Harden GitHub Actions: fix injections, isolate privileged operations to ci-privileged repo (#18318)
## Summary - Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in composite actions (`restore-cache`, `nx-affected`) and workflow files (`claude.yml`) - Reduce overly broad permissions in `ci-utils.yaml` (Danger.js) and `ci-breaking-changes.yaml` - Restructure `preview-env-dispatch.yaml`: auto-trigger for members, opt-in for contributor PRs via `preview-app` label (safe because keepalive has no write tokens) - Isolate all write-access operations (PR comments, cross-repo posting) to a new dedicated [`twentyhq/ci-privileged`](https://github.com/twentyhq/ci-privileged) repo via `repository_dispatch`, so that workflows in twenty that execute contributor code never have write tokens - Create `post-ci-comments.yaml` (`workflow_run` bridge) to dispatch breaking changes results to ci-privileged, solving the [fork PR comment issue](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/13713#issuecomment-3168999083) - Delete 5 unused secrets and broken `i18n-qa-report` workflow - Remove `TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN` from twenty (moved to ci-privileged as `CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`) - Use `toJSON()` for all `client-payload` values to prevent JSON injection ## Security model after this PR | Workflow | Executes fork code? | Write tokens available? | |----------|---------------------|------------------------| | preview-env-keepalive | Yes | None (contents: read only) | | preview-env-dispatch | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN only | | ci-breaking-changes | Yes | None (contents: read only) | | post-ci-comments (workflow_run) | No (default branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN only | | claude.yml | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN | | ci-utils (Danger.js) | No (base branch) | GITHUB_TOKEN (scoped) | All actual write tokens (`TWENTY_PR_COMMENT_TOKEN`, `CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`) live in `twentyhq/ci-privileged` with strict CODEOWNERS review and branch protection. ## Test plan - [ ] Verify preview environment comments still appear on member PRs - [ ] Verify adding `preview-app` label triggers preview for contributor PRs - [ ] Verify breaking changes reports still post on PRs (including fork PRs) - [ ] Verify Claude cross-repo responses still post on core-team-issues - [ ] Confirm ci-privileged branch protection is enforced
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@@ -19,4 +19,10 @@ runs:
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uses: nrwl/nx-set-shas@v4
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- name: Run affected command
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shell: bash
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run: npx nx affected --nxBail --configuration=${{ inputs.configuration }} -t=${{ inputs.tasks }} --parallel=${{ inputs.parallel }} --exclude='*,!tag:${{ inputs.tag }}' ${{ inputs.args }}
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env:
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NX_CONFIGURATION: ${{ inputs.configuration }}
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NX_TASKS: ${{ inputs.tasks }}
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NX_PARALLEL: ${{ inputs.parallel }}
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NX_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
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NX_ARGS: ${{ inputs.args }}
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run: npx nx affected --nxBail --configuration="$NX_CONFIGURATION" -t="$NX_TASKS" --parallel="$NX_PARALLEL" --exclude="*,!tag:$NX_TAG" $NX_ARGS
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@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ runs:
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- name: Cache primary key builder
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id: cache-primary-key-builder
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shell: bash
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env:
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CACHE_KEY: ${{ inputs.key }}
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REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
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run: |
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echo "CACHE_PRIMARY_KEY_PREFIX=v4-${{ inputs.key }}-${{ github.ref_name }}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
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echo "CACHE_PRIMARY_KEY_PREFIX=v4-${CACHE_KEY}-${REF_NAME}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
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- name: Restore cache
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uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
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id: restore-cache
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