, datasource backfill,
message-thread backfill, dedup engine commands, select-all fixes, AI
response format migration, edit-layout label, drop messaging FKs, folder
parent-id migration, messaging-infra-to-metadata, navigation refactor,
message-thread label fix, search-menu-item label).
- The `1-21-upgrade-version-command.module.ts` registration and the
`V1_21_UpgradeVersionCommandModule` import from
`WorkspaceCommandProviderModule`.
**Kept** (intentionally): the 3 `1-21-instance-command-fast-*` files.
Unlike workspace commands (which mutate data), instance commands carry
**schema deltas** still required by current entity definitions
(`AddViewFieldGroupIdIndex`, `MigrateMessagingCalendarToCore`,
`AddEmailThreadWidgetType`). They remain registered in
`INSTANCE_COMMANDS` and `'1.21.0'` stays in `TWENTY_PREVIOUS_VERSIONS`.
They will fold away naturally on a future version bump when a
`CoreMigrationCheck`-style snapshot picks them up.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-shared`
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front`
- [x] `npx prettier --check` on the changed files
- [x] `npx oxlint` on the changed server files
- [x] `npx jest feature-flag` (4 suites, 20 tests pass)
- [x] `npx jest workspace-entity-manager` (1 suite, 5 tests pass)
2026-05-12 11:25:20 +02:00
1019 changed files with 37683 additions and 14911 deletions
description: GitHub Actions security guidelines for supply chain protection
globs: **/.github/**/*.yml, **/.github/**/*.yaml
alwaysApply: false
---
# GitHub Actions Security
## Pin Third-Party Actions to Commit SHAs
Always reference external actions and reusable workflows by their full commit SHA, never by a mutable tag or branch. Tags can be force-pushed by a compromised maintainer account.
```yaml
# ❌ Mutable tag — vulnerable to supply chain attacks
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
# ✅ Pinned to commit SHA with tag comment for readability
## Prefer `gh api` Over Third-Party Dispatch Actions
For repository dispatch calls, use `gh api` directly instead of third-party actions like `peter-evans/repository-dispatch`. This eliminates a supply-chain dependency entirely.
```yaml
# ✅ Use env vars + bracket notation to prevent injection
Mode** (toggle on). Discord then shows extra "Copy ID" options on
right-click.
2.**Channel ID** — right-click any channel → *Copy Channel ID*.
3.**Message ID** — right-click any message → *Copy Message ID*.
4.**Server (guild) ID** — right-click the server icon → *Copy Server ID*.
Only needed for `discord-list-channels` when your bot is in multiple
servers (otherwise leave it blank for auto-pick).
> **Tip:** when chaining steps, pass `messageId` from a previous *Send
> Discord message* step directly into a follow-up *Update / Delete / Add
> Reaction* step. No copy/paste needed.
## Limitations
What this connector intentionally does **not** support in v1:
- **Direct messages to users.** Discord's DM API needs a different identity
flow.
- **Threads.** Replying inside a thread or starting a new one isn't exposed.
- **Webhooks.** Uses the bot REST API only.
- **Slash commands / interactions.** The bot doesn't register or respond to
`/commands`.
- **Per-workspace identity.** All Twenty workspaces in the same Twenty
deployment share the same Discord bot — see
[Why bot token instead of OAuth?](#why-bot-token-instead-of-oauth) below.
- **2000-character message limit.** Discord rejects longer payloads with
HTTP 400.
## Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| `Discord is not configured` | `DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN` not set | Admin: paste the bot token in Settings → Applications → Discord → **Settings tab** |
| `401 Unauthorized` | Token wrong, copied with whitespace, or rotated | Reset the token in the Discord Developer Portal and re-paste |
| `Missing Access (50001)` | Bot wasn't invited to that server | Re-run the OAuth invite URL for that server (see admin setup) |
| `Missing Permissions (50013)` | Bot is in the server but lacks Send / Manage / React permissions | In Discord: server settings → roles → grant the bot's role the missing permission |
| `Unknown Channel (10003)` | `channelId` is wrong, or bot can't see that channel | Verify the ID; check the bot has *View Channel* permission |
| `Unknown Message (10008)` | `messageId` is wrong, or message was deleted | Verify the ID is from a still-existing message |
| `Cannot edit a message authored by another user (50005)` | Trying to update / delete a message the bot didn't send | The bot can only edit its own messages; it can delete others' messages only with the *Manage Messages* permission |
| `Bot is in N Discord servers — please specify which one` (from list-channels) | Bot is in multiple servers and `guildId` was left blank | Copy the server ID from the error message and paste it into the `guildId` field |
| `Discord API responded with 429` | Hit Discord's rate limit | Reduce workflow concurrency; this connector doesn't yet auto-retry |
---
## Self-hosting setup (admin-only)
This section is for Twenty server admins. If you're on Twenty Cloud, skip
this — the bot credentials are already configured.
