## Summary
- **Module reorganization**: Moved `ApplicationUpgradeService` and cron
jobs to `application-upgrade/`, `ApplicationSyncService` to
`application-manifest/`, and
`runWorkspaceMigration`/`uninstallApplication` mutations to the manifest
resolver — each module now has a single clear responsibility.
- **Explicit install flow**: Removed implicit `ApplicationEntity`
creation from `ApplicationSyncService`. The install service and dev
resolver now explicitly create the `ApplicationEntity` before syncing.
npm packages are resolved at registration time to extract manifest
metadata (universalIdentifier, name, description, etc.), eliminating the
`reconcileUniversalIdentifier` hack.
- **Better error handling**: Frontend hooks now surface actual server
error messages in snackbars instead of swallowing them. Replaced the
ugly `ConfirmationModal` for transfer ownership with a proper form
modal. Fixed `SettingsAdminTableCard` row height overflow and corrected
the `yarn-engine` asset path.
## Test plan
- [ ] Register an npm package — verify manifest metadata (name,
description, universalIdentifier) is extracted correctly
- [ ] Install a registered npm app on a workspace — verify
ApplicationEntity is created and sync succeeds
- [ ] Test `app:dev` CLI flow — verify local app registration and sync
work
- [ ] Upload a tarball — verify registration and install flow
- [ ] Transfer ownership — verify the new modal UX works
- [ ] Verify error messages appear correctly in snackbars when
operations fail
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
## Summary
Follow-up to #18267. Hardens the OAuth implementation with security
fixes identified during audit:
**P0 — Critical:**
- Bind authorization codes to `client_id` in context to prevent auth
code injection (RFC 6749 §4.1.3)
- Store PKCE `code_challenge` directly in auth code context instead of a
separate `CodeChallenge` token — cryptographically binds the challenge
to its code
- Enforce `code_verifier` when `code_challenge` was used during
authorization
- Hash authorization codes (SHA-256) before storage to prevent exposure
if DB is compromised
- Add `Cache-Control: no-store` + `Pragma: no-cache` headers on token
responses (RFC 6749 §5.1)
- Add rate limiting on `/oauth/token` endpoint (20 req/min per client
via existing `ThrottlerService`)
**P1 — High:**
- Return HTTP 401 for `invalid_client` errors instead of 400 (RFC 6749
§5.2)
- Verify refresh tokens belong to the presenting client (cross-client
token theft prevention)
- Limit fields exposed by public `findApplicationRegistrationByClientId`
query to only what the frontend needs (`id`, `name`, `logoUrl`,
`websiteUrl`, `oAuthScopes`)
- Require `API_KEYS_AND_WEBHOOKS` permission for
`createApplicationRegistration` mutation
**P2/P3 — Medium/Low:**
- Add error handling and loading states to frontend Authorize page
- Rename redirect URL param from `authorizationCode` to `code` (RFC
standard)
- Add unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` utility (8 test cases)
## Test plan
- [ ] Existing OAuth integration tests updated for all changes (hashed
codes, context-based PKCE, client binding, 401 status codes, cache
headers)
- [ ] New test: auth code rejected when presented by a different client
- [ ] New test: refresh token rejected when presented by a different
client
- [ ] New test: `code_verifier` required when PKCE was used in
authorization
- [ ] New test: `Cache-Control: no-store` header present on responses
- [ ] New unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` (HTTPS, localhost,
fragments, invalid URIs)
- [ ] Verify frontend authorize page shows errors gracefully
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
