Removed the dependency on dragging state for the visibility of the add menu item button in the navigation drawer, ensuring it remains visible when in edit mode.
Closes#17089
### 1. Can't reopen record after having navigated to its show page
After opening a record in the show page from the command menu and going
back to the index, clicking the same record again did nothing. The
command menu navigation stack was not cleared when opening in the show
page, so the "already open" check skipped reopening. We now clear the
command menu navigation stack before navigating to the show page (in
`RecordShowRightDrawerOpenRecordButton`), so the same record can be
reopened from the index.
### 2. Row doesn't highlight when opening command menu after return from
show page
After returning from the record show page to the index, the first row
click opened the command menu but the row did not highlight. The "side
panel close" event was emitted not only when the panel actually closed,
but also when opening the command menu (cleanup ran with
`isCommandMenuClosing` and always emitted the event). Listeners like
`RecordTableDeactivateRecordTableRowEffect` then deactivated the row. We
now emit the side panel close event only when the close animation
actually completes (`CommandMenuSidePanelForDesktop`), and skip emitting
it when cleanup is run from the open path (`useNavigateCommandMenu`
passes `emitSidePanelCloseEvent: false`). The table still deactivates
the row when the user closes the panel, but no longer when they open the
command menu by clicking a row.
Fixes#13838
When creating a note from the command menu side panel (e.g. clicking
"Add Note" in a related notes section on an Opportunity/company/people
page), the title field was not auto-focused — focus point went to body
instead.
## Root Cause
When a record opens in the side panel, there is no page navigation, so
`PageChangeEffect` (which handles title auto-focus for full-page views)
never runs. `openNewRecordTitleCell()` was simply never called for the
side-panel path.
## Fix
`openRecordInCommandMenu` is the single entry point for all side-panel
record opens, so title auto-focus is handled there once for all callers.
Previously, `useCreateNewIndexRecord` called `openRecordInCommandMenu`
and then called `openNewRecordTitleCell` separately, which would have
caused a double invocation after this fix. The redundant call has been
removed.
## Before
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df0d9e4f-dc25-4a0d-a49e-898a14f9c0a0
## After
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1a5044f7-6bb7-4333-8934-c1081b935e97
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
- Implement a return-to-path mechanism that preserves the user's
intended destination across authentication flows (login, magic link,
cross-domain redirects)
- Uses layered persistence: Jotai atom (in-memory), sessionStorage with
TTL (tab-switch resilience), URL query parameter (cross-domain
propagation)
- Includes path validation to prevent open redirects, automatic cleanup
after successful login, and comprehensive test coverage
- Replaces the unused `previousUrlState` with a robust
`returnToPathState` system
## Test plan
- [ ] Visit a deep link (e.g. `/objects/tasks`) while logged out —
should redirect to login, then back to `/objects/tasks` after logging in
- [ ] Visit an OAuth authorize link while logged out — should redirect
to login, then to the authorize page
- [ ] Test magic link flow: click sign-in link that opens new tab —
should still redirect to original destination
- [ ] Test cross-domain: visit `app.twenty.com/objects/tasks` — should
preserve path through workspace domain redirect
- [ ] Verify auth/onboarding paths are excluded from being saved as
return paths
- [ ] Verify return-to-path is cleared after successful navigation
- [ ] All 215 existing `usePageChangeEffectNavigateLocation` tests pass
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
This PR adds an explicit role selector to the "Invite by email" flow,
requires a role choice before sending, and stores the selected role with
each invitation. The backend now accepts and persists `roleId` on
invitations and applies it when the invite is accepted, while keeping it
optional to avoid breaking existing clients and legacy invites.
---
### Frontend
- **Settings → Members → Invite by email**
- New **Role** dropdown (same `Select` pattern as member/API key role
selectors) between the email input and Invite button.
- Roles are loaded via `SettingsRolesQueryEffect` and
`settingsAllRolesSelector`; only roles with `canBeAssignedToUsers` are
shown.
- Role is **required**: form validates `roleId` (e.g.
`z.string().min(1)`) and the Invite button is disabled until a role is
selected and emails are valid.
- `WorkspaceInviteTeam` receives `roles` as a prop from the parent;
layout is responsive (e.g. stacked on small viewports).
- **Pending invitations table**
- New **Role** column showing the invitation’s role label (or "Unknown
role" for legacy invites without `roleId`), using the same roles source
for lookup.
