## Summary
Implements enterprise licensing and per-seat billing for self-hosted
environments, with Stripe as the single source of truth for subscription
data.
### Components
- **twenty-website** hosts the private key to sign `ENTERPRISE_KEY` and
`ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN`. It communicates with Stripe to emit the
daily `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` if the subscription is active, based
on the user's Stripe subscription ID stored in `ENTERPRISE_KEY`.
- **Stripe** is the single source of truth for subscription data
(status, seats, billing).
- **The client** (twenty-server + DB + workers) saves `ENTERPRISE_KEY`
in the `keyValuePair` table (or `.env` if
`IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED` is false) and the daily-renewed
`ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` in the `appToken` table.
`ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is verified client-side using a public key
to grant access to enterprise features (RLS, SSO, audit logs, etc.).
### Flow
1. When requesting an upgrade to an enterprise plan (from **Enterprise**
in settings), the user is shown a modal to choose monthly/yearly
billing, then redirected to Stripe to enter payment details. After
checkout, they land on twenty-website where they are exposed to their
`ENTERPRISE_KEY`, which they paste in the UI. It is saved in the
`keyValuePair` table. On activation, a first `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN`
with 30-day validity is stored in the `appToken` table.
2. **Every day**, a cron job runs and does two things:
- **Refreshes the validity token**: communicates with twenty-website to
get a new `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` with 30-day validity if the Stripe
subscription is still active. If the subscription is in cancellation,
the emitted token has a validity equal to the cancellation date. If it's
no longer valid, the token is not replaced. The cron only needs to run
every 30 days in practice, but runs daily so it's resilient to
occasional failures.
- **Reports seat count**: counts active (non-soft-deleted)
`UserWorkspace` entries and sends the count to twenty-website, which
updates the Stripe subscription quantity with proration. Seats are also
reported on first activation. If the subscription is canceled or
scheduled for cancellation, the seat update is skipped.
3. `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is verified server-side via a public key
to grant access to enterprise features.
### Key concepts
Three distinct checks are exposed as GraphQL fields on `Workspace`:
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `hasValidEnterpriseKey` | Has any valid enterprise key (signed JWT
**or** legacy plain string) |
| `hasValidSignedEnterpriseKey` | `ENTERPRISE_KEY` is a properly signed
JWT (billing portal makes sense) |
| `hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken` | `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is
present and not expired (expiration depends on signed token payload, not
on "expiresAt" on appToken table which is only indicative) |
Feature access is gated by `isValid()` =
`hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken || hasValidEnterpriseKey` (to support
both new and legacy keys during transition). After transition isValid()
= hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken
### Frontend states
The Enterprise settings page handles multiple states:
- **No key**: show "Get Enterprise" with checkout modal
- **Orphaned validity token** (token valid but no signed key): prompt
user to set a valid enterprise key
- **Active/trialing but no validity token**: show subscription status
with a "Reload validity token" action
- **Active/trialing**: show full subscription info, billing portal
access, cancel option
- **Cancellation scheduled**: show cancellation date, billing portal
- **Canceled**: show billing history link and option to start a new
subscription
- **Past due / Incomplete**: prompt to update payment or restart
### Temporary retro-compatibility: legacy plain-text keys
Previously, enterprise features were gated by a simple check: any
non-empty string in `ENTERPRISE_KEY` granted access. With this PR, we
transition to a controlled system relying on signed JWTs.
To avoid breaking existing self-hosted users:
- **Legacy plain-text keys still grant access** to enterprise features.
`hasValidEnterpriseKey` returns `true` for both signed JWTs and plain
strings, and `isValid()` checks `hasValidEnterpriseKey` as a fallback
when no validity token is present.
- **A deprecation banner** is shown at the top of the app when
`hasValidEnterpriseKey` is `true` but `hasValidSignedEnterpriseKey` is
`false`, informing the user that their key format is deprecated and they
should activate a new signed key.
- **No billing portal or subscription management** is available for
legacy keys since there is no Stripe subscription to manage.
This retro-compatibility will be removed in a future version. At that
point, `isValid()` will only check `hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken`.
