* Improve error handling in ratelimit * Update route.ts * Update route.ts * Update route.ts * address feedback
105 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
105 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { defaultResponderForAppDir } from "app/api/defaultResponderForAppDir";
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import { parseRequestData } from "app/api/parseRequestData";
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import { cookies } from "next/headers";
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import type { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { validPassword } from "@calcom/features/auth/lib/validPassword";
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import { hashPassword } from "@calcom/lib/auth/hashPassword";
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import { checkRateLimitAndThrowError } from "@calcom/lib/checkRateLimitAndThrowError";
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import getIP from "@calcom/lib/getIP";
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import { piiHasher } from "@calcom/lib/server/PiiHasher";
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import prisma from "@calcom/prisma";
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import { IdentityProvider } from "@calcom/prisma/enums";
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const passwordResetRequestSchema = z.object({
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csrfToken: z.string(),
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password: z.string().refine(validPassword, () => ({
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message: "Password does not meet the requirements",
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})),
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requestId: z.string(), // format doesn't matter.
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});
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async function handler(req: NextRequest) {
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const body = await parseRequestData(req);
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const {
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password: rawPassword,
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requestId: rawRequestId,
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csrfToken: submittedToken,
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} = passwordResetRequestSchema.parse(body);
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const cookieStore = await cookies();
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const cookieToken = cookieStore.get("calcom.csrf_token")?.value;
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if (submittedToken !== cookieToken) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid CSRF token" }, { status: 403 });
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}
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// token verified, delete the cookie / a resubmit on failure requires a new csrf token.
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cookieStore.delete("calcom.csrf_token");
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const remoteIp = getIP(req);
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await checkRateLimitAndThrowError({
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rateLimitingType: "core",
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identifier: `api:reset-password:${piiHasher.hash(remoteIp)}`,
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});
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// Note: There is a low, very low chance that a password request stays valid long enough
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// to brute force 3.8126967e+40 options, but rate limiting provides additional protection.
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const maybeRequest = await prisma.resetPasswordRequest.findFirstOrThrow({
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where: {
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id: rawRequestId,
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expires: {
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gt: new Date(),
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},
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},
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select: {
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email: true,
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},
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});
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const hashedPassword = await hashPassword(rawPassword);
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// this can fail if a password request has been made for an email that has since changed or-
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// never existed within Cal. In this case we do not want to disclose the email's existence.
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// instead, we just return 404
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try {
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await prisma.user.update({
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where: {
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email: maybeRequest.email,
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},
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data: {
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password: {
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upsert: {
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create: { hash: hashedPassword },
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update: { hash: hashedPassword },
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},
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},
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emailVerified: new Date(),
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identityProvider: IdentityProvider.CAL,
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identityProviderId: null,
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},
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});
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} catch (e) {
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return NextResponse.json({}, { status: 404 });
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}
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await expireResetPasswordRequest(rawRequestId);
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return NextResponse.json({ message: "Password reset." }, { status: 201 });
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}
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async function expireResetPasswordRequest(rawRequestId: string) {
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await prisma.resetPasswordRequest.update({
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where: {
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id: rawRequestId,
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},
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data: {
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// We set the expiry to now to invalidate the request
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expires: new Date(),
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},
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});
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}
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export const POST = defaultResponderForAppDir(handler);
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