## Summary Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR (#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer. This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window — every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload. ### Service migrations - **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new `decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for the resolver display path. - **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers — **instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info is `instance`. Updated consumers: - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap` - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials` - **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** — workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into `decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at execution time. - **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`** (workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the secret/non-secret toggle. - **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are shared across the JWKS. - **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING config variables. ### Slow instance commands (2.5.0) Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained: | timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint | |---|---|---|---| | `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId | `"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance | `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance | `"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_ — heterogeneous jsonb column | All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2 form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint. Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint — they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback. ### Tests - Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope. - New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts `decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId` (instance scope). - Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`, `ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API and the workspace HKDF context plumbing. - New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the service spec. - Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw legacy CTR. ### Out of scope (future PRs) - `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke `jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key + `encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own migration. - `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc` `iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration. ## Test plan - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier) - [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token | application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var | jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable | encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass. - [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86 tests pass. - [ ] CI green - [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer (each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
205 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
205 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto';
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import gql from 'graphql-tag';
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import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
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import { type DataSource } from 'typeorm';
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import { makeMetadataAPIRequest } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/utils/make-metadata-api-request.util';
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import { buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv } from 'test/integration/upgrade/utils/build-secret-encryption-service.util';
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import { SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/constants/secret-encryption.constant';
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import { type SecretEncryptionService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/secret-encryption.service';
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const V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX = /^enc:v2:[0-9a-f]{8}:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$/;
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const CONSTRAINT_NAME =
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'CHK_applicationRegistrationVariable_encryptedValue_encrypted';
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const CONSTRAINT_EXPR = `"encryptedValue" = '' OR "encryptedValue" LIKE 'enc:v2:%'`;
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describe('ApplicationRegistrationVariable encryption (integration)', () => {
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let dataSource: DataSource;
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let secretEncryption: SecretEncryptionService;
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let applicationRegistrationId: string;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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dataSource = global.testDataSource;
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secretEncryption = buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv();
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const createRegistrationResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
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query: gql`
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mutation CreateRegistrationForEncryptionTest(
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$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationInput!
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) {
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createApplicationRegistration(input: $input) {
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applicationRegistration {
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id
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}
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}
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}
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`,
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variables: {
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input: { name: 'enc-integration-test-registration' },
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},
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});
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const registrationId =
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createRegistrationResponse.body?.data?.createApplicationRegistration
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?.applicationRegistration?.id;
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if (!isDefined(registrationId)) {
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throw new Error(
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`createApplicationRegistration failed: ${JSON.stringify(
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createRegistrationResponse.body,
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)}`,
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);
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}
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applicationRegistrationId = registrationId;
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
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query: gql`
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mutation DeleteRegistrationForEncryptionTest($id: String!) {
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deleteApplicationRegistration(id: $id)
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}
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`,
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variables: { id: applicationRegistrationId },
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});
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});
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it('encrypts the value on the API write path, persists ciphertext in Postgres, and decrypts back via the API read path', async () => {
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const plaintext = 'this-is-a-v2-encrypted-secret-value';
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const createVariableResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
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query: gql`
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mutation CreateVariableForEncryptionTest(
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$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationVariableInput!
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) {
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createApplicationRegistrationVariable(input: $input) {
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id
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}
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}
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`,
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variables: {
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input: {
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applicationRegistrationId,
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key: 'TEST_V2_KEY',
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value: plaintext,
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isSecret: false,
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},
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},
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});
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expect(createVariableResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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const variableId =
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createVariableResponse.body.data.createApplicationRegistrationVariable.id;
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const [dbRow] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "encryptedValue" FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[variableId],
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);
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expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).not.toContain(plaintext);
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expect(
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dbRow.encryptedValue.startsWith(SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX),
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).toBe(true);
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expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).toMatch(V2_ENVELOPE_REGEX);
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const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
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query: gql`
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query FindVariablesForEncryptionTest(
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$applicationRegistrationId: String!
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) {
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findApplicationRegistrationVariables(
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applicationRegistrationId: $applicationRegistrationId
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) {
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id
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key
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value
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isSecret
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}
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}
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`,
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variables: { applicationRegistrationId },
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});
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expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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const variable =
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findResponse.body.data.findApplicationRegistrationVariables.find(
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(v: { id: string }) => v.id === variableId,
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);
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expect(variable).toBeDefined();
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expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(false);
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expect(variable.value).toBe(plaintext);
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});
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describe('legacy CTR fallback', () => {
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let legacyVariableId: string;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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await dataSource.query(
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`ALTER TABLE core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
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DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}"`,
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);
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await dataSource.query(
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`DELETE FROM core."applicationRegistrationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[legacyVariableId],
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);
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await dataSource.query(
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`ALTER TABLE core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
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ADD CONSTRAINT "${CONSTRAINT_NAME}" CHECK (${CONSTRAINT_EXPR})`,
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);
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});
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it('decrypts a legacy CTR-encrypted value through the live API', async () => {
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legacyVariableId = crypto.randomUUID();
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const plaintext = 'legacy-ctr-registration-variable-secret';
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await dataSource.query(
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`INSERT INTO core."applicationRegistrationVariable"
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(id, "applicationRegistrationId", "key", "encryptedValue",
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"isSecret", "isRequired")
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VALUES ($1, $2, 'TEST_LEGACY_CTR_KEY', $3, false, false)`,
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[
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legacyVariableId,
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applicationRegistrationId,
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secretEncryption.encrypt(plaintext),
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],
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);
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const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
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query: gql`
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query FindLegacyCtrVariablesForEncryptionTest(
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$applicationRegistrationId: String!
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) {
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findApplicationRegistrationVariables(
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applicationRegistrationId: $applicationRegistrationId
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) {
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id
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value
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isSecret
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}
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}
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`,
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variables: { applicationRegistrationId },
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});
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expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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const variable =
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findResponse.body.data.findApplicationRegistrationVariables.find(
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(v: { id: string }) => v.id === legacyVariableId,
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);
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expect(variable).toBeDefined();
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expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(false);
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expect(variable.value).toBe(plaintext);
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});
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});
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});
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