### Edge cases
- **Air-gapped / production environments**: for self-hosted clients that
block external traffic (or for our own production), provide a long-lived
`ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` (e.g. 99 years) directly in the `appToken`
table, with no `ENTERPRISE_KEY`. The daily cron will skip the refresh
(no enterprise key to authenticate with), but the pre-seeded validity
token will be used to grant feature access. No billing or seat reporting
occurs in this mode.
- **`IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED` is false**: if the user tries to
activate an enterprise key but DB config writes are disabled, the
backend returns a clear error asking them to add `ENTERPRISE_KEY` to
their `.env` file manually.
- **Canceled subscriptions**: the `/seats` endpoint skips Stripe updates
for canceled or cancellation-scheduled subscriptions to avoid Stripe API
errors.
### How to test
- launch twenty-website on a different url (eg localhost:1002)
- add ENTERPRISE_API_URL=http://localhost:3002/api/enterprise (or else)
in your server .env
- ask me for twenty-website's .env file content (STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;
STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_MONTHLY_PRICE_ID;STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_YEARLY_PRICE_ID;
ENTERPRISE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY; ENTERPRISE_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY;
NEXT_PUBLIC_WEBSITE_URL)
- visit Admin panel / enterprise
This PR adds an explicit role selector to the "Invite by email" flow,
requires a role choice before sending, and stores the selected role with
each invitation. The backend now accepts and persists `roleId` on
invitations and applies it when the invite is accepted, while keeping it
optional to avoid breaking existing clients and legacy invites.
---
### Frontend
- **Settings → Members → Invite by email**
- New **Role** dropdown (same `Select` pattern as member/API key role
selectors) between the email input and Invite button.
- Roles are loaded via `SettingsRolesQueryEffect` and
`settingsAllRolesSelector`; only roles with `canBeAssignedToUsers` are
shown.
- Role is **required**: form validates `roleId` (e.g.
`z.string().min(1)`) and the Invite button is disabled until a role is
selected and emails are valid.
- `WorkspaceInviteTeam` receives `roles` as a prop from the parent;
layout is responsive (e.g. stacked on small viewports).
- **Pending invitations table**
- New **Role** column showing the invitation’s role label (or "Unknown
role" for legacy invites without `roleId`), using the same roles source
for lookup.
- **Onboarding invite step**
- When sending invites during onboarding, the workspace **default role**
is used when available (`currentWorkspace?.defaultRole?.id`), so no role
selector is added there.
- **GraphQL**
- `sendInvitations` mutation accepts optional `roleId`;
`findWorkspaceInvitations` and resend mutation responses include
`roleId` on `WorkspaceInvitation`. Frontend types (e.g.
`WorkspaceInvitation`, hook variables) updated accordingly.
---
### Backend
- **API**
- `SendInvitationsInput` has an **optional** `roleId` (UUID, nullable).
The resolver normalises `null` to `undefined` so existing callers and
legacy flows are not broken.
- **Validation (when `roleId` is provided)**
- Role checks are centralised in **RoleValidationService**
(`RoleValidationModule`, in `metadata-modules/role-validation/`). It
validates that the role exists in the workspace and has
`canBeAssignedToUsers`, and throws a permissions-style error otherwise.
This avoids circular dependencies (e.g. `RoleModule` imports
`UserWorkspaceModule`, so invite/accept flows cannot depend on
`RoleModule`).
- **Send flow:** `WorkspaceInvitationResolver` and
`WorkspaceInvitationService.sendInvitations` both call
`RoleValidationService.validateRoleAssignableToUsersOrThrow` when
`roleId` is present (resolver before calling the service; service again
before creating tokens so that **resend** also validates the stored role
and fails fast if the role was deleted or made unassignable).
- **Accept flow:**
`UserWorkspaceService.addUserToWorkspaceIfUserNotInWorkspace` uses the
same service in `resolveRoleIdForNewMember` when an invitation provides
a `roleId`, then falls back to `workspace.defaultRoleId` when not.
Role/default is resolved and validated before any user/workspace/member
creation.
