## Summary
- Replaces all `depot-ubuntu-24.04` runners with `ubuntu-latest`
- Replaces all `depot-ubuntu-24.04-8` runners with
`ubuntu-latest-8-cores`
- Updates storybook build cache keys in ci-front.yaml to reflect the
runner name change
Reverts the temporary Depot migration introduced in #18163 / #18179
across all 23 workflow files.
The `repository_dispatch` API endpoint requires `contents: write`
permission on the GITHUB_TOKEN, not `actions: write`. Our security
hardening PR inadvertently changed this to `contents: read`, breaking
the self-dispatch to the keepalive workflow.
Made-with: Cursor
## Summary
- Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in composite actions
(`restore-cache`, `nx-affected`) and workflow files (`claude.yml`)
- Reduce overly broad permissions in `ci-utils.yaml` (Danger.js) and
`ci-breaking-changes.yaml`
- Restructure `preview-env-dispatch.yaml`: auto-trigger for members,
opt-in for contributor PRs via `preview-app` label (safe because
keepalive has no write tokens)
- Isolate all write-access operations (PR comments, cross-repo posting)
to a new dedicated
[`twentyhq/ci-privileged`](https://github.com/twentyhq/ci-privileged)
repo via `repository_dispatch`, so that workflows in twenty that execute
contributor code never have write tokens
- Create `post-ci-comments.yaml` (`workflow_run` bridge) to dispatch
breaking changes results to ci-privileged, solving the [fork PR comment
issue](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/13713#issuecomment-3168999083)
- Delete 5 unused secrets and broken `i18n-qa-report` workflow
- Remove `TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN` from twenty (moved to ci-privileged as
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`)
- Use `toJSON()` for all `client-payload` values to prevent JSON
injection
## Security model after this PR
| Workflow | Executes fork code? | Write tokens available? |
|----------|---------------------|------------------------|
| preview-env-keepalive | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| preview-env-dispatch | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN
only |
| ci-breaking-changes | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| post-ci-comments (workflow_run) | No (default branch) |
CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN only |
| claude.yml | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN,
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN |
| ci-utils (Danger.js) | No (base branch) | GITHUB_TOKEN (scoped) |
All actual write tokens (`TWENTY_PR_COMMENT_TOKEN`,
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`) live in `twentyhq/ci-privileged` with
strict CODEOWNERS review and branch protection.
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify preview environment comments still appear on member PRs
- [ ] Verify adding `preview-app` label triggers preview for contributor
PRs
- [ ] Verify breaking changes reports still post on PRs (including fork
PRs)
- [ ] Verify Claude cross-repo responses still post on core-team-issues
- [ ] Confirm ci-privileged branch protection is enforced
This is hard to test without merging PRs unfortunately
Goal of this PR is to replace the action I had introduced since there
was already a similar one in the codebase