- **Onboarding invite step**
- When sending invites during onboarding, the workspace **default role**
is used when available (`currentWorkspace?.defaultRole?.id`), so no role
selector is added there.
- **GraphQL**
- `sendInvitations` mutation accepts optional `roleId`;
`findWorkspaceInvitations` and resend mutation responses include
`roleId` on `WorkspaceInvitation`. Frontend types (e.g.
`WorkspaceInvitation`, hook variables) updated accordingly.
---
### Backend
- **API**
- `SendInvitationsInput` has an **optional** `roleId` (UUID, nullable).
The resolver normalises `null` to `undefined` so existing callers and
legacy flows are not broken.
- **Validation (when `roleId` is provided)**
- Role checks are centralised in **RoleValidationService**
(`RoleValidationModule`, in `metadata-modules/role-validation/`). It
validates that the role exists in the workspace and has
`canBeAssignedToUsers`, and throws a permissions-style error otherwise.
This avoids circular dependencies (e.g. `RoleModule` imports
`UserWorkspaceModule`, so invite/accept flows cannot depend on
`RoleModule`).
- **Send flow:** `WorkspaceInvitationResolver` and
`WorkspaceInvitationService.sendInvitations` both call
`RoleValidationService.validateRoleAssignableToUsersOrThrow` when
`roleId` is present (resolver before calling the service; service again
before creating tokens so that **resend** also validates the stored role
and fails fast if the role was deleted or made unassignable).
- **Accept flow:**
`UserWorkspaceService.addUserToWorkspaceIfUserNotInWorkspace` uses the
same service in `resolveRoleIdForNewMember` when an invitation provides
a `roleId`, then falls back to `workspace.defaultRoleId` when not.
Role/default is resolved and validated before any user/workspace/member
creation.
- **Persistence**
- Invitation app tokens store `roleId` in `context` next to `email`
(`context: { email, roleId? }`). `generateInvitationToken` and
`createWorkspaceInvitation` accept an optional `roleId` and only add it
to `context` when defined.
- **Resend**
- Resend passes the existing invitation’s `context.roleId` into
`sendInvitations`. The service validates that role (when present) before
creating the new token, so if the role was deleted or made unassignable,
resend fails with a clear error instead of sending a broken link.
- **Response shape**
- `SendInvitationsOutput.result` remains `WorkspaceInvitation[]`. When
`usePersonalInvitation` is false we only push full invitation records
(from `castAppTokenToWorkspaceInvitationUtil`), so the result always
matches the GraphQL type (`id`, `email`, `roleId`, `expiresAt`).
- **Modules**
- `WorkspaceInvitationModule` and `UserWorkspaceModule` import
**RoleValidationModule** (not `RoleModule`) and inject
**RoleValidationService** for validation. `RoleModule` imports
`RoleValidationModule` and `RoleService` delegates to
`RoleValidationService` for the same validation where the module graph
allows.
---
### Backward compatibility
- **Optional `roleId`**: Clients that don’t send `roleId` (or send
`null`) are unchanged; invitations are created without a role and the
accept flow uses the workspace default role.
- **Legacy invitations**: App tokens with only `context.email` still
work; `context.roleId` is optional and the UI can show e.g. "Unknown
role" for those in the pending-invitations table.
## Summary
Cleans up the chip component hierarchy in `twenty-ui`:
- **Fix twenty-ui Storybook** — The `wyw-in-js` Vite plugin crashed on
`/@react-refresh` virtual module. Fixed by setting `enforce: 'pre'` so
it runs before the React refresh plugin injects virtual imports.
- **Rename `AvatarChip` → `AvatarOrIcon`** — The old name was
misleading. This component is not a chip — it's a polymorphic renderer
that displays either an `Avatar` (image/initials) or an `Icon` (plain or
with colored background). It's typically slotted into `Chip`/`LinkChip`
as `leftComponent`.
- **Move `rightComponentDivider` to `Chip`/`LinkChip`** — The vertical
separator between chip content and a right action (e.g. a close button)
is a chip layout concern, not an avatar concern. Added
`rightComponentDivider` boolean prop to `Chip` and `LinkChip`.
- **Remove `MultipleAvatarChip`** — Zero consumers in the codebase. The
command menu implements its own overlapping avatar layout.
