* fix: harden API token handling against rate-limit tampering and plaintext logging - Make `allowed_rate_limit` read-only on APITokenSerializer so users can no longer raise their own API token rate limit via PATCH (GHSA-xfgr-2x3f-g2cf). - Stop persisting API keys in plaintext in APITokenLogMiddleware: store a SHA-256 hash as the token identifier and redact sensitive request headers (X-Api-Key, Authorization, Cookie) before logging (GHSA-r5p8-cj3q-38cc). * refactor: remove MongoDB log sink and add per-log-type retention Logs are now written to and cleared from PostgreSQL only; MongoDB is no longer used as a log sink or archive. - Drop the MongoDB write/archival paths from the API request logger, the webhook log writer, and the cleanup tasks; Postgres is the sole sink. - Cleanup tasks now hard-delete expired rows in batches via `all_objects` (rows are removed immediately, not soft-deleted). - Add env-backed, per-log-type retention settings: API activity logs (API_ACTIVITY_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), webhook logs (WEBHOOK_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 14), email logs (EMAIL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, default 7). HARD_DELETE_AFTER_DAYS no longer drives any log cleanup. - Delete settings/mongo.py, remove MONGO_DB_* settings and the plane.mongo loggers, and drop the pymongo dependency. * chore: gitignore local advisories.md notes file * fix: use keyed HMAC-SHA256 for API token log identifier Address CodeQL "weak hashing of sensitive data" by hashing the API key with a SECRET_KEY-keyed HMAC instead of a bare SHA-256. The identifier is a non-reversible tokenization of a high-entropy key (not password storage); keying it also prevents precomputing the digest from a known key value. * chore: address review feedback on log cleanup and request logging - process_logs accepts extra kwargs so jobs enqueued by an older release (with a mongo_log arg) don't fail during a rolling deploy. - Log-cleanup batch delete failures are logged and skipped rather than aborting the run, so a single bad batch can't block the rest. - Extend logger middleware test to assert Authorization and Cookie headers are redacted; add a test that a failing cleanup batch is swallowed. * fix: fall back to default when a log retention env value is invalid Negative (or unparseable) retention values would compute a future cutoff and delete every log row. The retention settings now fall back to their defaults in that case via a shared `_retention_days` helper.
164 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
164 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
# Copyright (c) 2023-present Plane Software, Inc. and contributors
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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# See the LICENSE file for details.
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# Python imports
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import logging
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import time
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# Django imports
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.http import HttpRequest
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# Third party imports
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from rest_framework.request import Request
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# Module imports
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from plane.utils.ip_address import get_client_ip
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from plane.utils.exception_logger import log_exception
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from plane.bgtasks.logger_task import process_logs
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api_logger = logging.getLogger("plane.api.request")
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class RequestLoggerMiddleware:
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def __init__(self, get_response):
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self.get_response = get_response
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def _should_log_route(self, request: Request | HttpRequest) -> bool:
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"""
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Determines whether a route should be logged based on the request and status code.
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"""
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# Don't log health checks
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if request.path == "/" and request.method == "GET":
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return False
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return True
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def __call__(self, request):
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# get the start time
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start_time = time.time()
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# Get the response
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response = self.get_response(request)
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# calculate the duration
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duration = time.time() - start_time
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# Check if logging is required
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log_true = self._should_log_route(request=request)
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# If logging is not required, return the response
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if not log_true:
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return response
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user_id = (
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request.user.id if getattr(request, "user") and getattr(request.user, "is_authenticated", False) else None
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)
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user_agent = request.META.get("HTTP_USER_AGENT", "")
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# Log the request information
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api_logger.info(
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f"{request.method} {request.get_full_path()} {response.status_code}",
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extra={
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"path": request.path,
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"method": request.method,
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"status_code": response.status_code,
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"duration_ms": int(duration * 1000),
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"remote_addr": get_client_ip(request),
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"user_agent": user_agent,
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"user_id": user_id,
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},
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)
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# return the response
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return response
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class APITokenLogMiddleware:
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"""
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Middleware to log External API requests to PostgreSQL.
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"""
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def __init__(self, get_response):
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self.get_response = get_response
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def __call__(self, request):
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request_body = request.body
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response = self.get_response(request)
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self.process_request(request, response, request_body)
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return response
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def _safe_decode_body(self, content):
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"""
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Safely decodes request/response body content, handling binary data.
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Returns None if content is None, or a string representation of the content.
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"""
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# If the content is None, return None
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if content is None:
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return None
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# If the content is an empty bytes object, return None
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if content == b"":
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return None
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# Check if content is binary by looking for common binary file signatures
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if content.startswith(b"\x89PNG") or content.startswith(b"\xff\xd8\xff") or content.startswith(b"%PDF"):
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return "[Binary Content]"
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try:
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return content.decode("utf-8")
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except UnicodeDecodeError:
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return "[Could not decode content]"
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# Headers whose values must never be persisted in plaintext logs
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SENSITIVE_HEADERS = frozenset({"x-api-key", "authorization", "cookie"})
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def _redacted_headers(self, request):
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"""
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Returns the request headers as a string with sensitive values redacted,
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so that credentials such as the API key are never stored in plaintext.
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"""
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redacted = {
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key: ("[REDACTED]" if key.lower() in self.SENSITIVE_HEADERS else value)
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for key, value in request.headers.items()
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}
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return str(redacted)
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def process_request(self, request, response, request_body):
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api_key_header = "X-Api-Key"
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api_key = request.headers.get(api_key_header)
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# If the API key is not present, return
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if not api_key:
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return
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try:
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log_data = {
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# Tokenize the (high-entropy) API key into a stable, non-reversible
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# identifier so logs can be correlated to a token without ever
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# persisting the raw key. A keyed HMAC is used rather than a bare
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# hash so the digest cannot be precomputed from a known key value.
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"token_identifier": hmac.new(
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settings.SECRET_KEY.encode(), api_key.encode(), hashlib.sha256
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).hexdigest(),
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"path": request.path,
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"method": request.method,
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"query_params": request.META.get("QUERY_STRING", ""),
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"headers": self._redacted_headers(request),
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"body": self._safe_decode_body(request_body) if request_body else None,
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"response_body": self._safe_decode_body(response.content) if response.content else None,
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"response_code": response.status_code,
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"ip_address": get_client_ip(request=request),
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"user_agent": request.META.get("HTTP_USER_AGENT", None),
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}
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process_logs.delay(log_data=log_data)
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except Exception as e:
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log_exception(e)
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return None
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