- **Persistence**
- Invitation app tokens store `roleId` in `context` next to `email`
(`context: { email, roleId? }`). `generateInvitationToken` and
`createWorkspaceInvitation` accept an optional `roleId` and only add it
to `context` when defined.
- **Resend**
- Resend passes the existing invitation’s `context.roleId` into
`sendInvitations`. The service validates that role (when present) before
creating the new token, so if the role was deleted or made unassignable,
resend fails with a clear error instead of sending a broken link.
- **Response shape**
- `SendInvitationsOutput.result` remains `WorkspaceInvitation[]`. When
`usePersonalInvitation` is false we only push full invitation records
(from `castAppTokenToWorkspaceInvitationUtil`), so the result always
matches the GraphQL type (`id`, `email`, `roleId`, `expiresAt`).
- **Modules**
- `WorkspaceInvitationModule` and `UserWorkspaceModule` import
**RoleValidationModule** (not `RoleModule`) and inject
**RoleValidationService** for validation. `RoleModule` imports
`RoleValidationModule` and `RoleService` delegates to
`RoleValidationService` for the same validation where the module graph
allows.
---
### Backward compatibility
- **Optional `roleId`**: Clients that don’t send `roleId` (or send
`null`) are unchanged; invitations are created without a role and the
accept flow uses the workspace default role.
- **Legacy invitations**: App tokens with only `context.email` still
work; `context.roleId` is optional and the UI can show e.g. "Unknown
role" for those in the pending-invitations table.
## Summary
Follow-up to #18267. Hardens the OAuth implementation with security
fixes identified during audit:
**P0 — Critical:**
- Bind authorization codes to `client_id` in context to prevent auth
code injection (RFC 6749 §4.1.3)
- Store PKCE `code_challenge` directly in auth code context instead of a
separate `CodeChallenge` token — cryptographically binds the challenge
to its code
- Enforce `code_verifier` when `code_challenge` was used during
authorization
- Hash authorization codes (SHA-256) before storage to prevent exposure
if DB is compromised
- Add `Cache-Control: no-store` + `Pragma: no-cache` headers on token
responses (RFC 6749 §5.1)
- Add rate limiting on `/oauth/token` endpoint (20 req/min per client
via existing `ThrottlerService`)
**P1 — High:**
- Return HTTP 401 for `invalid_client` errors instead of 400 (RFC 6749
§5.2)
- Verify refresh tokens belong to the presenting client (cross-client
token theft prevention)
- Limit fields exposed by public `findApplicationRegistrationByClientId`
query to only what the frontend needs (`id`, `name`, `logoUrl`,
`websiteUrl`, `oAuthScopes`)
- Require `API_KEYS_AND_WEBHOOKS` permission for
`createApplicationRegistration` mutation
**P2/P3 — Medium/Low:**
- Add error handling and loading states to frontend Authorize page
- Rename redirect URL param from `authorizationCode` to `code` (RFC
standard)
- Add unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` utility (8 test cases)
## Test plan
- [ ] Existing OAuth integration tests updated for all changes (hashed
codes, context-based PKCE, client binding, 401 status codes, cache
headers)
- [ ] New test: auth code rejected when presented by a different client
- [ ] New test: refresh token rejected when presented by a different
client
- [ ] New test: `code_verifier` required when PKCE was used in
authorization
- [ ] New test: `Cache-Control: no-store` header present on responses
- [ ] New unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` (HTTPS, localhost,
fragments, invalid URIs)
- [ ] Verify frontend authorize page shows errors gracefully
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
Pg scan was redundant because historically the workspaceId was
`varchar`, even though below migration won't change that we had a look
to workspaceId col declaration across the codebase
### Solution
> After discussion with charles & weiko, we chose the long term
solution.
>
> Fix FE to request checkUserExists resolver with lowercased emails
> Add a decorator on User (and AppToken for invitation), to lowercase
email at user (appToken) creation. ⚠️ It works for TypeOrm .save method
only (there is no user email update in codebase, but in future it
could..)
> Add email lowercasing logic in external auth controller
> Fix FE to request sendInvitations resolver with lowercased emails
> Add migration command to lowercase all existing user emails and
invitation emails
> For other BE resolvers, we let them permissive. For example, if you
made a request on CheckUserExists resolver with uppercased email, you
will not found any user. We will not transform input before checking for
existence.