### 1. Create a Discord application
1. Visit https://discord.com/developers/applications and click
**New Application**.
2. Name it (e.g. *"Twenty Bot"*) and create. Use a dedicated app — don't
'Connect Discord to Twenty. Workflow steps post, update, and delete bot messages and add reactions using a Discord bot token shared across the deployment.',
logoUrl:'public/twenty-discord.svg',
author:'Twenty',
category:'Communication',
aboutDescription:
'Official Discord connector for Twenty CRM. Create a Discord application at https://discord.com/developers/applications, copy its bot token into the DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN application variable, then invite the bot to each server you want workflows to post in. Use workflow actions to post, update, or delete bot messages and add reactions.',
'Bot token from your Discord application (Developer Portal → Bot tab → Reset Token). Used with the `Bot` auth prefix to call the Discord REST API. The same token authenticates the bot across every guild it has been invited to.',
'List the text-postable channels (types `GUILD_TEXT` and `GUILD_ANNOUNCEMENT`) in a Discord server, sorted by Discord position. Each entry exposes `id`, `name`, `type`, `parentId` (category), and `position`. Pass the server (guild) ID to scope the listing; if omitted and the bot is in exactly one server, that server is auto-selected. If the bot is in multiple servers, the error response lists each server name and ID for explicit selection. Voice channels, threads, forums, and categories are excluded.',
'List the Discord servers (guilds) the bot has been invited to. Each entry exposes `id` and `name`. Use this to discover which servers the bot can post in, then pass the chosen server ID to `discord-list-channels` or other server-scoped actions.',
'Bot has not been invited to any Discord server yet. Use the OAuth2 → URL Generator in the Discord Developer Portal (scope `bot`) to invite it to a server, then retry.',
};
}
if(guilds.length>1){
constguildList=guilds
.map((guild)=>`"${guild.name}" (${guild.id})`)
.join(', ');
return{
ok: false,
error:`Bot is in ${guilds.length} Discord servers — please specify which one via the guildId input. Available: ${guildList}.`,
description:'Channel where the message lives (Discord channel ID).',
},
messageId:{
type:'string',
label:'Message ID',
description:
'The message to react to: its **message ID** (same value as `messageId` returned when the bot posted it, or right-click the message → "Copy Message ID").',
},
emoji:{
type:'string',
label:'Emoji',
description:
'Emoji to add. For a standard unicode emoji, paste the emoji directly (e.g. `👍`, `✅`, `🎉`). For a custom server emoji, use the format `name:id` (e.g. `partyparrot:643452342342342342`). The bot must have **Add Reactions** permission in the channel.',
description:'Channel that contains the message (Discord channel ID).',
},
messageId:{
type:'string',
label:'Message ID',
description:
'Which message to remove: its **message ID** (same value as `messageId` returned when the bot posted it). The bot can delete its own messages without extra permissions; deleting others\' messages requires the **Manage Messages** permission.',
'Optional. The Discord server ID to list channels for (a long number like `1234567890123456789`). In Discord with Developer Mode on: right-click the server icon → "Copy Server ID". If omitted and the bot is in exactly one server, that server is used automatically; if the bot is in multiple servers, the error response lists each server name and ID so you can pick one.',
'Where to post: the Discord channel ID (a long number like `1234567890123456789`). In Discord with Developer Mode on: right-click the channel → "Copy Channel ID". The bot must be a member of the server and have permission to send messages in this channel.',
},
messageText:{
type:'string',
label:'Message',
multiline: true,
description:
'The message text. Supports Discord-flavoured markdown (**bold**, *italics*, ```code blocks```, lists, links). Max 2000 characters — Discord rejects longer payloads.',
},
replyToMessageId:{
type:'string',
label:'Reply to message ID',
description:
'Optional. To reply to an existing message, paste its ID (from a previous step\'s `messageId` output, or right-click the message → "Copy Message ID"). Leave empty for a normal new message.',
description:'Channel that contains the message (Discord channel ID).',
},
messageId:{
type:'string',
label:'Message ID',
description:
'Which message to edit: its **message ID** (same value as `messageId` returned when the bot posted the message). You can only edit messages this bot sent.',
},
newMessageText:{
type:'string',
label:'New message',
multiline: true,
description:
'Replacement text shown in Discord instead of the old content. Supports Discord-flavoured markdown. Max 2000 characters.',
'Discord is not configured. Open the Twenty Discord app settings and set the DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN application variable (Developer Portal → Bot tab → Reset Token).',
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