- **Migrate raw icon usages** — `CalendarEventDetails` and `FileIcon`
(small size) now use `AvatarOrIcon` for consistent Chip icon rendering.
- **Enhance stories** — Full `CatalogDecorator` coverage for `Chip` and
`LinkChip` showing all variants, sizes, accents, and states.
## Component hierarchy
```
AvatarOrIcon (twenty-ui)
├── No Icon → renders Avatar (image or initials)
├── Icon + background → renders icon in colored square
└── Icon only → renders plain icon
Used as leftComponent/rightComponent in Chip or standalone
Chip (twenty-ui)
├── leftComponent (typically AvatarOrIcon)
├── label (with overflow tooltip)
├── rightComponentDivider (optional vertical separator)
└── rightComponent (e.g. close icon via AvatarOrIcon)
LinkChip (twenty-ui)
└── Wraps Chip inside a react-router <Link>
RecordChip (twenty-front)
└── Composes Chip/LinkChip + AvatarOrIcon with record data
```
## `Chip` API additions
| Prop | Type | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| `rightComponentDivider` | `boolean` | Renders a vertical separator
before `rightComponent` |
## Stories
<img width="1032" height="576" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe7c7666-9b16-4545-b87e-1b53e22d462d"
/>
## Context
Part 1 of migrating gridPosition in favor of typed position
FE should now always send both values to the BE and use both.
Next steps:
- Update the backend to enforce and validate the new position field + DB
migrations gridPositon -> position (type: GRID)
- Cleanup frontend usage
- Cleanup backend
If-else branches cannot be recreated once deleted. Only else-if branches
can. On if-else branches removal, we now remplace the node by an empty
node instead of only deleting
Also fixing nested if-else.
## Summary
Follow-up to #18267. Hardens the OAuth implementation with security
fixes identified during audit:
**P0 — Critical:**
- Bind authorization codes to `client_id` in context to prevent auth
code injection (RFC 6749 §4.1.3)
- Store PKCE `code_challenge` directly in auth code context instead of a
separate `CodeChallenge` token — cryptographically binds the challenge
to its code
- Enforce `code_verifier` when `code_challenge` was used during
authorization
- Hash authorization codes (SHA-256) before storage to prevent exposure
if DB is compromised
- Add `Cache-Control: no-store` + `Pragma: no-cache` headers on token
responses (RFC 6749 §5.1)
- Add rate limiting on `/oauth/token` endpoint (20 req/min per client
via existing `ThrottlerService`)
**P1 — High:**
- Return HTTP 401 for `invalid_client` errors instead of 400 (RFC 6749
§5.2)
- Verify refresh tokens belong to the presenting client (cross-client
token theft prevention)
- Limit fields exposed by public `findApplicationRegistrationByClientId`
query to only what the frontend needs (`id`, `name`, `logoUrl`,
`websiteUrl`, `oAuthScopes`)
- Require `API_KEYS_AND_WEBHOOKS` permission for
`createApplicationRegistration` mutation
**P2/P3 — Medium/Low:**
- Add error handling and loading states to frontend Authorize page
- Rename redirect URL param from `authorizationCode` to `code` (RFC
standard)
- Add unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` utility (8 test cases)
## Test plan
- [ ] Existing OAuth integration tests updated for all changes (hashed
codes, context-based PKCE, client binding, 401 status codes, cache
headers)
- [ ] New test: auth code rejected when presented by a different client
- [ ] New test: refresh token rejected when presented by a different
client
- [ ] New test: `code_verifier` required when PKCE was used in
authorization
- [ ] New test: `Cache-Control: no-store` header present on responses
- [ ] New unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` (HTTPS, localhost,
fragments, invalid URIs)
- [ ] Verify frontend authorize page shows errors gracefully
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
- Fixes self host application
- add new telemetry information
- add serverId to identify a server instance
- remove .twenty from git tracking
- tree-shake "twenty-sdk" usage in built logic functions and front
components
- fix "twenty-sdk" version usage
- fix twenty-zapier cli
---------
Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The `repository_dispatch` API endpoint requires `contents: write`
permission on the GITHUB_TOKEN, not `actions: write`. Our security
hardening PR inadvertently changed this to `contents: read`, breaking
the self-dispatch to the keepalive workflow.