[link to comment
](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/12130#discussion_r2098062093)
### Test 🚧
- sign-in and up from main subdomain and workspace sub domain > Google
Auth (lowercased email) ✔️ | Microsoft Auth (uppercased email ✔️ &
lowercased email) | LoginPassword (uppercased email ✔️& lowercased
email✔️)
- invite flow with uppercased and lowercased ✔️
- migration command + sign-in ( former uppercased microsoft email ✔️) /
sign-up ( former uppercased invited email ✔️)
closes https://github.com/twentyhq/private-issues/issues/278, closes
https://github.com/twentyhq/private-issues/issues/275, closes
https://github.com/twentyhq/private-issues/issues/279
# Introduction
Added a no-explicit-any rule to the twenty-server, not applicable to
tests and integration tests folder
Related to https://github.com/twentyhq/core-team-issues/issues/975
Discussed with Charles
## In case of conflicts
Until this is approved I won't rebased and handle conflict, just need to
drop two latest commits and re run the scripts etc
## Legacy
We decided not to handle the existing lint error occurrences and
programmatically ignored them through a disable next line rule comment
## Open question
We might wanna activate the
[no-explicit-any](https://typescript-eslint.io/rules/no-explicit-any/)
`ignoreRestArgs` for our use case ?
```
ignoreRestArgs?: boolean;
```
---------
Co-authored-by: etiennejouan <jouan.etienne@gmail.com>
Fixes#9827
Also uncovered a conflict with `@objectType('Relation')` and
`@objectType('relation)`
I don't want to address it in this PR so I will create a followup issue
when we close this but I think there's a confusion between
Relation/RelationMetadata, it's unclear what is what
---------
Co-authored-by: Antoine Moreaux <moreaux.antoine@gmail.com>
Closestwentyhq/twenty#8240
This PR introduces email verification for non-Microsoft/Google Emails:
## Email Verification SignInUp Flow:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/740e9714-5413-4fd8-b02e-ace728ea47ef
The email verification link is sent as part of the
`SignInUpStep.EmailVerification`. The email verification token
validation is handled on a separate page (`AppPath.VerifyEmail`). A
verification email resend can be triggered from both pages.
## Email Verification Flow Screenshots (In Order):
## Sent Email Details (Subject & Template):
### Successful Email Verification Redirect:
### Unsuccessful Email Verification (invalid token, invalid email, token
expired, user does not exist, etc.):
### Force Sign In When Email Not Verified:
# TODOs:
## Sign Up Process
- [x] Introduce server-level environment variable
IS_EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED (defaults to false)
- [x] Ensure users joining an existing workspace through an invite are
not required to validate their email
- [x] Generate an email verification token
- [x] Store the token in appToken
- [x] Send email containing the verification link
- [x] Create new email template for email verification
- [x] Create a frontend page to handle verification requests
## Sign In Process
- [x] After verifying user credentials, check if user's email is
verified and prompt to to verify
- [x] Show an option to resend the verification email
## Database
- [x] Rename the `emailVerified` colum on `user` to to `isEmailVerified`
for consistency
## During Deployment
- [x] Run a script/sql query to set `isEmailVerified` to `true` for all
users with a Google/Microsoft email and all users that show an
indication of a valid subscription (e.g. linked credit card)
- I have created a draft migration file below that shows one possible
approach to implementing this change:
```typescript
import { MigrationInterface, QueryRunner } from 'typeorm';
export class UpdateEmailVerifiedForActiveUsers1733318043628
implements MigrationInterface
{
name = 'UpdateEmailVerifiedForActiveUsers1733318043628';
public async up(queryRunner: QueryRunner): Promise<void> {
await queryRunner.query(`
CREATE TABLE core."user_email_verified_backup" AS
SELECT id, email, "isEmailVerified"
FROM core."user"
WHERE "deletedAt" IS NULL;
`);
await queryRunner.query(`
-- Update isEmailVerified for users who have been part of workspaces with active subscriptions
UPDATE core."user" u
SET "isEmailVerified" = true
WHERE EXISTS (
-- Check if user has been part of a workspace through userWorkspace table
SELECT 1
