Files
twenty/packages/twenty-server/test/integration/secret-encryption/application-registration-variable-encryption.integration-spec.ts
T
Charles BochetandGitHub 7fa136f305 feat(twenty-server): migrate remaining at-rest encryption sites to versioned envelope (#20550)
## Summary

Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR
(#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and
migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer.
This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the
versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed
CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window
— every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently
delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload.

### Service migrations
- **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF
info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new
`decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for
the resolver display path.
- **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers —
**instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config
readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info
is `instance`. Updated consumers:
  - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap`
  - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials`
- **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** —
workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into
`decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at
execution time.
- **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`**
(workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the
secret/non-secret toggle.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are
shared across the JWKS.
- **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING
config variables.

### Slow instance commands (2.5.0)

Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows
into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained:

| timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId |
`"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance
| `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance |
`"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_
— heterogeneous jsonb column |

All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2
form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint.
Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint —
they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback.

### Tests

- Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the
idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope.
- New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts
`decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId`
(instance scope).
- Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`,
`ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API
and the workspace HKDF context plumbing.
- New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the
service spec.
- Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to
assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw
legacy CTR.

### Out of scope (future PRs)
- `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke
`jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key +
`encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own
migration.
- `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc`
`iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration.

## Test plan

- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier)
- [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token |
application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var
| jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable |
encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key |
encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass.
- [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86
tests pass.
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer
(each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the
migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
2026-05-14 06:10:52 +00:00

205 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'crypto';
import gql from 'graphql-tag';
import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
import { type DataSource } from 'typeorm';
import { makeMetadataAPIRequest } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/utils/make-metadata-api-request.util';
import { buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv } from 'test/integration/upgrade/utils/build-secret-encryption-service.util';
import { SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/constants/secret-encryption.constant';
import { type SecretEncryptionService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/secret-encryption.service';
const V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX = /^enc:v2:[0-9a-f]{8}:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$/;
const CONSTRAINT_NAME =
'CHK_applicationRegistrationVariable_encryptedValue_encrypted';
const CONSTRAINT_EXPR = `"encryptedValue" = '' OR "encryptedValue" LIKE 'enc:v2:%'`;
describe('ApplicationRegistrationVariable encryption (integration)', () => {
let dataSource: DataSource;
let secretEncryption: SecretEncryptionService;
let applicationRegistrationId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
dataSource = global.testDataSource;
secretEncryption = buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv();
const createRegistrationResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation CreateRegistrationForEncryptionTest(
$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationInput!
) {
createApplicationRegistration(input: $input) {
applicationRegistration {
id
}
}
}
`,
variables: {
input: { name: 'enc-integration-test-registration' },
},
});
const registrationId =
createRegistrationResponse.body?.data?.createApplicationRegistration
?.applicationRegistration?.id;
if (!isDefined(registrationId)) {
throw new Error(
`createApplicationRegistration failed: ${JSON.stringify(
createRegistrationResponse.body,
)}`,
);
}
applicationRegistrationId = registrationId;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation DeleteRegistrationForEncryptionTest($id: String!) {
deleteApplicationRegistration(id: $id)
}
`,
variables: { id: applicationRegistrationId },
});
});
it('encrypts the value on the API write path, persists ciphertext in Postgres, and decrypts back via the API read path', async () => {
const plaintext = 'this-is-a-v2-encrypted-secret-value';
const createVariableResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation CreateVariableForEncryptionTest(
$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationVariableInput!
) {
createApplicationRegistrationVariable(input: $input) {
id
}
}
`,
variables: {
input: {
applicationRegistrationId,
key: 'TEST_V2_KEY',
value: plaintext,
isSecret: false,
},
},
});
expect(createVariableResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variableId =
createVariableResponse.body.data.createApplicationRegistrationVariable.id;
const [dbRow] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue" FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
[variableId],
);
expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).not.toContain(plaintext);
expect(
dbRow.encryptedValue.startsWith(SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX),
).toBe(true);
expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).toMatch(V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX);
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindVariablesForEncryptionTest(
$applicationRegistrationId: String!
) {
findApplicationRegistrationVariables(
applicationRegistrationId: $applicationRegistrationId
) {
id
key
value
isSecret
}
}
`,
variables: { applicationRegistrationId },
});
expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variable =
findResponse.body.data.findApplicationRegistrationVariables.find(
(v: { id: string }) => v.id === variableId,
);
expect(variable).toBeDefined();
expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(false);
expect(variable.value).toBe(plaintext);
});
describe('legacy CTR fallback', () => {
let legacyVariableId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
await dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}"`,
);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await dataSource.query(
`DELETE FROM core."applicationRegistrationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
[legacyVariableId],
);
await dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
ADD CONSTRAINT "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}" CHECK (${CONSTRAINT_EXPR})`,
);
});
it('decrypts a legacy CTR-encrypted value through the live API', async () => {
legacyVariableId = crypto.randomUUID();
const plaintext = 'legacy-ctr-registration-variable-secret';
await dataSource.query(
`INSERT INTO core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
(id, "applicationRegistrationId", "key", "encryptedValue",
"isSecret", "isRequired")
VALUES ($1, $2, 'TEST_LEGACY_CTR_KEY', $3, false, false)`,
[
legacyVariableId,
applicationRegistrationId,
secretEncryption.encrypt(plaintext),
],
);
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindLegacyCtrVariablesForEncryptionTest(
$applicationRegistrationId: String!
) {
findApplicationRegistrationVariables(
applicationRegistrationId: $applicationRegistrationId
) {
id
value
isSecret
}
}
`,
variables: { applicationRegistrationId },
});
expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variable =
findResponse.body.data.findApplicationRegistrationVariables.find(
(v: { id: string }) => v.id === legacyVariableId,
);
expect(variable).toBeDefined();
expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(false);
expect(variable.value).toBe(plaintext);
});
});
});