Made-with: Cursor
This commit introduces the EditModeProps type to enhance type safety in edit mode handling. Additionally, it updates component imports in NavigationDrawerSectionForWorkspaceItemContent, NavigationDrawerSectionForWorkspaceItems, and NavigationDrawerSectionForWorkspaceItemsListDndKit to utilize the new type definitions, improving clarity and maintainability across the object metadata module.
## Summary
- Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in composite actions
(`restore-cache`, `nx-affected`) and workflow files (`claude.yml`)
- Reduce overly broad permissions in `ci-utils.yaml` (Danger.js) and
`ci-breaking-changes.yaml`
- Restructure `preview-env-dispatch.yaml`: auto-trigger for members,
opt-in for contributor PRs via `preview-app` label (safe because
keepalive has no write tokens)
- Isolate all write-access operations (PR comments, cross-repo posting)
to a new dedicated
[`twentyhq/ci-privileged`](https://github.com/twentyhq/ci-privileged)
repo via `repository_dispatch`, so that workflows in twenty that execute
contributor code never have write tokens
- Create `post-ci-comments.yaml` (`workflow_run` bridge) to dispatch
breaking changes results to ci-privileged, solving the [fork PR comment
issue](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/13713#issuecomment-3168999083)
- Delete 5 unused secrets and broken `i18n-qa-report` workflow
- Remove `TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN` from twenty (moved to ci-privileged as
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`)
- Use `toJSON()` for all `client-payload` values to prevent JSON
injection
## Security model after this PR
| Workflow | Executes fork code? | Write tokens available? |
|----------|---------------------|------------------------|
| preview-env-keepalive | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| preview-env-dispatch | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN
only |
| ci-breaking-changes | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| post-ci-comments (workflow_run) | No (default branch) |
CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN only |
| claude.yml | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN,
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN |
| ci-utils (Danger.js) | No (base branch) | GITHUB_TOKEN (scoped) |
All actual write tokens (`TWENTY_PR_COMMENT_TOKEN`,
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`) live in `twentyhq/ci-privileged` with
strict CODEOWNERS review and branch protection.
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify preview environment comments still appear on member PRs
- [ ] Verify adding `preview-app` label triggers preview for contributor
PRs
- [ ] Verify breaking changes reports still post on PRs (including fork
PRs)
- [ ] Verify Claude cross-repo responses still post on core-team-issues
- [ ] Confirm ci-privileged branch protection is enforced
## Summary
- **Settings selector**: The Settings navigation item is now rendered as
a `<button>` (via `NavigationDrawerItem` with `onClick`) instead of an
`<a>` link (with `to`). Updated `leftMenu.ts` POM and
`create-kanban-view.spec.ts` to use `getByRole('button', { name:
'Settings' })`.
- **create-record URL field**: The Linkedin field interaction was
missing an initial label click to trigger the hover portal rendering.
Added `recordFieldList.getByText('Linkedin').first().click()` before the
value click, matching the pattern used by the working Emails field.
## Test plan
- [ ] E2E `signup_invite_email.spec.ts` passes (uses
`leftMenu.goToSettings()`)
- [ ] E2E `create-kanban-view.spec.ts` passes (uses Settings click
directly)
- [ ] E2E `create-record.spec.ts` passes (Linkedin URL field
interaction)
- [ ] Existing passing E2E tests remain green
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
## Summary
- Fixes a script injection vulnerability in the `claude-cross-repo`
job's `actions/github-script` step where `${{ steps.prompt.outputs.repo
}}` and `${{ steps.prompt.outputs.issue_number }}` were interpolated
directly into JavaScript string literals. A crafted dispatch payload
could inject arbitrary JavaScript with access to
`secrets.TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN`.
- Values are now passed via `env:` and accessed through `process.env`,
which treats them as data rather than code.
## Context
Motivated by the [hackerbot-claw
campaign](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/hackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation)
which exploited similar `${{ }}` expression injection patterns in
workflows at Microsoft, DataDog, and CNCF projects.
The broader analysis found that our workflow is **not vulnerable** to
the primary attack vector (Pwn Request via `pull_request_target` +
untrusted checkout), and `claude-code-action` already gates on write
access internally. This expression injection in the cross-repo dispatch
job was the only concrete vulnerability identified.
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify the `claude-cross-repo` job still posts comments back to
the source issue after a dispatch run
- [ ] Confirm `TARGET_REPO` and `TARGET_ISSUE` env vars are correctly
resolved from step outputs
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
Abdul Rahman