Files
calendar/packages/features/oauth/services/OAuthService.ts
T
Lauris SkraucisGitHubDevin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
c321a6c07a feat: owner can test non accepted OAuth client (#27525)
* refactor: combine exchange and refresh into token endpoint

* refactor: controller error handling

* refactor: use snake_case

* refactor: use snake_case

* refactor: use snake case

* refactor: token endpoint accepts application/x-www-form-urlencoded

* refactor: token endpoint accepts application/x-www-form-urlencoded

* refactor: flat token response data

* refactor: error structure

* refactor: client_id in the body

* fix: address Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints

- Fix getClient endpoint to use proper REST API error format instead of OAuth token error format (confidence 9/10)
- Add missing space after comma in error format string in token.input.pipe.ts (confidence 9/10)
- Support both camelCase and snake_case inputs in authorize endpoint for backward compatibility (confidence 10/10)
- Restore legacy /exchange and /refresh endpoints alongside new /token endpoint for backward compatibility (confidence 10/10)
- Add OAuth2TokensResponseDto for legacy endpoint wrapped responses
- Add OAuth2LegacyExchangeInput and OAuth2LegacyRefreshInput for legacy endpoints

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* fix: address additional Cubic AI feedback on OAuth2 endpoints

- Log errors when status code >= 500 in handleClientError (confidence 9/10)
- Add Cache-Control: no-store and Pragma: no-cache headers to legacy /exchange and /refresh endpoints (confidence 9/10)

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* docs

* Revert "fix: address additional Cubic AI feedback on OAuth2 endpoints"

This reverts commit 39cc4aa3ebb9e59a171541d7010398425995ed89.

* Revert "fix: address Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints"

This reverts commit 97bf593186db04c0859f9ca30950c9e3e524019d.

* docs

* fix: address Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints

- Fix getClient to use handleClientError instead of handleTokenError (confidence 10)
- Restore legacy /exchange and /refresh endpoints for backward compatibility (confidence 9)
- Fix RFC 6749 error format: use human-readable messages in error_description (confidence 9)
- Fix errorDescription in OAuthService to use OAUTH_ERROR_REASONS mapping (confidence 9)

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* fix: address additional Cubic AI feedback on OAuth2 endpoints

- Fix security issue: Replace 'CALENDSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set' with generic 'Internal server configuration error' message (confidence 10/10)
- Fix backward compatibility: Create OAuth2LegacyTokensDto with camelCase properties for legacy /exchange and /refresh endpoints (confidence 9/10)
- Skipped: RFC 6749 error field issue (confidence 8/10, below threshold)

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* e2e

* Revert "fix: address additional Cubic AI feedback on OAuth2 endpoints"

This reverts commit a080e93f07aaf5a7dcf81fe605012cb7ebcdc192.

* Revert "fix: address Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints"

This reverts commit 04986a16c981521ca97069152457bf521a9ee45f.

* fix: re-apply Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints

- Restore OAuth2LegacyExchangeInput and OAuth2LegacyRefreshInput classes
- Restore legacy /exchange and /refresh endpoints in OAuth2Controller
- Restore OAuth2LegacyTokensDto and OAuth2TokensResponseDto classes
- Restore OAUTH_ERROR_DESCRIPTIONS mapping in oauth2-error.service.ts
- Restore OAUTH_ERROR_REASONS lookup in OAuthService.ts mapErrorToOAuthError
- Fix encryption_key_missing error to not expose internal env var name

Addresses Cubic AI feedback with confidence >= 9/10:
- Comment 32 (9/10): Legacy endpoints and input classes
- Comment 34 (9/10): Error description mapping in OAuthService
- Comment 35 (10/10): OAUTH_ERROR_DESCRIPTIONS in error service

Skipped (confidence < 9/10):
- Comment 33 (8/10): getClient handleTokenError vs handleClientError

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* Revert "fix: re-apply Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 endpoints"

This reverts commit 416bef9c931d9a7ed78c65a70a3425550d61b151.

* delete unused file

* fix: e2e tests

* address cubic review

* fix: address Cubic AI review feedback on OAuth2 exception filter

- Fix header case sensitivity: use lowercase 'x-request-id' instead of 'X-Request-Id' since Express lowercases all request headers
- Redact request body in error logs to prevent exposing sensitive OAuth2 credentials like client_secret, password, and refresh_token

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* docs: api v2 oauth controller docs

* chore: remove authorize endpoint

* feat: owner can test non accepted OAuth client

* fix: remove sensitive data from OAuth2 exception logs

Remove Authorization header and userEmail from error logs in
OAuth2HttpExceptionFilter to avoid logging sensitive information.

Addresses Cubic AI review feedback (confidence 9/10).

