## Summary
Removes the `?token=` URL query-parameter fallback from JWT
authentication. Every authenticated route (`/graphql`, `/metadata`,
REST, etc.) used to accept a full workspace JWT in the URL alongside the
`Authorization` header. The fallback was intended for the REST API
Playground only, but it was wired into the global Passport JWT extractor
and applied to every route.
URL-borne tokens leak into:
- Server access logs (nginx / Apache / CDN / proxy / load balancer)
- Log aggregators (Datadog, CloudWatch, Loki, Sumo, …)
- Browser history (and synced across devices)
- `Referer` headers when navigating to external pages
- Browser extensions with `tabs`/`webNavigation` permissions
A leaked log line was equivalent to a leaked workspace credential for
the lifetime of the token.
## What changed
- **`jwt-wrapper.service.ts`** — `extractJwtFromRequest()` is now
header-only (`ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken()`). No URL
fallback anywhere in the system.
- **`open-api.service.ts` / `base-schema.utils.ts`** — Dropped the
`token?: string` plumbing that propagated the URL token into the schema
description. The "Authentication" section gains a "Never put your token
in a URL" warning. The "Usage with LLMs" section is rewritten to point
at the **Twenty MCP server** (header-authenticated, exposes typed tools
— the right tool for AI agents) instead of telling users to paste
tokenized OpenAPI URLs into Cursor/ChatGPT.
- **`RestPlayground.tsx`** — Now fetches the OpenAPI schema with
`Authorization: Bearer ${playgroundApiKey}` and passes the JSON document
to Scalar via `spec.content` instead of constructing a URL with
`?token=`. Aborts in-flight fetches on unmount/key change.
- **New integration test** — Asserts `?token=` is rejected on `/rest/*`,
`/graphql`, `/metadata`, and that `/rest/open-api/core?token=` returns
the unauthenticated base schema (no workspace object paths).
## Why not keep `?token=` scoped to the OpenAPI endpoint only
The first instinct was to narrow the fallback to just
`/rest/open-api/*`, since that endpoint is what the Scalar playground
component fetches. But the same log-leakage attack still applies to that
endpoint — the workspace JWT would still sit in access logs, just from
one URL pattern instead of all of them. The cleaner long-term fix is to
remove the URL pattern entirely and let the playground fetch with a
header (Scalar supports `spec.content` natively). For LLM agent use, the
MCP server is a strictly better path — typed tools, OAuth or
header-based API key auth, no tokens in URLs anywhere.
## Not affected
File downloads at `file-url.service.ts` also use `?token=` URLs but with
separate, short-lived `FILE`-typed tokens validated by
`file-by-id.guard.ts` directly (not via `extractJwtFromRequest`). That
mechanism is scoped per-file with limited TTL and is acceptable.
## Action required for users
Anyone who previously pasted `?token=` URLs into LLM tools, scripts,
bookmarks, or shared configs should rotate their workspace API keys.
Those tokens are likely captured in server logs / chat histories
somewhere.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` — clean
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-front` — clean
- [x] OpenAPI utils unit tests + snapshots — 11/11 pass
- [ ] Run the new integration test against a live server: `nx run
twenty-server:test:integration:with-db-reset` and verify
`url-token-auth-rejection.integration-spec.ts` passes
- [ ] Manually open Settings → Playground → REST, confirm the schema
loads (now via Bearer header instead of `?token=` URL)
- [ ] Manually verify `POST /metadata?token=<jwt>` (no Authorization
header) returns Forbidden, and the same request with the token in the
header returns the user
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
