## Summary
- Fixes a script injection vulnerability in the `claude-cross-repo`
job's `actions/github-script` step where `${{ steps.prompt.outputs.repo
}}` and `${{ steps.prompt.outputs.issue_number }}` were interpolated
directly into JavaScript string literals. A crafted dispatch payload
could inject arbitrary JavaScript with access to
`secrets.TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN`.
- Values are now passed via `env:` and accessed through `process.env`,
which treats them as data rather than code.
## Context
Motivated by the [hackerbot-claw
campaign](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/hackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation)
which exploited similar `${{ }}` expression injection patterns in
workflows at Microsoft, DataDog, and CNCF projects.
The broader analysis found that our workflow is **not vulnerable** to
the primary attack vector (Pwn Request via `pull_request_target` +
untrusted checkout), and `claude-code-action` already gates on write
access internally. This expression injection in the cross-repo dispatch
job was the only concrete vulnerability identified.
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify the `claude-cross-repo` job still posts comments back to
the source issue after a dispatch run
- [ ] Confirm `TARGET_REPO` and `TARGET_ISSUE` env vars are correctly
resolved from step outputs
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