Co-Authored-By: unknown <>

* fix: e2e

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-19 08:11:46 -03:00

516 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import process from "node:process";
import type { TeamRepository } from "@calcom/features/ee/teams/repositories/TeamRepository";
import type { AccessCodeRepository } from "@calcom/features/oauth/repositories/AccessCodeRepository";
import type { OAuthClientRepository } from "@calcom/features/oauth/repositories/OAuthClientRepository";
import { generateSecret } from "@calcom/features/oauth/utils/generateSecret";
import { ErrorCode } from "@calcom/lib/errorCodes";
import { ErrorWithCode } from "@calcom/lib/errors";
import { verifyCodeChallenge } from "@calcom/lib/pkce";
import type { AccessScope, OAuthClientType } from "@calcom/prisma/enums";
import { OAuthClientStatus } from "@calcom/prisma/enums";
import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";
export interface OAuth2Client {
clientId: string;
redirectUri: string;
name: string;
logo: string | null;
isTrusted: boolean;
clientType: OAuthClientType;
}
export interface OAuth2Tokens {
accessToken: string;
tokenType: string;
refreshToken: string;
expiresIn: number;
}
export interface AuthorizeResult {
redirectUrl: string;
authorizationCode: string;
client: OAuth2Client;
}
export interface OAuthError {
error: string;
errorDescription?: string;
}
interface DecodedRefreshToken {
userId?: number | null;
teamId?: number | null;
scope: AccessScope[];
token_type: string;
clientId: string;
codeChallenge?: string | null;
codeChallengeMethod?: string | null;
}
export class OAuthService {
private readonly accessCodeRepository: AccessCodeRepository;
private readonly teamsRepository: TeamRepository;
private readonly oAuthClientRepository: OAuthClientRepository;
constructor(
private readonly deps: {
oAuthClientRepository: OAuthClientRepository;
accessCodeRepository: AccessCodeRepository;
teamsRepository: TeamRepository;
}
) {
this.accessCodeRepository = deps.accessCodeRepository;
this.teamsRepository = deps.teamsRepository;
this.oAuthClientRepository = deps.oAuthClientRepository;
}
async getClient(clientId: string): Promise<OAuth2Client> {
const client = await this.oAuthClientRepository.findByClientId(clientId);
if (!client) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.NotFound, "unauthorized_client", { reason: "client_not_found" });
}
return {
clientId: client.clientId,
redirectUri: client.redirectUri,
name: client.name,
logo: client.logo,
isTrusted: client.isTrusted,
clientType: client.clientType,
};
}
async getClientForAuthorization(
clientId: string,
redirectUri: string,
loggedInUserId?: number
): Promise<OAuth2Client> {
const client = await this.oAuthClientRepository.findByClientId(clientId);
if (!client) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.NotFound, "unauthorized_client", { reason: "client_not_found" });
}
this.validateRedirectUri(client.redirectUri, redirectUri);
this.ensureClientAccessAllowed(client, loggedInUserId);
return {
clientId: client.clientId,
redirectUri: client.redirectUri,
name: client.name,
logo: client.logo,
isTrusted: client.isTrusted,
clientType: client.clientType,
};
}
async generateAuthorizationCode(
clientId: string,
loggedInUserId: number,
redirectUri: string,
scopes: AccessScope[],
state?: string,
teamSlug?: string,
codeChallenge?: string,
codeChallengeMethod?: string
): Promise<AuthorizeResult> {
const client = await this.oAuthClientRepository.findByClientId(clientId);
if (!client) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "unauthorized_client", { reason: "client_not_found" });
}
this.ensureClientAccessAllowed(client, loggedInUserId);
// RFC 6749 4.1.2.1: Redirect URI mismatch on Auth step is 'invalid_request'
this.validateRedirectUri(client.redirectUri, redirectUri);
if (client.clientType === "PUBLIC") {
if (!codeChallenge) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_request", { reason: "pkce_required" });
}
if (!codeChallengeMethod || codeChallengeMethod !== "S256") {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_request", {
reason: "invalid_code_challenge_method",
});
}
} else if (client.clientType === "CONFIDENTIAL") {
if (codeChallenge && (!codeChallengeMethod || codeChallengeMethod !== "S256")) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_request", {
reason: "invalid_code_challenge_method",
});
}
}
let teamId: number | undefined;
if (teamSlug) {
const team = await this.teamsRepository.findTeamBySlugWithAdminRole(teamSlug, loggedInUserId);
if (!team) {
// Specific OAuth error for user denying or failing permission
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "access_denied", {
reason: "team_not_found_or_no_access",
});
}
teamId = team.id;
}
const authorizationCode = this.generateAuthorizationCodeString();
await this.accessCodeRepository.create({
code: authorizationCode,
clientId,
userId: teamSlug ? undefined : loggedInUserId,
teamId,
scopes,
codeChallenge,