FROM core."userWorkspace" uw
JOIN core."workspace" w ON uw."workspaceId" = w.id
WHERE uw."userId" = u.id
-- Check for valid subscription indicators
AND (
w."activationStatus" = 'ACTIVE'
-- Add any other subscription-related conditions here
)
)
AND u."deletedAt" IS NULL;
`);
}
public async down(queryRunner: QueryRunner): Promise<void> {
await queryRunner.query(`
UPDATE core."user" u
SET "isEmailVerified" = b."isEmailVerified"
FROM core."user_email_verified_backup" b
WHERE u.id = b.id;
`);
await queryRunner.query(`DROP TABLE core."user_email_verified_backup";`);
}
}
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Antoine Moreaux <moreaux.antoine@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com>
## What it does
### Backend
- [x] Add a mutation to create OIDC and SAML configuration
- [x] Add a mutation to delete an SSO config
- [x] Add a feature flag to toggle SSO
- [x] Add a mutation to activate/deactivate an SSO config
- [x] Add a mutation to delete an SSO config
- [x] Add strategy to use OIDC or SAML
- [ ] Improve error management
### Frontend
- [x] Add section "security" in settings
- [x] Add page to list SSO configurations
- [x] Add page and forms to create OIDC or SAML configuration
- [x] Add field to "connect with SSO" in the signin/signup process
- [x] Trigger auth when a user switch to a workspace with SSO enable
- [x] Add an option on the security page to activate/deactivate the
global invitation link
- [ ] Add new Icons for SSO Identity Providers (okta, Auth0, Azure,
Microsoft)
---------
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com>
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
From PR: #6626Resolves#6763Resolves#6055Resolves#6782
## GTK
I retain the 'Invite by link' feature to prevent any breaking changes.
We could make the invitation by link optional through an admin setting,
allowing users to rely solely on personal invitations.
## Todo
- [x] Add an expiration date to an invitation
- [x] Allow to renew an invitation to postpone the expiration date
- [x] Refresh the UI
- [x] Add the new personal token in the link sent to new user
- [x] Display an error if a user tries to use an expired invitation
- [x] Display an error if a user uses another mail than the one in the
invitation
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
In this PR:
1. Refactor guards to avoid duplicated queries: WorkspaceAuthGuard and
UserAuthGuard only check for existence of workspace and user in the
request without querying the database
The code removed in the PR was flagged as unused by the JetBrains
inspector.
I did a QA on the dev environment but other checks are highly
recommended.
There is one commit by scope to make the review easier.
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
# This PR
- Fix#5021
- Migrates `passwordResetToken` and `passwordResetTokenExpiresAt` fields
from `core.users` to `core.appToken`
- Marks those fields as `deprecated` so we can remove them later if we
are happy with the transition -- I took this decision on my own,
@FellipeMTX let me know what you think about it, we can also remove them
straight away if you think it's better
- Fixed the `database:migration` script from the `twenty-server` to:
```json
"database:migrate": {
"executor": "nx:run-commands",
"dependsOn": ["build"], // added this line
"options": {
"cwd": "packages/twenty-server",
"commands": [
"nx typeorm -- migration:run -d src/database/typeorm/metadata/metadata.datasource",
"nx typeorm -- migration:run -d src/database/typeorm/core/core.datasource"
],
"parallel": false
}
},
```
The migration script wasn't running because the builds were not executed
- [x] Added unit tests for the token.service file's changes
Looking forward to hearing feedback from you
cc: @charlesBochet
---------
Co-authored-by: Weiko <corentin@twenty.com>
Experiment using swc instead of tsc (as we did the switch on
twenty-front)
It's **much** faster (at least 5x) but has stricter requirements.
I fixed the build but there's still an error while starting the server,
opening this PR for discussion.
Checkout the branch and try `nx build:swc twenty-server`
Read: https://docs.nestjs.com/recipes/swc#common-pitfalls
We have recently discovered that we were using ID type in place of UUID
type in many place in the code.
We have merged #4895 but this introduced bugs as we forgot to replace it
everywhere