codeChallengeMethod,
});
const redirectUrl = this.buildRedirectUrl(redirectUri, {
code: authorizationCode,
state,
});
return { redirectUrl, authorizationCode, client };
}
private ensureClientAccessAllowed(
client: { status: OAuthClientStatus; userId: number | null },
loggedInUserId?: number | null
): void {
if (client.status === OAuthClientStatus.REJECTED) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "unauthorized_client", {
reason: "client_rejected",
});
}
const isOwner = loggedInUserId != null && loggedInUserId === client.userId;
if (!isOwner) {
this.ensureClientIsApproved(client);
}
}
private ensureClientIsApproved(client: { status: OAuthClientStatus }): void {
if (client.status !== OAuthClientStatus.APPROVED) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "unauthorized_client", {
reason: "client_not_approved",
});
}
}
private validateRedirectUri(registeredUri: string, providedUri: string): void {
if (providedUri !== registeredUri) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_request", { reason: "redirect_uri_mismatch" });
}
}
buildRedirectUrl(baseUrl: string, params: Record<string, string | undefined>): string {
const url = new URL(baseUrl);
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
if (value !== undefined) {
url.searchParams.set(key, value);
}
}
return url.toString();
}
buildErrorRedirectUrl(redirectUri: string, error: unknown, state?: string): string {
const oauthError = this.mapErrorToOAuthError(error);
return this.buildRedirectUrl(redirectUri, {
error: oauthError.error,
error_description: oauthError.errorDescription,
state,
});
}
private mapErrorToOAuthError(error: unknown): OAuthError {
const validOAuthErrors = [
"invalid_request",
"unauthorized_client",
"access_denied",
"unsupported_response_type",
"invalid_scope",
"server_error",
"temporarily_unavailable",
"invalid_client",
"invalid_grant",
];
if (error instanceof ErrorWithCode) {
if (validOAuthErrors.includes(error.message)) {
return {
error: error.message,
errorDescription: (error.data?.reason as string | undefined) ?? error.message,
};
}
switch (error.code) {
case ErrorCode.BadRequest:
return {
error: "invalid_request",
errorDescription: (error.data?.reason as string | undefined) ?? error.message,
};
case ErrorCode.Unauthorized:
return {
error: "unauthorized_client",
errorDescription: (error.data?.reason as string | undefined) ?? error.message,
};
default:
return {
error: "server_error",
errorDescription: (error.data?.reason as string | undefined) ?? error.message,
};
}
}
return {
error: "server_error",
errorDescription: "An unexpected error occurred",
};
}
async exchangeCodeForTokens(
clientId: string,
code: string,
clientSecret?: string,
redirectUri?: string,
codeVerifier?: string
): Promise<OAuth2Tokens> {
const client = await this.oAuthClientRepository.findByClientIdWithSecret(clientId);
if (!client) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "invalid_client", { reason: "client_not_found" });
}
// RFC 6749 5.2: Redirect URI mismatch during Token exchange is 'invalid_grant'
if (redirectUri && client.redirectUri !== redirectUri) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_grant", { reason: "redirect_uri_mismatch" });
}
if (!this.validateClient(client, clientSecret)) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "invalid_client", {
reason: "invalid_client_credentials",
});
}
const accessCode = await this.accessCodeRepository.findValidCode(code, clientId);
await this.accessCodeRepository.deleteExpiredAndUsedCodes(code, clientId);
if (!accessCode) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_grant", { reason: "code_invalid_or_expired" });
}
this.ensureClientAccessAllowed(client, accessCode.userId);
const pkceError = this.verifyPKCE(client, accessCode, codeVerifier);
if (pkceError) {
// RFC 7636 4.4.1: If verification fails, return 'invalid_grant'
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, pkceError.error, { reason: pkceError.reason });
}
const tokens = this.createTokens({
clientId,
userId: accessCode.userId,
teamId: accessCode.teamId,
scopes: accessCode.scopes,
codeChallenge: accessCode.codeChallenge,
codeChallengeMethod: accessCode.codeChallengeMethod,
});
return tokens;
}
async refreshAccessToken(
clientId: string,
refreshToken: string,
clientSecret?: string
): Promise<OAuth2Tokens> {
const client = await this.oAuthClientRepository.findByClientIdWithSecret(clientId);
if (!client) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "invalid_client", { reason: "client_not_found" });
}
if (!this.validateClient(client, clientSecret)) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.Unauthorized, "invalid_client", {
reason: "invalid_client_credentials",
});
}
const decodedToken = this.verifyRefreshToken(refreshToken);
if (!decodedToken || decodedToken.token_type !== "Refresh Token") {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_grant", { reason: "invalid_refresh_token" });
}
if (decodedToken.clientId !== clientId) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.BadRequest, "invalid_grant", { reason: "client_id_mismatch" });
}
this.ensureClientAccessAllowed(client, decodedToken.userId);
const tokens = this.createTokens({
clientId,
userId: decodedToken.userId,
teamId: decodedToken.teamId,
scopes: decodedToken.scope,
});
return tokens;
}
private validateClient(
client: { clientType: string; clientSecret?: string | null },
clientSecret?: string
): boolean {
if (client.clientType === "CONFIDENTIAL") {
if (!clientSecret) return false;
const [hashedSecret] = generateSecret(clientSecret);
if (client.clientSecret !== hashedSecret) return false;
}
return true;
}
private verifyPKCE(
client: { clientType: string },
source: { codeChallenge?: string | null; codeChallengeMethod?: string | null },
codeVerifier?: string
): {
error: "invalid_request" | "invalid_grant";
reason: "pkce_missing_parameters_or_invalid_method" | "pkce_verification_failed";
} | null {
const shouldEnforcePKCE =
client.clientType === "PUBLIC" || (client.clientType === "CONFIDENTIAL" && source.codeChallenge);
if (!shouldEnforcePKCE) return null;
const method = source.codeChallengeMethod || "S256";
// Structural missing params
if (!source.codeChallenge || !codeVerifier || method !== "S256") {
return { error: "invalid_request", reason: "pkce_missing_parameters_or_invalid_method" };
}
// Logical mismatch
if (!verifyCodeChallenge(codeVerifier, source.codeChallenge, method)) {
return { error: "invalid_grant", reason: "pkce_verification_failed" };
}
return null;
}
private generateAuthorizationCodeString(): string {
const randomBytesValue = randomBytes(40);
return randomBytesValue.toString("base64").replace(/=/g, "").replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_");
}
private createTokens(input: {
clientId: string;
userId?: number | null;
teamId?: number | null;
scopes: AccessScope[];
codeChallenge?: string | null;
codeChallengeMethod?: string | null;
}): OAuth2Tokens {
const secretKey = process.env.CALENDSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
if (!secretKey) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.InternalServerError, "server_error", {
reason: "encryption_key_missing",
});
}
const accessTokenPayload = {
userId: input.userId,
teamId: input.teamId,
scope: input.scopes,
token_type: "Access Token",
clientId: input.clientId,
};
const refreshTokenPayload = {
userId: input.userId,
teamId: input.teamId,
scope: input.scopes,
token_type: "Refresh Token",
clientId: input.clientId,
...(input.codeChallenge && {
codeChallenge: input.codeChallenge,
codeChallengeMethod: input.codeChallengeMethod,
}),
};
const accessTokenExpiresIn = 1800; // 30 minutes
const accessToken = jwt.sign(accessTokenPayload, secretKey, {
expiresIn: accessTokenExpiresIn,
});
const refreshToken = jwt.sign(refreshTokenPayload, secretKey, {
expiresIn: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60, // 30 days
});
return {
accessToken,
tokenType: "bearer",
refreshToken,
expiresIn: accessTokenExpiresIn,
};
}
private verifyRefreshToken(refreshToken: string): DecodedRefreshToken | null {
const secretKey = process.env.CALENDSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
if (!secretKey) {
throw new ErrorWithCode(ErrorCode.InternalServerError, "server_error", {
reason: "encryption_key_missing",
});
}
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(refreshToken, secretKey) as DecodedRefreshToken;
return decoded;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
}
export type OAuthErrorReason =
| "client_not_found"
| "client_not_approved"
| "client_rejected"
| "redirect_uri_mismatch"
| "pkce_required"
| "invalid_code_challenge_method"
| "team_not_found_or_no_access"
| "access_denied"
| "invalid_client_credentials"
| "code_invalid_or_expired"
| "pkce_missing_parameters_or_invalid_method"
| "pkce_verification_failed"
| "invalid_refresh_token"
| "client_id_mismatch"
| "encryption_key_missing";
// Mapping of OAuth error reasons to descriptive messages, keeping previous messages for compatibility
export const OAUTH_ERROR_REASONS: Record<OAuthErrorReason, string> = {
client_not_found: "OAuth client with ID not found",
client_not_approved: "OAuth client is not approved",
client_rejected: "OAuth client has been rejected",
redirect_uri_mismatch: "redirect_uri does not match OAuth client's redirect URI",
pkce_required: "code_challenge required for public clients",
invalid_code_challenge_method: "code_challenge_method must be S256",
team_not_found_or_no_access: "Team not found or user is not an admin/owner",
access_denied: "The resource owner or authorization server denied the request.",
invalid_client_credentials: "invalid_client",
code_invalid_or_expired: "invalid_grant",
pkce_missing_parameters_or_invalid_method: "invalid_request",
pkce_verification_failed: "invalid_grant",
invalid_refresh_token: "invalid_grant",
client_id_mismatch: "invalid_grant",
encryption_key_missing: "CALENDSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set",
};